

Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University

Mariam Tsitsikashvili

Smart power and its constraints: case of Russia's smart power in
Georgia

Master of Eurasian and Caucasus Studies

The Master's Thesis has been Written for Receiving Academic degree of Master
in Social Sciences

Supervisor: Associate professor

Dr. Pikria Asanishvili

Tbilisi 2019

Abstract

Smart power has become especially important in a world that is changing at a historically unprecedented pace and that has resulted in changing nature of national as well as international power. Traditionally smart power has been explored in the context of the US foreign policy making, despite the fact that other states also opted for smart power strategies. The thesis tries to fill to this gap and empirically study effects and constraints of smart power on the case of Russia's foreign policy vis-à-vis Georgia that during the past years implied both soft and hard power instruments. The thesis tries to answer the following question: *Why Russia has shifted its policy from clearly hard power centered to more softened smart power policy in Georgia and how this shift has effected on Georgia's European and Euro-Atlantic foreign policy choice?*

In doing so, the thesis uses case study as a main research method, where Russia's foreign policy documents and statements of the relevant public officials are duly examined in order to analyze how hard and soft power instruments have been incorporated in Russia's policy towards Georgia. On the other hand, the thesis explores public statements of Georgian officials, foreign policy and security strategic documents in order to assess the trends in Georgia's foreign policy making and behavior vis-à-vis Russia and the West. The thesis looks at the public attitudes towards Georgia's declared foreign policy goal as well as Russia and analyzes trends in those regards. Russia's soft power is measured by the discourses of Orthodox church and mainstream media outlets in Georgia.

The thesis hypothesis suggests that *Russia's overreliance on hard power instruments have undermined effectiveness of Russia's smart power to effectively reverse Georgia's European and Euro-Atlantic foreign policy choice.* Despite the fact that the research proves that Russia's hard power tools decreased the efficacy of overall Russia's smart power to change Georgia's foreign policy priorities on policy level, the thesis also identifies some changing trends in public attitudes of Georgians ultimately indicating that Russia's soft power has effected on public opinion to some extent.

Contents

Abstract	2
1. Introduction.....	4
1.1 Methods, collection and analysis of data.....	7
1.2 Scientific and practical implications of the study.....	7
2. Smart Power – Concept and Theory Review.....	8
2.1. Hard power	9
2.2 Soft power	12
2.3 Smart power theory.....	17
“Near Abroad” in Russia’s foreign policy	20
3. Russia’s foreign policy towards Georgia: aim, objectives and instruments.....	23
Georgia’s western ambitions and Russia’s hard power tools as counter-measures	24
4. Shift from hard power centered policy to softer smart power	38
5. Russia soft power toolkit in Georgia	39
6. Orthodox Church of Georgia – images of Russia and the West	42
7. Mainstream media discourse about Russia and the West	44
8. Russia’s soft power – constraints and effects	46
9. Merging theory and case	49
10. Conclusion.....	51
Bibliography.....	53

1. Introduction

The concept of power has always been central to International Relations. The discussions about power from Thucydides to the present day have been striving to find sophisticated conceptual frameworks, but still the concept represents one of the most troublesome in the field of international relations (Gilpin, 1981). One of the prevalent definitions that enjoys widespread acceptability was suggested by Robert A. Dahl - *'A' causing (or having the ability to cause) B to do something that B otherwise would not do.*

Traditionally, states opted for hard power tools in the framework of realpolitik thinking, where military power represented main instrument for the pursuit of one's interest. The nuclear revolution was one of the push factors that decreased the role of war, particularly among major powers as the cost of war has become too big. Later technological development resulted in the information revolution has also transformed the nature of the power. In global information age, the power is no longer limited to tangible material resources. Therefore, nowadays "success is the result not merely of whose army wins but also of whose story wins" (Nye, 2004, 162).

Soft power and its corollary smart power were first introduced by Joseph Nye and both emerged as a focus for understanding US foreign policymaking. The debate has further expanded on the nature of international and national power. According to Joseph Nye there are several ways of exercising the power: coercion or sticks (hard power), payments or carrots (hard power), attraction or persuasion (soft power). According to Nye, soft power is the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through attraction and its instruments are not limited to, but include: culture, values, policies and other non-coercive measures. Based on his engagement with the soft power, later Nye introduced a smart power concept that basically means the ability to combine hard and soft power resources into effective strategies (Nye, 2004). Thus, in

the twenty-first century when talking about power, scholarly and public debates on foreign affairs generally differentiate among the following three powers: hard, soft and smart power.

However, a mere combination of soft and hard power cannot result in desired outcomes. Much has been written and discussed about what makes smart power smart and effective. Still, the relationship between the two components of smart power, hard and soft power, is complicated, complex and interactive: the two are neither perfect substitutes nor are they perfect complements. However, these scholarly debates largely lack empirical testing and examination of cases that would illustrate peculiarities of interrelationship between soft and hard power that eventually form smart power strategies. In addition, traditionally, smart power has largely been discussed in the context of US foreign policy making and behavior, despite the fact that smart power strategies have been also employed by other states, including by Russia.

Russia that is willing to pose as a great power in the international arena has also tried to incorporate soft and smart tools in its foreign policy. Russia's alleged meddling in the US presidential elections or the Kremlin's increased attempts to influence foreign audiences through diverse dissemination channels have attracted policy-makers' attention across Euro-Atlantic space. Hence, apart from scholarly interest into the matter, the use of hard and soft power means has become a great focus for policy-makers as well.

The thesis focuses on examining Russia's foreign policy and its instruments vis-à-vis Georgia. Russia's policy towards post-Soviet countries that is perceived by Moscow as its own "sphere of influence" became more influence-seeking during President Putin's second term. This period also coincides with the so called velvet revolutions in Russia's perceived "near abroad" that was taken by Russia as an indication to its weakening position vis-à-vis its former allies. Since then Russia has directed its soft and hard power instruments in order to ensure its solid presence and influence over these countries. The same happened in case of Georgia that became one of the very first targets of Russia smart power tools (i.e. hard and soft). Russia's primary goal in Georgia (as well as in other post-Soviet countries) have always been to bring

Georgia back into its sphere of influence and, therefore, not to allow Georgia to become a member of either NATO or the EU. To this end, Russia has specific objectives, such as: a) to undermine popular support among Georgians for the EU and NATO; b) to increase popular support among Georgians for Russia; c) to have at least non-anti-Russia government in Tbilisi. Overall, Russia has never changed its policy goal towards Georgia; however, Moscow did modify the means of fulfilling its own interests. If Russia was employing hard military instruments in Georgia during 1990s and early 2000s, the concept of soft power has gained a substantial place in the country's 2013 foreign policy concept, which, in practice, was converted into an extensive use of its soft power assets against Georgia. Therefore, the thesis tries to explore reasons of Russia's shift from hard power dominated policy to softening its smart power and thereafter, to look into the effects of this policy shift on Georgia's European and Euro-Atlantic foreign policy choice.

The aim of this paper is to explore a complex relationship between the soft and hard power instruments and to explore the effects and constraints of smart power tools as foreign policy instruments. The paper takes Russia's foreign policy towards Georgia as a case study and forms thesis main research question as follows: *Why Russia has shifted its policy from clearly hard power centered to more softened smart power policy in Georgia and how this shift has effected on Georgia's European and Euro-Atlantic foreign policy choice?*

The thesis hypothesis proposes that *Russia's overreliance on hard power instruments have undermined effectiveness of Russia's smart power to effectively reverse Georgia's European and Euro-Atlantic foreign policy choice.* According to the hypothesis, Georgia's European and Euro-Atlantic foreign policy choice is the dependent variable, while Russia's hard and soft power tools are independent variables. The thesis takes into consideration intervening variables as well, such as the US, NATO and EU soft power instruments in Georgia that indirectly also contribute to the (in)effectiveness of Russia's smart power instruments in Georgia.

The thesis reviews Russia's foreign policy documents and statements of the relevant public officials in order to analyze how hard and soft power instruments have been incorporated in Russia's policy towards Georgia. While operationalizing Russia's hard power instruments the thesis analyzes coercive and tangible power resources that Russia has deployed in Georgia, such as 2008 military invasion and 2006 economic embargo; in case of soft power instruments, the thesis operationalizes them by analyzing Russia's image and attitudes towards Russia in popular discourses of Orthodox Church of Georgia and mainstream media discourses. In order to operationalize dependent variable, the thesis analyzes Georgia's strategic documents such as foreign policy concept, security concept and strategic defense reviews as well as public statement and dominant narratives of Georgia's public officials, such as President, Prime-minister and Foreign Affairs Minister.

1.1 Methods, collection and analysis of data

The thesis relies on a single case study approach and tries to enrich understanding of the smart power processes and its effects based on in-depth and detailed examination of Russia policy towards Georgia. In order to study effects of Russia's smart power in Georgia, the thesis uses qualitative research methods, namely discourse analysis (DA) by which policy documents, public statement of relevant officials both in Russia and Georgia will be analyzed. Moreover, the study entails analysis of public opinion polls in order to illustrate effects of Russia's smart power instruments on Georgian public.

1.2 Scientific and practical implications of the study

The study tries to contribute to a larger aim of the thesis that is to enrich smart power studies and illustrate peculiarities of smart power. Smart power and the assumptions that are developed by the scholars remain to be mainly tested in the context of the US policy-making. Expanding the research on other cases and testing the theory assumptions will shed light on the different aspects of smart power and the interrelationship between soft and hard power.


In addition, the thesis has practical implication as long as in-depth and detailed exploration of the case would also encourage policy-makers to understand the essence of the smart power and ways of its effective use.

2. Smart Power – Concept and Theory Review

The hypothesis is explained with the smart power theory and the effects of Russia's soft and hard power instruments are analyzed based on the theory assumptions that the scholars of smart power studies have developed.


“Smart power is neither hard nor soft. It is both.” (Nye, 2004, xiii). This is the simplest definition of smart power proposed by the author of this concept – Joseph Nye. Smart power as well as other power related concepts usually attract as many supporters as critics. Over time, Joseph Nye's smart power has also been largely discussed in academia and the interest enhances not only among scholars, but also policy-makers who face a new reality in the global information age where tangible material resources or traditional means of hard power are not ultimate prerequisites for getting desired outcomes in international affairs.

The idea of smart power suggests that a foreign policy based on combined use of both hard and soft power is able to get better results than one that relies exclusively on one or another. Smart power means developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve one's objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power. Smart power was introduced by Nye as a response to criticism and misperception about soft power that has been wrongly understood as power that alone could produce effective policy outcomes (Nye, 2009, 161). Before going into details of what smart power theory and its assumption entail, it's necessary first to conceptualize the two indispensable components of smart power – soft and hard power.




2.1. *Hard power*

Traditionally Realist vision of power that dominated the field for many times has been equated to hard power. Hard power thus was understood as a box of material and tangible resources that states used to influence others in the international system. Usually hard power has been measured by such criteria as population size, territory, natural resources, military force, and social stability (Nye and Armitage, 2007).



Gilpin defines power in terms of capabilities such as military, economic and technological (Gilpin, 1981). His definition also relies mostly on tangible assets that determines a country's capacity to use force in pursuit of its goals. David C. Gompert and Hans Binnendijk propose rather narrow understanding of hard power. Under this concept, they mainly incorporate military and tangible resources: "hard power is the use of physical military means to force enemy regimes to change their ways or to change those regimes." (Gompert and Binnendijk, 2016, 5). All the other forms of non-military but coercive measures of power are included into the concept of power to coerce (P2C) by the authors. While majority of scholars differentiate

between soft and hard power based on the following two criteria: tangibility and the aim of using these power (coercion or persuasion), Gompert and Binnendijk put coercive instruments, other than military resources, altogether into the concept of *power to coerce*. According to them, the instruments under the concept of power to coerce include: economic sanctions, punitive political measures, cyber operations, covert intelligence operations, military aid, propaganda, the constriction or manipulation of trade, the interdiction of goods and people and support for political measures (Gompert and Binnendijk, 2016).



