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Russia-Armenian strategic cooperation and its influence over
Armenia's Security

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Abstract

After dissolution of the Soviet Union, Armenia become independent state and ethnic conflict had started in Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia's "near abroad" policy and Turkey's active foreign policy was challenge for post-Soviet states. This paper analyzes Armenia's foreign policy starting from first president of Levon Ter-Petrosyan. The research has historical discourse of Armenian history which focus of World War I and covers Soviet history.

Genocide issue and battle for Nagorno-Karabakh remains one of the most important factor for Armenian nation. These issues has a symbolic importance for the nation and nowadays Yerevan persistently fights for genocide acknowledgment. Starting from first years of independence, the first president of Armenia, Levon Ter-petrosyan had tried to restore relations with Turkey, but he failed. Yerevan remained under strong influence of Russian federation and they are strategic partners as well. Moscow had achieved its influence in Armenia, after opening military base in Gyumri. That base has strategic importance for Moscow, if we glance to other post-soviet republics in South Caucasus, Georgia and Azerbaijan are free from Russia's bases, they had already realized non-exigency of Russians. Military base of Gyumri is as a final bastion and serves Putin's imperial ambitions in South Caucasus.

Research paid in depth attention on Russian-Armenian strategic cooperation, it describes strategic interests between them. In the same way paper describes importance of that cooperation for Armenia and Russian federation for Yerevan. Research paper underlines which factors had influence over strategic cooperation between them.

List of Abbreviations

AO - Autonomous Oblast

ASSR - Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

APF - Azerbaijan Popular Front

CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States

CSTO - Collective security treaty Organization

APNM – Armenian Pan-National Movement

ARF - Armenian Revolutionary Federation

PKK - Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê - Kurdistan Workers Party

FBS - Federal Border Service

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Introduction

The south Caucasian Region, which is mostly one of the dissent and unstable region in the world. Here states with a different foreign policies, lagging behind for future rapprochement and security development. Russia, as a major player in the region, possessing leverages and perceives his influence over the region. Fortunately, Azerbaijan survived from Russian influence but still a victim of harsh heritages, which is inherited from Soviet past. In South Caucasus only Armenia hosts Russian military base, which is strategically important for Moscow and Armenia as well. The opening of military base was important for Armenia, which provides security to Yerevan. But we should think also from Russian perspectives, the Gyumri base ensures Russian influence in region, it is last bastion where Russia has installed strategically important equipment.

For Armenia which remains insular state, Georgia has strategic important as well. Georgia strives to become part of western institutes, which is contradictory for Kremlin strategic thinking in Caucasian region. The rising threats from Putin's Russia towards Georgia, pose serious problem for stability of the region and hinders security, strategic and military cooperation between Armenia and Georgia. Armenia constrained under Russia which has negative impact over neighbors. Historically, Russia has indispensable influence over Yerevan. That influence increased when Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh had started and after opening of military base in Gyumri, Yerevan hanged on Russia. After Levon Ter-Petrosyan, Nagorno-Karabakh clan had captured power, the political crisis which coincide mass shootings in Armenian parliament caused resignation of Ter-Petrosyan and granted power to Robert Kocharyan. Kocharyan had continued pro-Russian foreign policy. After resignation of Kocharyan, which led also political crisis and demonstrations in Yerevan, Serj Sargsyan had become president of Armenia who had prolonged Russian presence in Gyumri until 2044.

The major part of research covers historical analysis in contrast of policy which precise current conditions of Armenia. The research focused on Levon Ter-Petrosyan's foreign policy when he tried to resolve relations with Turkey but Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was crucial for him and detrimental of his regime. Turkey as major strategic partner for Azerbaijan, had took

aggressive stance towards Armenia and Ter-Petrosyan's "Southern-Policy" had failed. Paper focusing to Russia as major player in region and conflict resolution and major military partner for Armenia. However I will try to focus on Moscow's preponderant position over belligerents which hinders peaceful settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and by that way paper reflects the profits for Kremlin which coming from the conflict. The basic part of my research is based on security and military issues and arm race of Armenia, as we know Armenia is major purchaser of Russian military companies.

The strength of Russia, and its participation in formation of Armenia's politics, shows up in last year. At 2017, Armenia had refused to participate NATO's led exercises "Agile Spirit" which hold place in Georgia (news.am, 2017). After that fact simultaneously, media had stated allegations of Russia's influence over Yerevan. Aleksandr Iskandaryan, Director of Caucasus institute believes that behind that decision is special relations with Kremlin and CSTO members. He mentioned: "I am speaking about Russia, of course. I have no specific data, these are just my assumptions. Russia's relations with the West are experiencing a crisis, Perhaps, Armenia refused to attend the NATO drill at the last gasp because of some changes in Moscow. Something has evidently changed in Moscow. It could be connected with many factors" (Mghdesyan, Eurasia Daily, 2017). Another expert, Tevan Poghosyan connects the decision of efforts, where Yerevan tries to avoid political pressures from Moscow, but at the same time outcome of this blinked decision would harm Armenia's image in eyes of International community, which would be negative for Armenia. Poghosyan said: "Such decision that are made in a blink of eye create a reputation of an unpredictable partner' in the world community " (Mghdesyan, Eurasia Daily, 2017).

