ეკონომიკური სანქციის, როგორც ეკონომიკური დილომატიის ინსტრუმენტის ეფექტიანობა

The objective of the thesis is to analyze the factors that influence the efficiency of the economic diplomacy. The study is based on a wide range of literature reviews. The methodology used includes: discourse analysis, content analysis and analysis of statistical data.
The The purpose of this paper is to examin the sanctions imposed by the United States and the United nations from 2003 untill 2016 to persuade North Korea to discontinue its nuclear weapon programs and reverse to Non Proliferation Treaty. The hypothesis is formatted as follows: In the years of 2003- 2016, negative economic sanctions of the United States and the United Nations against North Korea, in terms of nuclear restructuring, was inefficient because: a) a high expectation rate of conflict between the initiator and the target and b) the low economic cost of the target. The hypothesis is discussed in the theoretical context of conflict expectation model.
On the basis of data analysis, it is confirmed that in the given period, due to the imposition of sanctions, low marginal economic cost of North Korea and the high level of expected confrontation with the United States caused the inefficiency of economic sanctions in terms of stopping the nuclear program. Furthermore, the third factor of the inefficiency of economic sanctions is the inadequate mechanism of enforcement.