For Joseph Nye hard power can be used to get others change their position through inducements (carrots) and threats (sticks). (Nye, 2008). He also incorporates a country’s military and economic might into hard power assets, but at the same time Nye does not exclude the possibility for military and economic resources to be used to attract others.

	Hard	Soft
Spectrum of Behavior	Command Coercion Inducement	Co-opt Agenda-setting Attraction
Most Likely Resources	Force Payments Sanctions Bribes	Institutions Values Culture Policies

Table 1. Source: Joseph Nye, "Soft power: means to success in world politics", 2004.

Nye defines power both in terms of the nature of behavior as well the tangibility of the resources. He defines hard power as command power that is the use of either coercion or inducements. According to him, the most likely resources for hard power are as follows: force and sanctions (direct coercion) and payment and bribes (inducement). (Nye, 2004).

Steven Rothman criticizes dichotomous approach towards power. He argues that different types of actions or behaviors are softer or harder depending on their location on the continuous diagram of power that he elaborated.

Dichotomous	Hard power (command) Coercion Inducement		Soft power (co-opt) Agenda-setting Attraction	
Continuous	Harder powers ← → Softer powers			
Resources	Military	Economic	Institutional	Rhetoric/success

Table 2. Source: Rothman, Steven. (2011). Revising the soft power concept: what are the means and mechanisms of soft power. *Journal of Political Power*. 51.

He identifies extreme poles of power, where left most ideal type is hardest form of power in which case the actor wielding the power reduces the payoff of all but two choices of the target to zero (Rothman, 2011). Disregarding Rothman's attempts not to conceptualize power only into two extreme poles and instead to develop a spectrum of power forms on a relative basis

for softness and hardness, he in a way agrees with the aforementioned scholars in case of defining ideal types of power, i.e. hard and soft. Like others, he also argues that the basic attribute associated with hard power is physical coercion and the ability to physically manipulate another actor is the most common way of using hard power to change behavior of another actor (Rothman, 2011). In terms of resources, Rothman identifies military and economic forms of powers. According to him, military resources create limited choices for the target country and herein, he brings the examples of Bush's policy towards Iraq and Melian dialogue of Thucydides. As he suggests in both cases, the nation wielding power limited opponent's choice either to surrender or to get physically routed. He also identified economic forms of power that can be used as either sanctions or rewards (Rothman, 2011).


To summarize, hard or command power is the oldest form of power that is connected to the idea of anarchic international system and its conceptualization was largely developed by Realist school of International Relation. Hard power thus is an ability to reach one's goal through coercion or inducement and it is mostly measures by tangible resources or assets that country can physically possess.

2.2 Soft power

Unlike hard power, soft power is quite a new concept and the theory assumptions that are based on this concept are also relatively new. However, some roots of soft power can be traced to Lukes and Isaac back to 1970s. Steven Lukes has developed an idea of three dimensional power. Among those power, Lukes distinguishes third face of power that represents the ability of an actor A to get B to do something B would not otherwise do through affecting B's preferences, desires or thoughts (Lukes, 1974). Conversely, the third face of power described how power could manipulate by changing what the target countries or audiences want. On the other hand, Isaac's idea of structural power and Nye's idea of co-optation go hand in hand as they both postulate that influence can be acquired if an actor is able to mold the preferences and interests of other actors so as to converge closer to its own preferences and interests (Isaac,

1987,34). In another example, one could trace the roots of soft power in Carr's writings when he equated divided powers into three categories: military power, economic power, and power over opinion (Carr, 1946). Military and economic powers are obviously the attributes of hard power, while the power over opinion could be viewed as the variant of Nye's soft power.

According to Nye, who has first introduced the concept, soft power is the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through attraction. Soft power uses different type of currency (not force, not money) to engender cooperation – an attraction to shared values and justness and contributing to the achievement of those values. As Nye suggests, “the soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad) and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).” (Nye, 2004, 11).



For Nye, culture is the set of values and practices that create meaning for a society. In this regard, the author also distinguishes two types of culture: high culture (such as literature, art and education, that appeals to elites) and popular culture (which focuses on mass entertainment). Both are resources of soft power. Nye also suggests that if a country's culture includes universal values and if its policies promote values and interests that others share, it may increase the probability of obtaining desired outcomes (Nye, 2004). With regards to political values and foreign policies, the author assumes that if these two appear to be hypocritical, arrogant, indifferent to the opinion of others and is based on a narrow approach of national interests it can in fact undermine one's soft power. In all of the resources, the legitimacy component is

key. As Nye suggests on the example of the USA: “if a people or nation believes American objectives to be legitimate, we are more likely to persuade them to follow our lead without using threats and bribes. Legitimacy can also reduce opposition to—and the costs of—using hard power when the situation demands. Appealing to others’ values, interests, and preferences can, in certain circumstances, replace the dependence on carrots and sticks.”. (Nye and Armitage, 2007, 6).

Guilio Gallarotti’s definition of soft power suggests that this power derives from a more intangible and enlightened source: a positive image in world affairs that makes a nation attractive to other nations (Gallarotti, 2015). He lists the domestic and international sources of soft power, that largely coincide with Nye’s approach but includes more detailed information (See the table below).

Table 3. Foundations of soft power.

International Sources	Domestic Sources
Respect for international laws, norms, and institutions	Culture
	* Pronounced Social Cohesion
	* Elevated Quality of Life
Fundamental reliance on multilateralism, and disposition against excessive unilateralism	* Freedom
	* Sufficient Opportunities
	* Tolerance
Respect for international treaties and alliance commitments	* Alluring Lifestyle
	* Cultural Status (religious, racial, ethnic)
Willingness to sacrifice short-run national interests in order to contribute toward the collective good	Political Institutions
	* Democracy
	* Constitutionalism
	* Liberalism/Pluralism
Liberal foreign economic policies	* Well Functioning Government Bureaucracy

According to Gallarotti, soft power conditions target nations to voluntarily do what soft power nations would like them to do, hence it has capacity to create a greater harmony of interests. As visible from the table, both domestic and international sources of soft power according to

Gallarotti, reflect an emphasis on policies and actions that exude an orientation of justice, collective concern, and rules of fair play. In this respect we clearly see pervasive principles of political liberalism at work in both sources.

As mentioned above, Rothman criticizes traditional approach of defining soft and hard power concepts, he suggests that it's more useful to develop a spectrum of continues power rather than to strictly distinguish among two powers. In this respect, Rothman proposes two resources of the soft power, namely agenda-setting (institutional control) and framing (rhetoric). Agenda-setting power does not entail the forceful manipulation of another actor and hence, it is not as hard as military force. In Rothman's opinion, framing and rhetoric are the closest resources to the ideal type soft power. He discusses two types of framing: normative and analytical. "Normative framing consists of identifying an issue at a moral and emotional level, suggesting that attending the issue is the *right thing to do*, while analytical framing involves the creation of a causal story, arranging and connecting the causes and consequences uniquely." (Rothman, 2011, 54). Rothman does not limit his discussion on the power resources and provides in-depth exploration of the mechanisms of soft power influence that according to him, basically happens in two ways: norm diffusion and discourse dominance. Norm diffusion entails copying of successful policies or the diffusion of common practices. States can also influence others through altering the dominant discourse by using symbols and rhetoric provided through traditional and new media outlets. Despite specific differences from Nye's approach, Rothman agrees that harder power is not always successful in achieving the most desired outcomes and hence its's important to employ softer power resources.

David C. Gompert and Hans Binnendijk define soft power as institutions, and incorporate such instruments as diplomacy, economic assistance, democracy promotion, cultural exchanges, propagation of ideas into the toolkit of soft power. However, they propose that power to coerce that is more like a combination of both hard and soft power tools are more likely to help states and leaders to achieve their desired goals. "Unlike soft power, P2C could obviate the need to

use force under the right conditions, or is at least worth attempting prior to a decision to use force”. (Gompert and Binnendijk, 2016, 5). However, the power to coerce is not the same as so-called smart power, which encompasses both hard and soft power and is meant to convey the idea that knowing when to apply which is the key to success. Nye’s construct would subsume what Gompert and Binnendijk call the power to coerce under hard power, as the goal of this power is to coerce opponents rather than to attract.

Rob de Wijk examines the limits of military power (hard power) in US policy-making and illustrates cases how unsuccessful reliance on military resources can be. He suggests that a significant component of the new war—one that has been historically successful for both allies and adversaries of the United States—is the campaign to win the support of the populace of the opponent. In other words, the United States and its allies must also wage a battle for the hearts and minds of the people, in this case, in the Islamic world. This effort—using several approaches, including humanitarian aid and propaganda—must be made along with diplomatic measures and military operations (Wijk, 2001).

The concept of soft power and theories based on the concept have also attracted many critics. Among them is David W. Kern who develops a hard conceptual core of soft power and presents several important theoretical criticisms and limitations for practical policy. According to him, “the concept seems highly dependent on a context of interdependent, rule-governed interactions between states that share fundamental goals and values” (Kern, 2011, 81). Because soft power works through the interests and preferences of states, its effects are indirect, and often only materialize over the long run. Moreover, Kern criticizes soft power due to its applicability solely to western countries. He suggests that outside of the realm of shared norms and values, where countervailing forces such as culture, religion, and ethno-nationalism are strong, soft power is far less likely to be relevant, except in the extreme long term (Kern, 2011).

2.3 Smart power theory

The concept of smart power and its corollary theory was introduced by Nye as a response to criticism towards soft power. Nye suggests that soft power is not the solution to all problems and that the best foreign policy strategies should be able to combine resources of both hard and soft power into smart-power strategies, that requires what he calls “contextual intelligence” (Nye, 2009,161). The Contextual intelligence is the intuitive diagnostic skill that helps policymakers align tactics with objectives to create smart strategies. Nye argues that the military power is small part of any response to the new threats and while discussing smart power in the context of US foreign policy, he proposes that though the US military might be supreme in the global commons of air, sea and space, it is much less able to control for example nationalist populations in occupied areas. That is why, Nye promotes his idea that the US should develop an overarching policy that would smoothly incorporate both soft and hard power tools for strengthening of one another and for increasing the US influence worldwide and in particular target countries (Nye, 2009).

Guilio Gallarotti, Per Jansson and others have further elaborated the theoretical assumptions about smart power and tried to develop several prescriptions how to combine soft and hard power instruments into smart power strategies.

Per Jansson in his article “Smartness as prudence: smart power and classical realism” highlights the connection between current policy-oriented understandings of smart power and key elements of classical realism. By doing so, he tries to bring theoretical depth to the concept and reinterpretation of the idea of smart power. He argues that the concept of smart power as the successful combination of soft and hard elements goes dangerously close to truism. That is why he develops the theory further and brings the concept of prudence into discussion. Jansson criticizes emphasis on the technical aspect of policy-making by giving prominence to the skills of (instrumental) combination and instead, suggests that core of smart power is the faculty of fully grasping circumstances, the complexity of the situation at hand and to discern

what is called for in terms of action. According to him, smartness as prudence suggests the understanding that a purely coercive, “push” strategy sometimes may be the right choice just as a purely co-opting, “pull” approach may be preferable in other situation and that a combination along the continuum in between may be the prudent course (Jansson, 2018).

