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ეკონომიკური სანქციები როგორც პოლიტიკის ინსტრუმენტი, რუსეთ-საქართველოსა და ინდოეთ-ნეპალის ქეისების მიხედვით
Date Issued
2017
Author(s)
Advisor(s)
Institution
Abstract
The present paper – „Economic sanctions as a tool of politics, according to Russian-Georgian and Indian-Nepalese cases” is about the issue of economic sanctions and in particular, using economic power for political purposes. Besides reviewing the literature concerning the effectiveness/ineffectiveness of sanctions, the main focus will be on the comparative analysis of Russian-Georgian and Indian-Nepalese cases. The choice of these specific cases is due to the nature of the theory that should be tested in the research. Specifically, the purpose of the given thesis is to test Daniel W. Drezner’s so called conflict expectation model which asserts that the higher the expectation of the conflict between the sender and the target, the more likely the sanctions are to end ineffectively and even the less the chance that target concedes completely.
Consequently, since both of the above mentioned cases ended up with absolutely contradictory results (In the Russian-Georgian case sanctions did not work, though in Indian-Nepalese case it worked completely) while there was high expectation of conflict between sender and the target in each case the research question is as follows: why did the sanctions work in one case and not in the other when the political price of compliance was very high as it was related to the issues of state security, independence and sovereignty for both targets? A hypothesis is developed which asserts that Nepal’s specific geographical location, unlike Georgia, made it impossible for Nepal to withstand the impact of Indian sanctions. By analyzing Georgia’s and Nepal’s responsive efforts towards imposed sanctions, bearing in mind their pure geographical location, is shown those factors which led to a different results in terms of sanctions effectiveness.
Consequently, since both of the above mentioned cases ended up with absolutely contradictory results (In the Russian-Georgian case sanctions did not work, though in Indian-Nepalese case it worked completely) while there was high expectation of conflict between sender and the target in each case the research question is as follows: why did the sanctions work in one case and not in the other when the political price of compliance was very high as it was related to the issues of state security, independence and sovereignty for both targets? A hypothesis is developed which asserts that Nepal’s specific geographical location, unlike Georgia, made it impossible for Nepal to withstand the impact of Indian sanctions. By analyzing Georgia’s and Nepal’s responsive efforts towards imposed sanctions, bearing in mind their pure geographical location, is shown those factors which led to a different results in terms of sanctions effectiveness.
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MA Thesis.xvedeliZe(1).pdf
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ეკონომიკური სანქციები როგორც პოლიტიკის ინსტრუმენტი, რუსეთ-საქართველოსა და ინდოეთ-ნეპალის ქეისების მიხედვით
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1.44 MB
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Adobe PDF
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(MD5):5dfd3079821650b2728040d64816bab0