NATO’s Defense and Deterrence Policy on its Eastern Flank in the Wake of Ukraine Crisis

The European security has been considerably challenged by the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its continuing intervention in Eastern Ukraine. Russian aggression towards Ukraine especially strengthened fears and concerns among NATO’s Eastern Allies, namely, the Baltic States and Poland about Vladimir Putin’s future intentions due to the following factors: geographical proximity, long-term historical relationships, tensed by the Soviet invasion and domination during the Communist era, relatively low military capabilities, energy dependence on Russia and having a large amount of Russian minorities.
Conventional as well as non-conventional threats posed by Russia made the Baltic States and Poland prompt calls for strengthened NATO presence on their territory. Considering the concerns of the Eastern Allies, NATO, to some extent, strengthened its defense and deterrence posture on its Eastern flank. But the Allies do not have common approach to what extent the Eastern Allies are vulnerable to the Russian threat, to what degree NATO should strengthen its defense and deterrence on its Eastern flank and what kind of relations should be pursued with Russia. The Ukraine Crisis turned out to be a crucial point and kind of litmus test for transatlantic relations as it revealed deep divisions among Allies which, consequently, hampered their efforts to elaborate coherent defense and deterrence policy on NATO’s Eastern border.
Accordingly, the thesis aims to explore the reasons for NATO’s inability to pursue coherent defense and deterrence policy on the Alliance’s Eastern flank in the wake of Ukraine Crisis. Main finding of the research is that the Allies’ different perceptions of security threats and their divergent views regarding the formation of policy towards Russia restrained NATO from elaborating coherent defense and deterrence policy on its Eastern flank.