Different to Jansson, Ernest Wilson suggest that smart power should become a national security imperative. He defines smart power as one’s capacity to combine elements of hard and soft power in ways that are mutually reinforcing such that the actors’ purposes are advanced effectively and efficiently. However, he agrees with Janson on the issue that emphasis on technical combination of hard and soft power do not constitute to smart power. He proposes that combining hard and soft power effectively means recognizing their interrelationships as well as their distinctiveness. These influences can flow in both directions, for example hard power can and typically does amplify soft power (Wilson, 2008). But Wilson largely misses examination of circumstances of how hard and soft power can influence one another.

Guilio Gallarotti has substantially contributed to smart power theory with the detailed examination of relationships between soft and hard power. He has also developed several prescriptions for decision-makers to value and effectively use smart power strategies in their foreign policies. Thus Gallarotti’s work includes both scientific and practical implication.

The thesis also takes Gallarotti’s approach to different between hard and soft power. According to him, the principle difference between hard and soft power can therefore be understood thus: hard power coerces compliance principally through reliance on tangible material resources – more direct methods (either through their symbolic or actual use); while soft power cultivates it through policies, qualities, and actions that make nations attractive to other nations – more indirect and non-coercive methods (Gallarotti, 2015). Most importantly, Gallarotti tries to analyze what is the interrelationship between hard and soft power and in what circumstance do they reinforce or weaken one another. The author assumes that the two components of smart power are neither perfect substitutes nor are they perfect complements.

For example, even though the possession of hard power itself can make a nation a role model in a variety of ways (large military arsenals and successful military strategies can generate significant soft power by enhancing respect and admiration), but at the same time, hard power can also be used in such manner that undermine respect and admiration. Gallarotti also brings practical examples of the latter. The use of hard power resources in fact diminish the hard power position of a nation when military atrocities stiffen resistance in a manner that weakens aggressor nation as the victims may either grow to hate the aggressor. But at the same time. The use of aggressive military force can generate a positive image with nations who are benefiting from such an initiative, for example, liberating Kuwait and protecting Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War (Gallarotti, 2015). Gallarotti also goes in line with Nye's and Jansson's argument and states that ultimately, as interconnected as the two sources of power are and thus share many qualities, the real differentiation of power is in the context of its use.

Gallarotti has further contributed to the theory development and based on Nye's contribution he coined the concept of cosmopolitan power by which he challenged the dominant vision of power espoused by Realism. He argues that when the world is in flux, hard power alone is insufficient to effectively acquire influence in the world system and he proposes that theory of cosmopolitan power is one of the solution to this challenge. The theory creates a balance among the sub-sources of power: hard, soft and smart power. He identified the following three signatures of cosmopolitan power: soft empowerment (the need to raise a nation's influence through the increased use of soft power), hard disempowerment (avoiding the dangers of overreliance on hard power, which carries self-defeating consequences), and the superiority of a prudent combination of hard and soft power over the excessive use of either one (optimal diversification between hard and soft power) (Gallarotti, 2010). Overall, Gallarotti's main argument lies in optimal diversification among soft and hard power resources.

Theoretically speaking, these authors have substantially explored the use of different forms, however, smart power theory needs further empirical testing. On the example of Russia's smart

power strategy towards Georgia, the thesis tries to contribute to the smart power studies with its empirical examination. Theoretical explanation will be mainly based on Gallarotti's assumptions.

“Near Abroad” in Russia's foreign policy

Over the years, Russia has increasingly tried to posit as major actor and power center in international system. After a decade of weakness and upheaval, Russia returned to the world stage during Vladimir Putin's eight-year presidency, regaining influence in its neighborhood and beyond, and venturing into parts of the globe from which it retreated after the Soviet collapse (Stent, 2008). The foreign policy concepts of Russian Federation from 2008 till 2016 explicitly illustrate evolution of Moscow's worldwide ambitions and objectives. In 2008, Russia already assumed that the country has strengthened enough and that its empowerment entailed “increased role of the country in international affairs, its greater responsibility for global developments and related possibilities to participate in the implementation of the international agenda, as well as in its development” (Foreign Policy Concept of Russian Federation, 2008). In the same document, Russia emphasizes its willingness to achieve “strong positions in of authority in the world community that best meet the interests of the Russian Federation as one of influential centers in the modern world”.

The foreign policy concept of 2013 of Russia continues this line of argument, but in this case Russia already poses not as an actor eager to gain more advanced position in the international system, but rather takes Russia's “increased responsibility for setting the international agenda and shaping the system of international relations” as a fact (Foreign Policy Concept of Russian Federation, 2013). In foreign policy concept of 2016, Russia declares consolidation of Russia's position “as a center of influence in today's world” as its priority (Foreign Policy Concept of Russian Federation, 2016).

For a country that has claims for being center of influence in international arena, having dominance and influence over neighboring countries is essential. Hence, development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the member states of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) constituted and still continues to be a priority area of Russia's foreign policy. Meanwhile since 2008, Russia has officially declared its negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO, notably to the plans of admitting Ukraine and Georgia to the membership in the alliance, as well as to bringing the NATO military infrastructure closer to the Russian borders (Foreign Policy Concept of Russian Federation, 2008, 2013, 2016). Earlier before officially incorporating this provision into its official foreign policy concept, at Munich Security Conference, President Vladimir Putin has strictly criticized NATO's eastern expansion and has portrayed NATO's activities in eastern flank as "a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust" between Russia and the Alliance (Putin, 2007).

Georgia and the Caucasus have always been of strategic and geopolitical interest for Russia. Imperial and Soviet Russia managed to incorporate Georgia as well as its neighboring Armenia and Azerbaijan under its control. This dominance dates back to late 18th, when Russia finalized its efforts to gain control on its southern neighbors. Therefore, past legacy also largely contributes to Russia's increased thirst for having influence and dominance in the Caucasus as well as in other former allies.

The color revolutions (2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia and 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine) in Russia's immediate neighborhood have signaled Moscow of its weakening influence in the region and increased threats of western (EU and US/NATO) expansion into the east. These political evolutions have triggered a gradual transformation of Russian foreign policy into aggressive stance vis-à-vis its near abroad (Matsaberidze, 2015). Overall approach of Russia's foreign policy started to evolve around the concept of 'Great power-ness' (*derzhavnost*) during Putin's second presidential term. Since then, Russia's key foreign policy

priorities have become overwhelmingly security-oriented and the Kremlin's overall approach of influence-seeking in neighboring countries intensified.

The most explicit illustration of Russia's policy towards post-Soviet countries, including Georgia, is the term "near abroad" coined in Russia in the early 1990s, that reflects the perception that they are not "really" foreign-became a national minority and no longer members of the leading nationality as they had been in the Soviet era (Shevel, 2015). Hence, the decision of Georgia to become a NATO member and to have closer ties with the European Union became the troublesome issue for the Kremlin.

Image promotion and use of public diplomacy in that regard have been part of Russia's foreign policy doctrine since 2008. In foreign countries, promotion and propagation of the Russian language and Russian peoples' culture "constituting a unique contribution to cultural and civilizational diversity of the contemporary world" have been one of the key objectives (Foreign Policy Concept of Russian Federation, 2008). However, as suggested in later strategic documents, Russia has acknowledged new trends in global development and has also recognized the limitations of "traditional military and political alliances cannot protect against all the existing trans-border challenges and threats" (Foreign Policy Concept of Russian Federation, 2008). Russia started to revise its foreign policy vision and has acknowledge that economic, legal, scientific, environmental, demographic and IT factors became as important for states in influencing the world politics as the military power. In 2013, Russia explicitly incorporated "soft power" toolkit for achieving foreign policy objectives in its concept of foreign policy: "'Soft power", a comprehensive toolkit for achieving foreign policy objectives building on civil society potential, information, cultural and other methods and technologies alternative to traditional diplomacy, is becoming an indispensable component of modern international relations. At the same time, increasing global competition and the growing crisis potential sometimes creates a risk of destructive and unlawful use of "soft power" and human rights concepts to exert political pressure on sovereign states, interfere in their internal affairs,

destabilize their political situation, manipulate public opinion, including under the pretext of financing cultural and human rights projects abroad” (Foreign Policy Concept of Russian Federation, 2013).

3. Russia’s foreign policy towards Georgia: aim, objectives and instruments

Russia’s primary goal in Georgia is to not allow Georgia to become a member of either NATO or the EU and therefore, to bring Georgia back to its “sphere of influence”. To this end, Russia has specific objectives, such as: a) to undermine popular support among Georgians for the EU and NATO; b) to increase popular support among Georgians for Russia; c) to have at least non-anti-Russia (ultimately to have a pro-Kremlin) government in Tbilisi.

For Moscow, Georgia keeps being strategically key country in the region. Control over Georgia allows Russia to control its unstable Northern Caucasus, to counterbalance Turkey’s power in the region. According to Alexander Rondeli, as a satellite of Russia, Georgia could cut off energy-rich Azerbaijan and Central Asian land-locked states from the West by closing access to the Black Sea and mostly importantly, by controlling Georgia, the Kremlin would more easily block the penetration of European and Euro-Atlantic structures in the Caucasus (Rondeli, 2013).

In order to achieve these goals and objective, Russia has developed a diverse toolkit. The nature of the instruments that Russia has employed over time in Georgia are of both hard and soft power nature. Overall, Russia has always been implementing what scholars call smart power, combination of both hard and soft instruments. However, alternation among these instruments were not consistent and main focus of its smart power has not been always the same. If Russia was employing hard military instruments in Georgia during 1990s and early 2000s, recently soft power instruments have gained increasing role in Russia’s policy vis-à-vis Georgia.

The main direction of Russia's soft power activity since early 2000's, if not earlier, has been focused on promoting so called "Russian World"¹, that implies developing a certain socio-cultural reality in the post-Soviet space, a "so-called "civilizational space" based on three pillars: 1) Orthodoxy, 2) Russian culture and the Russian language and 3) a common historical memory and common views on societal development" (Rondeli, 2014, 4). However, soft power instruments were not institutionalized and Russia's smart power used to be more hard power centered up until 2012.

Georgia's western ambitions and Russia's hard power tools as counter-measures

Georgia declared its aspiration to NATO membership for the first time at the 2002 Prague Summit and Georgia's integration process into the Alliance began accordingly. In 2004 Georgia became the first partner to develop an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO and undertook specific commitments in the frames of the Action Plan. In 2005 NATO deployed a Liaison Officer to Georgia, that was tasked with supporting reforms in Georgia and the country's integration process into the Alliance (NATO-Georgia Cooperation, 2019). Georgia's quest for joining NATO was effectively resulting in concrete institutional and political cooperation with the allied partners and NATO. The Alliance undertook a decision to offer an Intensified Dialogue to Georgia at the meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers held in New York in 2006. Consultations on political, security, conflict resolution, defense, civil emergency planning, economic, scientific, educational and other issues were held in the frames of the Intensified Dialogue. Based on successful implementation of commitments undertaken under the IPAP and a progress achieved during cooperation within the Intensified Dialogue, allied heads of states and governments agreed at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Georgia will become a NATO member (Bucharest Summit Declaration, 2008).

¹ Piotr Shchedrovitsky, a philosopher actively engaged in developing ideas concerning Russia's future and a way of development, coined the powerful imperial concept of the "Russian World" which is to provide Russia with "its due place" in the globalizing world.

At this time, it was a fact that Russia was unable to undo NATO's eastwards expansion in Eastern and Central European countries, but a political message and promise from the Alliance that Georgia would become a NATO member has been a critical point for Russia to at least keep NATO from spreading farther.

Along with NATO, Georgia has also been striving to deepen its relations with the European Union. Saakashvili started his career with loud pro-western statements, his public addresses were similar to Shevardnadze's but more vocal, underlining historical ties between Georgia and the European and Western civilizations (Chkhikvadze, 2016). In his 2004 inauguration speech, Saakashvili pointed out that "we [Georgians] are not only early Europeans, we are ancient Europeans, and therefore, Georgia holds special place in European civilization". Likewise, in his 2008 inauguration speech, President noted that "Georgia's persistent harbor and its natural environment is Europe, to which we are connected with common culture, history and democratic values that are based on human rights protection, rule of law and principles of peaceful and just development of the community" (Inauguration Speech of the President of Georgia 2004/2008).

Along with the increased pro-western narrative, Georgian government was developing new cooperation tools with the European Union as well. In 2004, Georgia became part of the EU's European Neighborhood Policy, that was launched in 2004 based on a Communication entitled "Wider Europe – Neighborhood" adopted by the European Commission one year earlier and that was set as a framework to govern the EU's relations with 16 of the EU's Eastern and Southern Neighbors in order to achieve the closest possible political association and the greatest possible degree of economic integration (European Neighborhood Policy, 2016). However, in the early 2000s, Russia was not explicitly stating its negative approach towards European projects. Even more, in late 2004, in the immediate aftermath of the Orange revolution, President Putin even said that Russia could look favorably on Ukraine becoming a

member of the EU (Press Conference Following Talks with Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, 2004).

Alongside with European and Euro-Atlantic integration, Georgian government has intensified cooperation with the United States. Even before Saakashvili's presidency, Georgia traditionally has been a leading recipient of U.S. foreign and military aid in Europe and Eurasia. But since 2000's Georgia became the largest per capita recipient of U.S. aid in Europe and Eurasia and, until the August 2008 war, the third-largest recipient in the region, after Russia and Ukraine (Welt, 2018, 11). The United States gave increased amounts of military aid to Georgia after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Apart from military cooperation, the United States traditionally has supported Georgia's NATO membership aspirations. Before the 2008 war, the United States supported granting Georgia a MAP and backed NATO's April 2008 pledge that Georgia eventually would become a member of NATO.

However, not only Georgia's increased endeavors to deepen relations with the western institutions did irritate Russia, but also domestic political processes that indicated weakening of Russia's position in Georgia. These events included the collapse of Aslan Abashidze's pro-Moscow regime in the Adjara autonomous region and the new Georgian government's territorial operations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2005 and 2006 – that eventually contributed to Russian distrust (Cecire, 2013).

In order to impede Georgia's NATO integration Russia utilized economic and military coercive sticks against Georgia. Before utilizing extreme forms of hard power, such as military invasion in Georgia, Russia attempted to coerce its former ally with economic means. At the end of 2005 Russia started placing restrictions on the imports of Georgian fruits and vegetables: “on the grounds of the decision made by “Rosselkhoznadori” on December 19, 2005, imports of agricultural products from Georgia were banned” (Eric Livny et al, 2007, 5). The next big shock for Georgian economy was doubling the price of natural gas imported from Russia (January 2006): the price was raised from USD 65 per cubic meter to USD 110. The spring of the 2006


year was benchmarked by the announcement of Russian embargo on the import of Georgian wines and mineral water. On the basis of order No.6 of March 15, 2006, “given by the chief sanitary inspector of Russian federation, Genadi Onishchenko, imports of Georgian wine, wine products, brandy and champagne were banned, citing health concerns about contaminants in these liquids” ((Eric Livny et al, 2007, 5).

Table 1: Chronology of Sanctions by Russia

Date	Event
December 19, 2005	Ban on imports of agricultural products from Georgia
January, 2006	Sharp increase in the price of gas imported from Russia
March 15, 2006	Ban on import of Georgian wine, wine products, brandy and champagne
May, 5, 2006	Ban on imports of Georgian mineral water
July 8, 2006	Georgian-Russian border checkpoint at Verkhniy Lars closed
September 27, 2006	Arrest of Russian officers by Georgian authorities
September 28, 2006	Russia recalled its ambassador in Georgia, and began a partial evacuation of Russian diplomatic staff from Georgia
October 3, 2006	Russia suspended air, rail, road, sea and postal links to Georgia, and stopped issuing entry visas to Georgian citizens
January 2007	Another sharp increase in the price of gas imported from Russia

Source: Eric Livny, Mack Ott, Karine Torosyan. (2007). Impact of Russian Sanctions on the Georgian Economy. *International School of Economics at TSU*.

Nevertheless, it can be safely argued that the impact of the 2006 Russian embargo on Georgia was far lower than initially feared. GDP growth remained strong in 2006 and 2007 (in 2004-2007 times period Georgian average economic growth amounted to 9.3% (FactCheck.ge, 2018)), and there was no significant blow to employment (in fact, it decreased in these two years). Some of the experts even state that “Russian embargo rather than pulling Georgian economy back, pushed it forward, forcing Georgian entrepreneurs to find new markets for their goods” (EPRC, 2015, 14).



Coercing its former ally with economic means was followed by direct military invasion by Russia in 2008. On the evening of August 7, 2008, South Ossetia accused Georgia of launching a “massive” artillery bombing against Tskhinvali, while Georgian side has been reporting that intense bombing on Georgian villages near the conflict zone was taking place. After Russian regular army entered Roki tunnel and started invasion into sovereign territory of Georgia, then President and Commander In-Chief Saakashvili ordered Georgian army to stop the Russian columns heading toward Tskhinvali and coming through the Roki Tunnel, and to suppress the Ossetian shelling of Georgian positions and villages (Asmus, 2010).

Russian President Medvedev addressed an emergency session of the Russian Security Council on August 8. He denounced Georgia's incursion into South Ossetia, asserting that "women, children and the elderly are now dying in South Ossetia, and most of them are citizens of the Russian Federation." (Nichol, 2009, 8). Adding that "historically Russia has been, and will continue to be, a guarantor of security for peoples of the Caucasus". On 12 August 2008, with the mediation of the EU and its president Sarkozy, the six-point Ceasefire Agreement was agreed between Russia and Georgia. During the five-day conflict, 170 servicemen, 14 policemen, and 228 civilians from Georgia were killed and 1,747 wounded. Russia did not fulfill the ceasefire agreement and moreover, on August 26, President Medvedev signed an order recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia that ultimately damaged Russia's image in Georgia.

Russian-Georgian conflict and particularly, Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia was a clear indication to Georgia, Ukraine as well as Western countries that in the so-called "near abroad" (post-Soviet space), Russian rules would operate and no one else's (Rondeli, 2013, 4). Stephen Jones also argues that "...for Russia, the war was not fundamentally about Georgia. It was bound up with larger international issues such as eastward expansion of NATO, the recognition of Kosovo, Russia's security in the North Caucasus and the West's challenge to Russian control of oil and gas supplies in Eurasia" (Jones, 2013, 250). With its invasion of Georgia in the summer of 2008, Moscow demonstrated for the first time since the Soviet collapse that under some circumstances, it was willing to court real foreign opposition to assert what it perceived as its interests inside the CIS (Mankoff, 2012).

Despite the fact that Russia launched military assault against Georgia and recognized its breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali region as independent states, it worked counterproductive vis-à-vis reversing Georgia's European and Euro-Atlantic aspiration. Some may argue that the invasion managed to delay Georgia's Euro-Atlantic integration and to some extent, Russia has managed to portray Georgia to the members of

NATO as unstable and militarily indefensible and, therefore, a potential liability as a member, Moscow has been so far unable to either change Georgia’s aspiration on policy level or to substantially decrease popular support for Georgia’s declared goal to become EU and NATO member among Georgian public.

Following the Russia’s use of hard power tools against Georgia, in the discourses of Georgia political leaders Russia’s image was framed as an enemy, while Georgia’s European and Euro-Atlantic future has been framed as the only solution for Georgia’s territorial integrity, security and welfare.

Russia in the statements of Georgian leaders	EU and NATO in the statements of Georgian leaders
<p>“Four years ago I stood before you and extended my hand in friendship and cooperation to our neighbors and colleagues in Russia. Today I do the same once again.” President Saakashvili, inauguration speech, 2008.</p>	<p>“Georgia is forever yoked to Europe. We are joined by a common and unbreakable bond-one based on culture-on our shared history and identity-and on a common set of values” “Georgian people ... expressed their overwhelming desire to enter NATO-and so too has the community of shared values that makes up this great organization.” “We will continue our progress toward NATO and the European Union.” President Saakashvili, inauguration speech, 2008.</p>
<p>“Our northern neighbor expected us to change our path when it imposed on us a full embargo in 2006, invaded us in 2008,</p>	<p>“We might belong to different States and live on different side of the mountains, but in terms of human and cultural space. there is</p>

<p>ethnically cleansed Georgian regions and illegally occupied 20% of our territory. an occupation that continues to this day.”</p> <p>“I am speaking of the lawlessness bred by the Russian occupation. Our two occupied regions exist in a black hole of governance.”</p> <p>“for the last two years. the Russian Federation has been violating the ceasefire agreement broke red on 12 August 2008”</p> <p>“Hundreds of thousands of IDPs. victims of the ethnic cleansing campaign led by the Russian forces are still prevented from returning to their home”</p> <p>“...the populations held hostage by the Russian occupiers, on the other side of the New Iron Curtain that illegally divides our country”</p> <p>President Saakashvili, Speech at General Assembly of the UN, 2010.</p>	<p>no North and South Caucasus, there is one Caucasus, that belongs to Europe and will one day join the European family of free nations, following the Georgian path.”</p> <p>“I dream about the day when an Abkhaz or Ossetian citizen of Georgia - as it happened several times in our common history - will become President of a reunited democratic and European Georgia.”</p> <p>President Saakashvili, Speech at General Assembly of the UN, 2010.</p>
<p>“As I speak, the Russian Federation militarily occupies 20% of sovereign Georgian territory, in violation of international law and of the August 12, 2008, cease-fire agreement.”</p> <p>President Saakashvili, Speech at General Assembly of the UN, 2010.</p> <p>“The annexation of Georgian lands by Russian troops continues.”</p>	<p>“The European Union - the greatest political success of recent decades – has been built on three pillars, which also could be characterized as three rejections:</p> <p>the rejection of the extreme nationalism that had led Europe to the collective suicide of two world wars and the horrors of Nazism - the rejection of communism that was</p>

<p>“Despite the friendly statements made by the new Georgian government in the recent weeks and months, the Russian military keeps advancing its positions, dividing communities with new barbwires, threatening our economy, moving towards the vital Baku-Supsa pipeline, approaching more and more the main highway of Georgia and thus putting into question the very sustainability of our country.”</p> <p>President Saakashvili, Speech at General Assembly of the UN, 2013.</p>	<p>threatening to spread throughout the continent-and, in the end, the rejection of colonialism and imperialism.”</p> <p>„But never had our ancestors benefited from a vast and powerful enough force that had understood its strategic interest was to preserve the sovereignty of each of our nation. Today, this force exists: it is the European Union“</p> <p>„We are and should remain a nation united in our historical destiny to join the European family of democratic nations, the family we should never have been separated from, our family. The path of the Georgian people towards freedom, regional unity and European integration is far from over and I will continue to dedicate every day of my life to its success, as a proud citizen of a proud nation“</p> <p>President Saakashvili, Speech at General Assembly of the UN, 2013.</p>
<p>“A top area of concern for Georgia is the issue of internally displaced persons and refugees. There are hundreds of thousands of IDPs in Georgia as a result of Russia's military aggression.”</p>	<p>“Increased Euro-Atlantic and European integration is our way of returning to the family of European nations, with whom we share history, culture, and most importantly, common values.”</p>

<p>“We Georgians want a good relationship with Russia, but not at the expense of our sovereignty and independence, which we fought so hard to achieve”</p> <p>Prime-Minister Gharibashvili at UN General Assembly, 2014.</p>	<p>Prime-Minister Gharibashvili at UN General Assembly, 2014.</p> <p>“Georgia is given a historical opportunity today to return to its regular environment - Europe, its political, economic, social and cultural space.”</p> <p>Prime-Minister Gharibashvili at the ceremonial of signing the association agreement, 2014.</p>
<p>“Russia therefore continues to illegally extend its control over Georgian sovereign territory.”</p> <p>“I condemn this creeping annexation and Russia's disregard for international law.”</p> <p>Prime-Minister Gharibashvili at UN General Assembly, 2015.</p>	<p>“The steady arc of our Euro-Atlantic path reflects Georgia's strong European identity and values”.</p> <p>“A core element of Georgia's security and its Euro-Atlantic integration is its ever deepening relationship with NATO.”</p> <p>Prime-Minister Gharibashvili at UN General Assembly, 2015.</p>
<p>“We have made some concrete progress in de-escalating tensions, but Georgia's steps forward have not all been reciprocated. The Russian Federation has yet to honor even the EU-mediated ceasefire Agreement of August 2008”</p> <p>Prime-Minister Kvirikasvhili, UN General Assembly, 2016.</p>	<p>“Georgia's future lies within the European and Euro-Atlantic community.”</p> <p>Prime-Minister Kvirikasvhili, UN General Assembly, 2016.</p>

As shown in the table, basically the main rhetoric of Georgian public officials emphasizes cultural and historical belonging with the Europe and underlines irreversibility of Georgia's European and Euro-Atlantic integration. It's also significant, that Georgian officials frame integration in NATO as guarantor of the country's security. While Russia is framed as an "occupier" that disrespects international law, Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Along with the active pro-western narrative, Georgia's strategic documents also highlight the importance of Georgia's western ambitions and make European and Euro-Atlantic membership as the country's top priorities: "The development a European type liberal-democratic state and its gradual integration into the EU is one of the main goals of the country's foreign and domestic policy" (Foreign Policy Concept, 2015-2018). Regarding the Euro-Atlantic aspirations, membership to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is one of the main priorities of Georgia's foreign and security policy, according to the foreign policy concept.

Occupation of Georgian territories by the Russian Federation is recognized as a primary threat to Georgia's security environment according to the National Security Concept of Georgia. The same strategic document emphasis the fact that the 2008 war demonstrated that the Russian Federation does not accept the sovereignty of Georgia, including Georgia's choice of democracy and its independent domestic and foreign policy (National Security Concept, 2011). On the other hand, the concept underscores that Georgia is a part of the European and Euro-Atlantic space and that its full-fledged integration in these institutions represent important foreign and security priority for Georgia.

The same discourse is reflected in the Strategic Defense Review of the Ministry of Defense of Georgia that describes the current security environment, reviews the threats and challenges facing Georgia. The SDR pays particular attention to Russia and acknowledges Russia's willingness to disregard international law, violate the sovereignty of its neighboring countries through open military aggression and the use of hybrid warfare, as a key challenge for Georgia's security (Strategic Defense Review, 2017-2020).

Georgia's Strategic Defense Review highlights Georgia's willingness to join the Alliance and until the political consensus is obtained among allied members Georgia continues to deepen its relations with NATO and increase the country's defense capabilities: "Georgia obtains all practical tools to prepare for joining NATO and successfully continues its cooperation with the Alliance. Successful implementation of NATO-Georgia cooperation mechanisms (NATO-Georgia Commission, Annual National Programme, Substantial NATO-Georgia Package etc.) and strengthening of bilateral and multilateral relations with NATO" (Strategic Defense Review, 2017-2020).

Moreover, Georgia's European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations have been incorporated in the country's supreme law – the Constitution. Inclusion of the European and Euro-Atlantic course in the Constitution not only represents declaratory and symbolic in nature, but also has legal significance. As political elite agreed, inclusion of this provision in the revisited Constitution in 2017, can act as a countermeasure, if at any point the political group in power decides for Georgia to join an organization that is incompatible with Euro-Atlantic aspirations. The above constitutional norm can be used a legal basis for the Constitutional Court to abolish the decision.

Apart from pro-EU and pro-NATO policy formulations, Georgia has practically advanced its relations with the USA, European Union and NATO. With regards to NATO, the scope and the depth of NATO-Georgia cooperation has substantially increased since 2008. NATO Foreign Ministers agreed to replace the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with the Annual National Program (ANP), a practical cooperation mechanism between NATO and Georgia that supports enhancing Georgia's interoperability with the Alliance. A Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP), which puts forward a strategic, tactical and operational support across 13 areas, was introduced to strengthen Georgia's defense capabilities and advance its preparation for membership. NATO Expert Team has been permanently residing in Georgia since 2015, when the NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Centre (JTEC) was inaugurated.



Another institutional development is related to the establishment of the Defense Institution Building School (DIBS) that aims at increasing professional development capabilities of representatives from wider defense and security sector, through various courses and training, workshops, discussions and conferences on various issues. NATO has been significantly contributing to strengthening Georgia's capacity for democratic management and oversight in the ministry of defense and other security institutions. NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) has been operating since 2008 creating a unique opportunity for both political consultations and practical cooperation to help Georgia advance on NATO membership path. Over the years, the strong NATO-Georgian bond continues at improving Georgia's defense capabilities, increasing its resilience, enhancing interoperability with NATO, and supporting NATO membership preparation process.

In case of EU-Georgia relations, it was after 2008-year war, that the EU developed Eastern Partnership Policy that is a joint policy initiative which aims to deepen and strengthen relations between the European Union (EU), its Member States and its six Eastern neighbors: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Even though, EaP framework does not provide Georgia with a clear European membership perspective, participation in the policy has substantially enhance EU-Georgian relations. EaP has created an opportunity for Georgia to obtain practical carrots from the EU side, namely signing of Association Agreement on 27 July 2014 that created a deep and comprehensive free trade area and exempted almost all goods or services (with some EU caveats in the service sector) from most tariff or non-tariff barriers. Georgia's AA also deals with close co-operation in 22 spheres and provides strong tools both for the country's functional integration into European structures as well as for improving the quality of its economic integration through EU market access and high levels of sectoral co-operation. Another huge step in EU-Georgia relations is related to Visa liberalization process. In June 2012, the EU opened a visa dialogue with Georgia and a visa liberalization action plan was presented in early 2013. After 5 years of intensive dialogue and after successful fulfillment Visa Liberalization Action Plan (VLAP – that consisted of four key


blocks of benchmarks in the following spheres: document security; border and migration management; public order and security external relations and fundamental rights) on 27 February 2017, the EU Council adopted a regulation on visa liberalization for Georgians travelling to the EU for a period of stay of 90 days in any 180-day period.

In relations with the US, Georgia has also deepened its partnership with the USA. The advanced cooperation between Georgia and the USA was institutionalized in 2009 with signing of 2009 U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership. Consequently, the U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission was developed that comprises four bilateral working groups on priority areas identified in the Charter: democracy; defense and security; economic, trade, and energy issues; and people-to-people and cultural exchanges. In addition to holding a high-level plenary session of the Commission each year, senior-level U.S. and Georgian policymakers lead yearly meetings of each working group to review commitments, update activities, and establish future objectives. Since the signing of the Charter, the United States and Georgia have strengthened their mutual cooperation based on U.S. support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and its commitment to further democratic and economic reforms.

Alongside with the intensified cooperation with the western structures, Georgian public has been overall supportive towards the country’s declared goals to integrate with the EU and NATO.



RUTHRTNGB: How much of a military threat is Russia to its neighboring countries? (%)



On the other hand, the image of Russia remained strongly negative and one of the top concerns have been related to territorial integrity. For example, 61% of public believes that Russia poses a major military threats to its neighbors. With the use of hard power military tools Russia did manage to create the image

invincibility among Georgia, as 41% of public declares that Russia is superior to the USA in terms of military might (CRRRC, 2018). Nevertheless, this attitude has not induced Georgian public to get supportive towards Russia.

4. Shift from hard power centered policy to softer smart power

As Russia's hard military tools have been ineffective to provide desired outcomes in the short-term period, Russia has shifted its policy to softer policy. Moscow has not abandoned its hard power instruments though, but rather has increased use of its soft power assets against Georgia. Power of ideas has been acknowledged among Russian experts and opinion-makers long before Russia officially incorporated it as a foreign policy instruments in its strategic documents. For example, the chairmen of Foreign Affairs Committee of the Russian Duma once stated: "the situation is absurd" when post-Soviet states enjoy more benefits from cooperating with Russia and still they want to "enter into the straitjacket of the European institutions and to fall under the diktat of Brussels" (Kosachev, 2012). Tsygankov in his article published in 2006, suggests that Russian authorities were increasingly demonstrating their readiness to employ soft power to achieve foreign policy objectives. He also states that in the absence of pro-Russian governments in Georgia, Ukraine and elsewhere, the task of mobilizing ties amongst people rather than with governments, was seen especially important for preserving influence


(Tsygankov, 2006). Tsygankov described Russia's soft power, as including "all aspects of Russia's attractiveness to foreigners: Russian mass media, a large and efficient economy, familiar language and religion, aspects of historical legacy, family ties, and electronic products." (Tsygankov, 2006).

Following the color revolutions, Russian politicians realized that the West's relative advantage over Russia particularly in post-Soviet was due to its better access to public opinion through sophisticated NGOs and media outlets. Hence, Moscow also tried to employ similar tools. For example, in 2007 Russian authorities established Russky Mir (Russian World) Foundation that was funded both by government and private companies. The foundation's primary aim was to support and promote Russian language and in general, Russian culture abroad. In 2008, "Rossotrudnichestvo –Ros Cooperation" was established that focused on cooperation with the diaspora. However, it was after Putin's return as president in 2012, when the Kremlin took more serious steps in developing its soft power instruments. In 2012, in his presidential address to Russian ambassadors and permanent representatives in international organizations, Putin underlined the necessity to work more actively in this direction, as "soft power' is all about promoting one's interests and policies through persuasion and creating a positive perception of one's country, based not just on its material achievements but also its spiritual and intellectual heritage." (Putin, 2012) He also argued with the representatives of Diplomatic Corps that Russia's image abroad does not fully reflect reality and there is much to do in order to improve it. Russian language and opportunities related to it, compatriots, permanently living abroad and defending rights of Russian citizens were also major themes in the context of instructing Russian diplomats to strengthen their soft power efforts. (Putin, 2012).

5. Russia soft power toolkit in Georgia

In attempting to repair Russia's image, Moscow does possess certain assets. Russian popular culture, music, books, films and TV programs are quite popular in post-Soviet countries,

including in Georgia². However, as Nye correctly argues soft power cannot be equated to popular culture alone. With regards to Russian Governmental non-governmental organizations, they are not much influential in Georgia. For example, Russian World in Georgia provided Russian language courses in Georgia and in 2014, they have enrolled 120 attendees. Likewise, Russia attempted to open its educational markets for Georgian students. In 2013-2014, Russia allocated 92 stipends for Georgian students who received the opportunity to study in 20 universities across Georgia (Kapanadze, 2016 – Carnivorous plant). These numbers are not competitive to US and EU provided scholarships to Georgian youngsters and the overall awareness regarding openly pro-Russian NGOs are quite minimal in Georgia.



Within the Erasmus+ Programme of the European Union, during 2014-2017 more than 8000 Georgian students studied in EU member states with the Erasmus+ Programme.

Source: National Erasmus+ Office Georgia

After 2012, Russia opened its labor market that traditionally has been attractive for Georgian citizens. Opening has been particularly important for ethnic minorities residing in Georgia who have difficulties with the Georgian language knowledge and who therefore see employment opportunities in either Armenia, Azerbaijan or Russia. Attitudes towards Russia have been traditionally more friendly among ethnic minority populated areas in Georgia than the other part of the population.



Despite the fact that the EU has introduced visa-free regime with Georgia, that substantially increased pro-Western public attitudes, still today Russia abstains from doing the same.

² An illustrative example is related to the fact that during New Years' time, majority of Georgian TV channels still put in their airtime a 1976 Soviet romantic comedy film "The Irony of Fate, or Enjoy Your Bath!" that was traditionally broadcasted on New Year's Even during Soviet Times. Even the most pro-Western mainstream media channels do air this film until present day. – Author's note.

Russian President in one his media commentaries did not exclude possibility to introduce full visa free regime for Georgians. Later, he stated that visa free travel would contribute to the “fundamental normalization of relations”. Nevertheless, Moscow has only partially simplified visa regulations for Georgian citizens, but it has not removed it in full, that shows some limits of Russia’s soft power capacity.

In case of Georgia, Orthodox Church and mainstream media outlets are the strongest tools of Russian soft power and the main tenets of the Kremlin’s narratives are increasingly visible in the discourses of some clergymen and certain TV channels.

Russia’s objective to hunt hearts and minds of Georgian public has smartly found dissemination channels. Georgian Orthodox Church keeps being one of the most trustful institutions among Georgian public and TV remains the main source of information for the population as well.



The main narratives that are espoused by Kremlin sympathizers both in media and Georgian Church are directed at two objectives: a) to undermine popular support of the West and b) to increase support for Russia. The structure of the Kremlin narrative in the Georgian discourse consists of three stages: “1. Creating threats; 2. Sowing distrust towards partners and Western institutions; 3. Ingraining a belief that Russia is the only option in fighting against the threats” (Media Development Foundation, 2018, 7).

6. Orthodox Church of Georgia – images of Russia and the West

Russian Orthodox Church has become an important ally in supporting state policies. It is also largely utilized by Russia for achieving its foreign policy goals in post-Soviet spaces. Ukrainian media has reported on priests of the Moscow-led church refusing funerals and last rites for Ukrainian soldiers killed in battle, as well as harboring Russia-backed separatist fighters and blaming Kyiv for starting the war -- despite evidence that has since come to light during more than four years of fighting to suggest that Moscow instigated. The Moscow Patriarchat alongside with the Kremlin's intensified soft power efforts, has also started to increased its attempts to unite Orthodox believers in post-Soviet countries into a unique Russian civilization portrayed as the only true preacher of Christianity.

Many of the Georgian clergymen have close links with the Russian Orthodox Church. Majority of them have studied in the religious institutions in Moscow and elsewhere in Russia. Influence of Russian Church on Georgian bishops if not on the entire institution was also openly stated by the Alexey Dugin, radically anti-Western and Eurasianist Russian philosopher – “The Orthodox Churches of Georgia and Russia expressed their solidarity with each other by not attending Crete World Orthodox meeting. Crete gathering was a clear indication of rivalry between Patriarch of Constantinople and Russian Orthodox Church. “The rivalry between the powerful Russian church, which encompasses two-thirds of the world’s Orthodox population, and the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople, which numbers less than 3,000 faithful in Istanbul but boasts a primacy of honor over all of Orthodoxy, has in fact been for years one of the most serious conflicts within the Christian East,” (Guardian, 2016). On this critical occasion, Georgian Church sided with Russian Orthodox Church and did not participate in the gathering.

Besides, Georgian Church has deeply entrenched beliefs and positions that usually and traditionally align with the Russian Orthodox Church. On the one hand, the Patriarch of Orthodox Church Ilia II publicly supports Georgia’s integration into the EU, but on the other

hand, the isolationist policy of Georgian Church towards the Western Christian organizations as well as anti-Western statements of religious servants illustrate Russia's soft power influence.

Anti-discrimination legislation was an interesting and quite illustrative example to see the general attitudes of clergymen vis-à-vis Europe and Russia. The law was interpreted by majority of priests and bishops as infringing "traditional" Georgian values. For example, following adoption of the law, David Lasurashvili, a Georgian Orthodox priest, has stated: "The closer we get to European and American 'values,' the more we'll turn away from Christ and the Church" (Tabula, 2015). Such narrative was not limited to particular clergymen, but the Georgian Orthodox Church officially published statement, where says believers consider the antidiscrimination bill to be "propaganda and legalization" of "deadly sin," because it includes "sexual orientation" and "gender identity" on the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination (Radio Liberty, 2014).

A dominating view by many clergymen is that the West tries to impose homosexuality, incest, pedophilia, zoophilia, perversion and fights against national identity, traditions, Orthodox Christianity, family as a social institution. In such a logic, these priests then directly or indirectly portray Orthodox Russia as the counterweight to the West. Apart from statements about the threat of losing identity in case of integration with the West, religious servants promoted an exceptional role of Russia as an Orthodox country and blamed the US for encouraging the previous government to start the 2008 war with Russia (Media Development Foundation, 2018).


While majority of priests share traditional views that align Russia's narratives, only few of them express directly sympathies towards Russia. One of the representatives of the latter is Ruis-Urbnisi high ranking bishop Iobi that assessed Russian bombs during the 2008 Russia-Georgia war as punishment sent from heaven (Media Development Foundation, 2017). Yet another example is related to bishop Spiridon who blamed third powers (most probably the

West) in tensions between Ukraine and Russia and he urged his followers to pray Russia to unite Ukraine and Belarus into its boundaries (netgazeti, 2015).

7. Mainstream media discourse about Russia and the West

Trust in media

In general, how much do you trust or distrust coverage of news and current affairs on the following TV channels? (q72)



NDI December 2018 Survey

www.caucasusbarometer.org
www.ndi.org/georgia-polls

in 46.2% of stories made on Rustavi 2 implied an impression that Yanukovich and his government were in crisis, but in almost the same amount (45.1%) Rustavi 2 particularly emphasized Russia and Vladimir Putin's roles and also underscored similarities with the conflicts in Georgia (Kutidze, 2015).

Imedi TV company, first by viewership, in some cases applies pro-Kremlin narrative when covering issues though, normally, it observes journalistic standards, according to experts. In political and current affairs talk-shows on Imedi as well as Maestro TV channel, ‘presenters, when having respondents of pro-Russian orientation as guests, fail to adequately challenge them, thereby facilitating the spread of disinformation and negative stereotypes’ (Media Development Foundation, 2017). There were several instances, when the webpage of the channel published stories that were found misleading and fake. In one of the examples of such, Imedi News reported as if Great Britain replaced the term “pregnant women” with “pregnant people” in the United Nations. The similar story was also published on Sputnik Georgia that cited Russian Ria Novosti as its source. Both publications write that the initiative was taken by

According to the most recent opinion polls, there are five top most watched media outlets in Georgia: Imedia, Rustavi 2, TV Pirveli, Georgian Public Broadcaster and Obiektivi. Among discourses of TV channels Rustavi 2 and TV Pirveli Russia is framed as an “enemy” and “occupier”. During Ukrainian crisis,

the UK is related to the protection of rights for transgender persons (Myth Detector, 2017). However, apart from these separate cases, editorial policy of Imedi TV seems to be mostly pro-Western oriented.

The clearly pro-Kremlin TV channel is Obiektivi TV. The channel is a useful tool for pro-Kremlin non-governmental organizations and individuals to disseminate stories that, on the one hand, portray the West as a source of immorality and Russia as indispensable brother of Georgia with common values. Media reports show the growing tendency that Anti-Western comments were most frequently made on TV Obieqtivi (Media Development Foundation, 2017, 2016, 2014-2015).

Media Union Obieqtivi was established in August 2010. A co-founder of the company is Irma Inashvili, the current Secretary General of Alliance of Patriots of Georgia (APG)³; however, since 2014, she is not listed among the management of the channel. The political party office and television are in the same building. TV Channel pursues Turkophobic, xenophobic and homophobic editorial policy.

Traditionally, anti-Western messages concern the issues related to identity, human rights and values. Obieqtivi TV portrayed visa liberalization and integration with the EU as a threat to Georgian identity - Valeri Kvaratskhelia, anchor of Obiektivi TV talk show “Politikuri Ghame” stated: “Women are raped in Europe openly, during the daylight; astonishing things happen there... And you think that against this background and considering our region, our mentality, et cetera, Europe will grant us visa free travel?” (Media Development Foundation, 2016).

³ In 2016, in parliamentary elections the party got 5.01% of the votes, it gained seats in Parliament. The party claims to be of right-conservative ideology. In its vision and program, available on the English language webpage of the political party (unavailable in Georgian), the party defines patriotism as “thinking and pondering, speaking and discussing, acting and behaving in conformity with the national spirit, which in our case is the Georgian spirit”. According to the party’s vision, the tolerance of Georgian spirit implies readiness to adopt everything good from other nations, though, at the same time, giving preference to native Georgian. On its English-language website, the party declares the desire to integrate into the European Union while **expressing skepticism about prospects of Georgia’s integrating into NATO.**

TV Obieqtivi largely portrayed the USA as an aggressor, instigator of coups, inciter of terrorism, whereas Russia was portrayed as the country fighting against all this: Valeri Kvaratskhelia, presenter: “The USA has recently created a terrorist state, the so-called Islamic State, and used it for strengthening its hegemony in the Middle East. It was primarily Russia that went against it because Russia believed that the existence of a terrorist state was unacceptable”. Therefore, framing of the West on Obiektivi TV is mostly done in a way to instill skepticism and fear against the USA and NATO – the cooperation with NATO, including the joint military training conducted in Georgia, are portrayed as a move which could provoke Russia and lead to military escalation, meanwhile inducing the fear of war and stressing that the integration into NATO was not a guarantee of Georgia’s security and contrary that it can result in the loss of territories and disintegration of the country; Likewise, TV Obieqtivi tries to discredit Georgia’s European integration, fueling narrative that the EU will eventually break up. The channel attempts to downplay the importance of visa liberalization granted to Georgia by the EU with the argument that the visa liberalization was actually useless for Georgian citizens.

8. Russia’s soft power – constraints and effects

Russia’s soft power has attracted wide skepticism among scholars who have studied soft power. Nye suggests that what Russia has been doing in its immediate neighborhood or elsewhere in Europe or America is “negative soft power”. “By attacking the values of others, one can reduce their attractiveness and thus their relative soft power” (Nye, 2017). According to him, a major mistake made by Russia (and China too) is “thinking that government is the main instrument of soft power. In today’s world, information is not scarce but attention is, and attention depends on credibility. Government propaganda is rarely credible. The best propaganda is not propaganda.” (Nye 2013) Even more, as Nye suggests, paradoxically, in the context of soft power propaganda can often be even counterproductive. (Nye, Putin’s Rules of Attraction 2014).

To some extent, Russia has managed to undermine public attitudes towards the West but that has not directly translated into increased support for pro-Kremlin foreign policy. Despite the high support towards Georgia's declared goal to become an EU member, 41% of public fully agrees or agrees more than disagrees with the statement that the EU threatens Georgian traditions (CRRC, 2017).



The campaign about anti-discrimination law, that was adopted due to the requirements of Visa Liberalization Action Plan and the following media and church discourse might have contributed to this attitude of Georgians who perceive the European Union as threat to their traditions. Moreover, the same opinion poll results reveal that 43% of respondents say that one the reasons why they would vote against EU membership is that it would hinder good neighborly relations with Russia (CRRC, 2017).

Yet another example of Russia's soft power effects can be related to the fact that legislative changes have been effected in Georgia taking cues from the narratives of pro-Kremlin media outlets and ultra-nationalist groups. A new provision was introduced in the Constitution banning the sale of agricultural land to foreigners, after media articles circulated, which were sounding the alarm on "whole villages" being owned by foreigners. Similarly, another change in the Constitution bans gay marriage that goes in line with the Kremlin narrative that poses as the source of morality in contrast with the western countries. These changes were taken into consideration by the ruling party due to the popular support towards these amendments as they say: Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili, stated: "I believe that the [proposed] formulation directly corresponds to the demands of a vast majority of our citizens and I think this is the decision that the ruling party has to take." (Kvirikashvili, 2017). Traditional values vs liberal values are a usual card for Russia's soft power. The Kremlin had the same attempt in Romania, where the same-sex-marriage referendum failed amid low turnout. In case of Georgia, it worked and marriage is now defined in the Georgian constitution. Even though these examples are not directly linked to Georgia foreign policy choice, in the long-term period

public attitudes that align to so called “traditional” and “orthodox” vision of Russia can effectively change their foreign policy sympathies.

What has Russia’s soft power been doing in Georgia is not proposing an attracting policy, but rather coercing Georgian public that in case the country continues its integration into western structures it would eventually negatively influence on Georgian traditions, would provoke the war with Russia, etc. Hence, as Russia’s “soft power” mainly threatens and instills fear among target audience, it is far from what Nye calls soft power.

Russia’s objective to undermine pro-Western foreign policy choice among Georgians has been traditionally successful with regards to ethnic minority groups, who experience lack of Georgian language knowledge and therefore, are hardly participating in public life.



Presumably, such attitudes are the results of a lack of awareness and information among the ethnic minorities. Of ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis (in total, approximately 400,000 persons) living in Georgia’s Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli regions, the majority cannot speak Georgian. A lack of knowledge of the Georgian language and the reality of Soviet history mean that Russian was used as the lingua franca for years in such areas. The 70 years of Soviet experience made these local populations particularly accustomed to receiving information in the Russian language. Therefore, their principal source of information is Russian TV and they are extensively dependent upon Russian media outlets like ORT, Russia 24 or NTV, resulting

in a systemic exposure to Russian media agencies. These groups have been traditionally economically linked with Russia partly due to lack of Georgian language knowledge as well. However, Russian speaking ethnic minorities in Georgia have been traditionally loyal constituencies with Russia and it's hard to measure apart from these groups whether Russia has won hearts and minds of people who do not share Russia's foreign principles and goals.

9. Merging theory and case

“Russia has tested a wide range of instruments over the last 20 years to retain influence over its former vassal. From economic embargoes, the expulsion of Georgian citizens, and the occupation of Georgia's territories, to terrorist attacks and direct interference in domestic politics, Russia has applied an array of tactics to undermine the Georgian state, intensifying the pressure whenever Georgia attempted to enhance its relations with the West.” (Kapanadze, 2014). Since early 2000s, Russia has infused hard and soft power tools with different proportions. As analyzed above from 2004 when Russia's foreign policy became more influence-seeking in its immediate neighborhood, Russia mostly utilized coercive measures that was expressed in economic embargos, coercive diplomacy and finally, with the direct military attack and subsequent recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region vis-à-vis Georgia. At the same time, the narratives about the immorality of the West and disadvantages of Georgia's approachment towards the Western structures have been floating in media outlets as well as in statements of influential clergymen. However, soft part of Russia smart power has been often unmatched with the hard power instruments that Russia has deployed in Georgia up until 2012.

Even though, Russia has directed its hard and soft efforts to bring back Georgia into its sphere of influence, it has been unable so far to reverse Georgia's pro-Western foreign policy choice at the policy level. Basically as the aforementioned analysis suggests, the stronger Russia coerced Georgia, more vocal Georgian government and public were claiming their pro-Western aspirations. At the same time, even military invasion did not help Russia to stop

cooperation between Georgia and the EU and Georgia and the NATO. The cooperation and partnership with both structures continued to be characterized with positive dynamics. We can assume that Russia had influenced even more on Western countries in their decision to delay Georgia's Euro-Atlantic membership that it did on the decision-makers in Tbilisi.

Military invasion has undermined Russia's image harshly. Most of the narratives of Georgian public officials as well as country's strategic documents recognize Russia as an "enemy", "occupier" and "threat". Hence, later Russian soft power tools have not found fertile ground in Georgia. Even though, Russian narrative resonates and appeals to some part of the Georgian public, overall majority of the population still considers country's European and Euro-Atlantic membership as the only foreign policy priority.

Makarychev assesses Russia's policy towards Georgia as inconsistent and highly controversial while discussing Moscow's (non)soft power tools. He suggests that on the one hand, engaging Tbilisi in reconciliation and simultaneously threatening the country was unable to prevent Georgia from signing Association Agreement with the EU and seeking greater integration with NATO (Makarychev, 2014).

Dr. Ćwiek-Karpowicz argues that Russian elites do not appreciate the idea of true partnership with mutual benefits in near and long term. Even though Russia holds influential soft power channels for post-Soviet states such as an accessible labor market, language proximity, common culture and energy resources, Moscow has not been able to enhance its attractiveness as a soft power among its closest neighbor. One of the reasons by which Ćwiek-Karpowicz explains ineffectiveness of Russia's soft power is related to its neo-imperial attitude towards neighboring states. He argues that Russia's military intervention in Georgia damaged Russia's image not only in Georgia but also in the post-Soviet area, as the leaders of CIS countries began to fear for their states' territorial integrity (Ćwiek-Karpowicz, 2012).

Josephy Nye and Guilio Gallaroti's theoretical assumption explain the effects of Russia's smart power on Georgia's foreign policy behavior well. As they suggest, even though smart power

implies using both hard and soft power there are certain conditions that need to be considered while states employ them. Using hard power in an aggressive-unilateralist manner disadvantages smart power capacities of the nation wielding the power (Gallarotti, 2014). The employment of force can only generate soft power if it's used in the service of goals of widely perceived as consistent with such principles as protecting nations against aggression, peacekeeping or liberation. In case of Georgia, Russia's employment of hard power has been directly abusive towards the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity that undermined Russia's image much. Russia's use of hard power and later focus on soft power that in reality is far from Nye's version of soft power and represents more a box of hard tools wrapped up in soft power façade, has been so far unable to reverse Georgia's European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations on policy level.

10. Conclusion

The concept of smart power was fairly recently introduced in International Relations. The theories that have been developed based on this concept have attracted much interest among scholars as well as policy-makers. Despite its fast popularity, there are many critics who believe that smart power and its related theoretical developments are vague and too difficult to testify. Nevertheless, understanding smart power has become especially important in a world that is changing at a historically unprecedented pace and that has resulted in changing nature of national as well as international power. The conventional visions of state power are poorly suited to understanding modern world where material and tangible resource do not constitute to nation's power any more.

The thesis has studied Russia's smart power, its components, hard and soft power and has also analyzed its effects on Georgia's foreign policy choice. The case of Russia's smart power strategy vis-à-vis Georgia illustrates applicability and validity of smart power theoretical assumptions. In order to explore the effects of Russia's smart power, the thesis has examined Russia's soft and hard power instruments and their effects on Georgia's foreign policy behavior.

In doing so, I have analyzed statements of public officials as well as evolution of policy documents of Georgia. The analysis shows that the use of hard power tools against Georgia has its consequences up until today. Since 2008-year war, in the statements of Georgian officials as well as strategic documents Russia is framed as enemy and threat for the country's security and development, while EU and NATO are viewed as the guarantees for the prosperity and peaceful development of the country. Hence, despite the fact that Russia has tried to increase its use of soft power instruments, eventually its strategy has been unable to reverse Georgia's foreign policy choice. However, on the other hand, Russia's smart power did result to influence public attitudes on number of issues that have not yet impeded Georgia's western ambitions, but have at least created doubts in people's mind.

Overreliance on hard power tools have been largely discussed in smart power studies as the most common mistake that the nations have made in their smart power strategies. This thesis empirically confirms that aggressive use of hard power has diminished the efficacy of overall smart power.

The scholarly research on this issue should intensify and develop more empirically tested cases that would better illustrate interrelationship between soft and hard power as well as peculiarities of the smart power. In case of Russia's policy towards Georgia and its employment of smart power tools, the thesis has mainly focused on analyzing popular discourses of Orthodox Church representatives and mainstream media. However, it would substantially increase the depth of the research, if future endeavors would include analysis of other indicators of Russia's soft power such as ultra-nationalist groups and their pro-Kremlin discourses, political parties and their discourses, including ultra-nationalist and openly pro-Kremlin ones. Moreover, due to technological development new media is getting increasing important and thus, analyzing online media agencies and their narratives could also contribute to creating more comprehensive picture about Russia's soft power capabilities and effects.

Bibliography

Armitage, R., & Nye, J. (2007). *CSIS Commission on Smart Power*. Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press.

Asmus, R. (2010). *A little war that shook the world: Russia, Georgia, and the future of the West*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Baldwin, D. (2016). *Power and International Relations: A Conceptual Approach*. Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1q1xsp6>

Carr, E. (1946). *The twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939*. London: Macmillan & Co. ltd.

CRRC-Georgia. *Caucasus Barometer*. Retrieved from <https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/>

Chkhikvadze, A. (2016). "A Promised land": *Elite Discourse on "Europeanness" in Georgia*. Working Paper, Georgia's Reforms Associates. Retrieved from <https://grass.org.ge/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Paper-A-Promised-land-AniChkhikvadze.pdf>

EPRC. (2015). *Focus on Russia: Georgia under Russian Expansionism and Financial Crisis*. Retrieved from https://www.eprc.ge/admin/editor/uploads/files/Russia_A5_WEB.pdf

Foreign Policy Strategy of Georgia 2015-2018; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. Retrieved from <http://mfa.gov.ge/MainNav/ForeignPolicy/ForeignPolicyStrategy.aspx>

Foreign Policy Concept of Russian Federation. (2008). Retrieved from <http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4116>

Foreign Policy Concept of Russian Federation (2013). Retrieved from http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents//asset_publisher/CptlCk6BZ29/content/id/122186

Gallarotti, G. 2010. *Cosmopolitan Power in International Politics: A Synthesis of Realism, Neoliberalism and Constructivism*. New York: Cambridge UP.

Gallarotti, G. (2011). Soft power: what it is, why it's important, and the conditions for its effective use, *Journal of Political Power*, 4:1, 25-47. Retrieved from <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/2158379X.2011.557886>

Gallarotti, G. (2015). Smart Power: Definitions, Importance, and Effectiveness, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 38:3, 245-281. Retrieved from <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2014.1002912>

Gilpin, R. (1981). *War and change in world politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gompert, D., & Binnendijk, H. (2016). The Power to Coerce: Countering Adversaries. In *The Power to Coerce: Countering Adversaries Without Going to War* (pp. 1-38). RAND Corporation. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt1b67wn2.6>

Isaac, J.C., 1987. *Power and Marxist theory: a realist view*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Jansson, P. (2018). Smartness as prudence: smart power and classical realism, *Journal of Political Power*, 11:3, 341-358. Retrieved from <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/2158379X.2018.1523317>

Jones, S. 2013. *Georgia: A Political History Since Independence*, I. B. Tauris, London-New York.

Kakachia, K., and Cecire, M. (2013). *Georgian Foreign Policy: a Quest for Sustainability*. Retrieved from https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=ab4f5ccc-a514-bce0-655b-75096aa181a7&groupId=252038

Kapanadze, S. 2014. *Georgia's Vulnerability to Russian Pressure Points*. Policy Memo, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). Retrieved from https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/georgias_vulnerability_to_russian_pressure_points312

Kapanadze, Sergi. (2015). *Russia's Soft Power in Georgia – A Carnivorous Plant in Action* in Toms Rostoks and Andris Spruds (eds) "The Different Faces of "Soft Power": The Baltic States and Eastern Neighborhood between Russia and the EU/ Ed". Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs.

Kearn, D. (2011). The hard truths about soft power, *Journal of Political Power*, 4:1, 65-85. Retrieved from <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/2158379x.2011.556869>

Kosachev, K. (2012). The Specifics of Russian Soft Power. *Russia in Global Affairs*.

Kutidze, D. (2015). Ukraine's Crisis in the focus of Georgian Media. *Journal of Young Researchers*, 94-120. Retrieved from http://jyr.tsu.ge/public/uploads/sitepdf/05-Kutidze_JYR_VOL01_JUL15.pdf

Lukes, S., 1974. *Power: a radical view*. 1st ed. London: Macmillan.

Lyvni, E. and et al. (2007). *Impact of Russian Sanctions on the Georgian Economy*. Retrieved from <http://georgica.tsu.edu.ge/files/02-Economy/Economy/Livny-d.u.pdf>

Makarychev, A. 2016. *The Limits to Russian Soft Power in Georgia*. Policy Memo, PONARS Eurasia.

Mankoff, J. (2012). *Russian foreign policy: The return of great power politics* Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Matsaberidze, D. (2015). Russia vs. EU/US through Georgia and Ukraine. *Connections*, 14(2), 77-86. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26326399>

Media Development Foundation. (2017). Kremlin Influence Index. Retrieved from <http://mdfgeorgia.ge/eng/view-library/67>

Media Development Foundation. (2016). *Anti-Western Propaganda: Media Monitoring Report*. Retrieved from [http://mdfgeorgia.ge/uploads/library/65/file/eng/Antidasavluri-ENG-web_\(2\).pdf](http://mdfgeorgia.ge/uploads/library/65/file/eng/Antidasavluri-ENG-web_(2).pdf)

Media Development Foundation. (2018). *Anti-Western Propaganda: Media Monitoring Report*. Retrieved from <http://mdfgeorgia.ge/uploads/library/89/file/eng/AntiWest-2017-ENG.pdf>

Ministry of Defense of Georgia. *Georgia-NATO cooperation*. Retrieved from <https://mod.gov.ge/en/page/38/nato-georgia-cooperation>

Myth Detector. 2017. *The United Kingdom has made no demands for the expression 'pregnant woman' to be replaced*. Available at <https://www.mythdetector.ge/en/myth/united-kingdom-has-made-no-demands-expression-pregnant-woman-be-replaced>

National Security Concept of Georgia. (2011). Retrieved from <https://mod.gov.ge/uploads/2018/pdf/NSC-ENG.pdf>

NATO. Bucharest Summit Declaration. (2018). Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/us/natohq/official_texts_8443.htm

NDI. (2015, 2016, 2017, 2018,). *Public Attitudes in Georgia*. Results of Public opinion polls, Retrieved from <https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/>

Nichol, W. (2009). *Russia-Georgia conflict in August, 2008: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests*. Retrieved from <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34618.pdf>

Nikitin, A. (2008). Russian Foreign Policy in the Fragmented Post-Soviet Space. *International Journal on World Peace*, 25(2), 7-31. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20752831>

Nye, J. (2004). Soft Power and American Foreign Policy. *Political Science Quarterly*, 119(2), 255-270. Retrieved from doi:10.2307/20202345

Nye, J. (2009). Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power. *Foreign Affairs*, 88(4), 160-163. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20699631>

Nye, J., & Goldsmith, J. (2011). The Future of Power. *Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, 64(3), 45-52. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41149419>

Nye, J. (2008). Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616, 94-109. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25097996>

Nye, J. 2004b. *Soft power: the means to success in world politics*. New York: Public Affairs.

Nye, J. 2003. The velvet hegemon: how soft power can help defeat terrorism. *Foreign Policy*, May/June, 74–75.

Nye, Jr., Joseph S. (2013). "What China and Russia Don't Get About Soft Power." *Foreign Policy*.

Nye, Jr., Joseph S. (2014). "Putin's Rules of Attraction." Project Syndicate.

Nye, Jr., Joseph S. (2013). "What China and Russia Don't Get About Soft power", *Foreign Policy*.

Nye, Jr., Joseph S. (2017). "For Russia, some hard lessons in the use of soft power", *The Globe and Mail*.

Popescu, N. (2006). *Russia's Soft Power Ambitions*, Policy Brief, CEPS. Retrieved from <http://aei.pitt.edu/11715/1/1388.pdf>

Press Conference Following Talks with Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. (2004). Retrieved from <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22742>

Prime Minister of Georgia Irakli Garibashvili delivered a speech at the ceremonial of signing the association agreement. (2014). Retrieved from http://gov.ge/print.php?gg=1&sec_id=387&info_id=43084&lang_id=ENG

President Saakashvili Inauguration speech. (2008). Retrieved from <https://www.president.gov.ge/en-US/Mikheil-Saakashvili-en.aspx>

President Saakashvili Speech at UN General Assembly. Retrieved from <https://gadebate.un.org/en/68/georgia>

Prime-Minister Gharibashvili Speech at UN General Assembly. Retrieved from <https://gadebate.un.org/en/69/georgia>

Prime-Minister Kvirikashvili Speech at UN General Assembly. Retrieved from <https://gadebate.un.org/en/71/georgia>

Putin, Vladimir. Russia and the changing world. February 27, 2012.

Radio Liberty. (2014). "Georgia's Orthodox Church Opposes Antidiscrimination Bill". Retrieved from <https://www.rferl.org/a/georgias-orthodox-church-opposes-antidiscrimination-bill/25366250.html>

Rondeli, A. (2013). *Georgia-Russia: from Negative to Positive Uncertainty*. Expert Opinion, GFSIS. Retrieved from <https://www.gfsis.org/library/view-opinion-paper/3>

Rondeli, A. (2014). *Moscow's Information Campaign and Georgia*. Expert Opinion, GFSIS. Retrieved from <https://www.gfsis.org/library/view-opinion-paper/29>

Rothman, S. (2011). Revising the soft power concept: what are the means and mechanisms of soft power?, *Journal of Political Power*, 49-64. Retrieved from <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/2158379X.2011.556346>

Shevel, O. (2015). Russia and the Near Abroad. *Great Decisions*, 5-16. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44214789>

Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy. (2007). Retrieved from <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034>

Stent, A. (2008). Restoration and Revolution in Putin's Foreign Policy. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 60(6), 1089-1106. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20451574>

Strategic Defense Review of Georgia, 2017-2020. Retrieved from <https://mod.gov.ge/en/page/73/strategic-defence-review>

Tabula. (2015). The closer we get to European and American ‘values,’ the more we’ll turn off Christ and the Church.” Retrieved from <http://www.tabula.ge/ge/verbatim/96850-mghvdeli-rac-ufro-davuaxlovdebit-evropas-mit-metad-davshordebit-qristes>

Tsygankov, A. (2006). If not by tanks, then by banks? The role of soft power in Putin's foreign policy, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 58:7, 1079-1099. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130600926355>

The Guardian. (2016). “Orthodox Christians' global gathering unravels as five churches pull out”. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/14/orthodox-church-gathering-unravels-five-pull-out>

Wilson, E. (2008). Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616, 110-124. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25097997>

Wijk, R. (2001). The limits of military power, *The Washington Quarterly*, 25:1 pp. 75–92. Retrieved from <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1162/016366002753358339>

Ćwiek-Karpowicz, J. 2012. *Limits to Russian Soft Power in the Post-Soviet Area*. Policy review, DGAP analysis. Retrieved from <https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/10.5771/9783845241968-47/limits-to-russian-soft-power-in-the-post-soviet-area>

ივანე ჯავახიშვილის სახელობის თბილისის
სახელმწიფო უნივერსიტეტი

მარიამ წიწიკაშვილი

ჭკვიანი ძალა და მისი შეზღუდვები: რუსეთის ჭკვიანი ძალა
საქართველოში

ევრაზიის და კავკასიის კვლევების სამაგისტრო პროგრამა

სამაგისტრო ნაშრომი შესრულებულია მაგისტრის აკადემიური ხარისხის
მოსაპოვებლად

თემის ხელმძღვანელი: ასოცირებული პროფესორი
Dr. ფიქრია ასანიშვილი

თბილისი 2019

აბსტრაქტი

ჰკვიანი ძალის კონცეფცია განსაკუთრებით მნიშვნელოვანი გახდა მსოფლიოში, რომელიც უპრეცედენტო სიჩქარით იცვლება და სადაც ეროვნული თუ საერთაშორისო ძალის ბუნება იცვლება. ტრადიციულად ჰკვიანი ძალის კონცეფცია ამერიკის საგარეო პოლიტიკის კონტექსტში მიმოიხილება, მიუხედავად იმისა, რომ სხვა სახელმწიფოებოებზე იყენებ ამ ტიპის სტრატეგიებს. აღნიშნული თეზისი ცდილობს შეავსოს ეს სივრცე და ემპირიულად შეისწავლოს ჰკვიანი ძალის ეფექტები და შეზღუდვები საქართველოს მიმართ რუსეთის საგარეო პოლიტიკის მაგალითზე, რომელიც გასული წლების განმავლობაში მოიცავდა როგორც ხისტი, ასევე რბილი ძალის ინსტრუმენტებს. თეზისის საკვლევი კითხვა მდგომარეობს შემდეგში: *რატომ შეიცვალა რუსეთის გამოკვეთილად ხისტ ძალაზე დაფუძნებული პოლიტიკა უფრო შერბილებული ჰკვიანი ძალის პოლიტიკისკენ და რა გავლენა იქონია ამ ცვლილებამ საქართველოს გაცხადებულ ევროპულ და ევროატლანტიკურ საგარეო პოლიტიკურ არჩევანზე?*

ნაშრომი იყენებს case study-ის მეთოდს, რომელშიც გაანალიზებულია რუსეთის საგარეო პოლიტიკური დოკუმენტები და შესაბამისი საჯარო პირების განცხადებები რათა გაანალიზდეს ხისტი და რბილი ძალის ინსტრუმენტები რუსეთის საგარეო პოლიტიკაში. მეორე მხრივ, ნაშრომი მიმოიხილავს საქართველოს ლიდერების განცხადებებს, მის საგარეო და უსაფრთხოების სტრატეგიულ დოკუმენტებს რათა შეაფასოს საქართველოს საგარეო პოლიტიკასა და ქვეყანაში არსებული ტრენდები რუსეთისა და დასავლეთის მიმართებით. ნაშრომი ასევე მიმოიხილავს საქართველოში არსებულ განწყობებს ქვეყნის საგარეო პოლიტიკური მიზნისა და რუსეთის მიმართ. რუსეთის საგარეო პოლიტიკა გაზომილია საქართველოს ეკლესიისა და ტრადიციული მედია დისკურსების შედეგად.

თეზისის ჰიპოთეზა გულისხმობს შემდეგს: *რუსეთის გადაჭარბებულმა დაყრდნობამ ხისტი ძალის ინსტრუმენტებზე შეასუსტა რუსული ჭკვიანი ძალის ეფექტურობა რათა მას ეფექტური გავლენა მოეხდინა საქართველოს ევროპულ და ევროატლანტიკურ საგარეო პოლიტიკურ არჩევანზე.* მიუხედავად იმისა, რომ ნაშრომი ამტკიცებს, რომ რუსეთის ხისტი ძალის ინსტრუმენტებმა მართლაც მოახდინეს ეს ეფექტი და პოლიტიკის დონეზე მოსკოვმა ვერ შეძლო საქართველოს საგარეო პოლიტიკური არჩევანის შეცვლა, თეზისი ასევე მიმოიხილავს საქართველოში საზოგადოებრივ განწყობებში არსებულ ცვლილებებს, რომლებიც სწორედ რუსეთის რბილი ძალის გარკვეულ წარმატებულ შედეგებზე მიუთითებს.