After those allegations, Defense Ministry of Armenia evaluated above-mentioned statements nothing but only a speculation. Defense Ministry of Armenia called this exercise as non-necessity for Yerevan, there was not any official statements around this incident. (Mkrtchyan, 2017). But such unequivocal decision had occurred also in 2002, when Georgia was participating in NATO's Partnership program, when Armenia suddenly took same decision like in 2017. But there was official statement of Lt-Gen. Arutyunyan, when he stated that Armenia might send military observes to the exercises, despite of Soldiers (Civil.ge, 2002)

As I mentioned above, Yerevan is big purchaser of Russian equipment, consequently this actions, is guarantor of stability and military balance vis-a-vis Azerbaijan, to deter both parties from further confrontation. Chronologically, military and security relations with Russia had started after dissolution of Soviet Union, with war hysteria over Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia become member of Russian led, Collective security treaty organization (1992). Under military cooperation, Armenia has signed several contracts with Russia, which considers to supply high tech military hardware, and conventional weapons for Armenia. On the last year Armenia and Russian Federation has signed an agreement, which gave Armenia an export loans, with and 3 percent annual interest rates (Weekly, 2017). Around this document, Yerevan will export Russian arms for the necessity of state security to meet requirements of military units. With strong economic relations, Russia had strengthened its position in Armenia, they elaborated common strategies. In 2015 parties have signed an agreement and unifying Air-defense systems in Caucasus. (Today, 2015)

Research paper examines, Russia-Armenian strategic cooperation and its influence over Armenia's Security. As we can see, Russia is major security provider for Armenia, research describes all steps and factors which has significant influence over it. Therefore research focuses on policymakers decisions which had indispensable influence to bringing back Armenia under Russian influence and transformed it Kremlin's "last bastion" in south Caucasus. And as a result large number of military personnel and high-tech piece of weaponry had already in Armenia, Gyumri is first largest base of Russia in Southern military district, where strong defensive systems are already allocated. Moscow had needed reason to return in Caucasus and conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh was best opportunity. Protracted conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh gives Russia leverages to use and justify its military presence in Armenia and push Moscow to stand behind its strategic interests in South Caucasus. In fact, Moscow's strategy assessment gives us images of arms race between Armenia and Russia and at the same time with Azerbaijan is grand strategy of Russia and expression of "divide and rule" policy over region.

Research question and hypothesis

The facts which I have mentioned above, intensifies general view about Armenia that it is under strong influences of Russia. So the basic part of my research will cover the reasons and scenarios which indicates of Armenia's pro-Russian orientation. The research question is formed as follow: **"Which factors defined strategic partnership between Armenia and Russia?"** The research also answers, **how this cooperation reduces security threats from Turkey?**

The thesis underlines a historical experience of Armenian people, which consists by tribulation and bitter experience with its neighbor Turkey. The shadows of Genocide, was one of the major issue, which affects perception of Armenian people toward Turks. The research covers effects of genocide to Armenian people and for better explanation of historical experience Pier Nora's lieu de memoire is used. Despite of Ter-Petrosyan, who started resolving relations with Turkey, aggressive rhetoric from Ankara and its policymakers had played indispensable role and hindered future rapprochement of Armenia and Turkey. Therefore research reflects strong influence of historical memory over Armenia's behavior.

Major part of thesis covers Turkish activities, started from Genocide and World War I, Turkey become major factor for Armenia's foreign policy. However Dissolution of Soviet Union and losses of hegemony in central Asia, Balkans, Middle East and in the South Caucasus was best chance for Turkey and started to increase Ankara's influence. In 1991, Turgut Ozal's post-cold war press-conference expressed that; "Turkey should leave its passive and hesitant policy and engage an active foreign policy."(Makovsky: 1999:1). When crumble of Soviet Union was inevitable Turkey had increased military budget, to accomplish that goals and regain influence of territories which was once under Ottoman rulers.

We can assume that Turkey was major threat for Armenian statehood. Turkish policymakers had stated anti-Armenian allegations. Statements was characterized strong support of Azerbaijan and detrimental for Armenia. Turkey's anger was Armenia's significant victories against Azerbaijan for Nagorno-Karabakh. The battle of Khojali was final straw for Turkey and

Turgut Ozal and in 1993 he said that Turkey must “show its teeth” (BAKU, 1993) to Armenia and force it, to stop dispatching troops from Azerbaijan’s territories. The hypothesis is formulated as follow: *Turkish aggressive foreign policy after the dissolution of USSR, which threatened to Armenia and promised incursion, had influenced foreign policy of Yerevan and choose pro-Russian vector and deepened strategic cooperation with Moscow.*

As a result of the research, the hypothesis will be explained by Stephen M. Walt’s idea of origin of alliances, which based on neo-realist school of international relations. Author explains different scenarios of alliance formations and underlines two behavior of states: Balancing and Bandwagoning. From his arguments, the factors which are inducing alliance formations are shaping international system and the outcome of interactions are Balancing or Bandwagoning behaviors. In Armenia’s case balancing behavior fits, which was immediate response of Turkish threats. Author goes much further and describes threats as major stimulator of alliance formation and he suggested major threats: aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power and aggressive intentions, all those factors had induced Armenian policymakers and based on balancing behavior choose “Protector” of motherland.

The next theoretical explanation of “Turkish aggressive foreign policy and threats to Armenia, had influenced Armenia’s foreign policy and choose pro-Russian foreign policy” hypothesis is theory of constructivism. If we consider Turkish-Armenian relations during World War I, from constructivist understanding international relations, which is infused by intersubjective understandings and “social relationship” Armenian people had identified themselves as anti-Turks which was outcome of social interaction which had bitterly obliterated Armenian population and marked in history as an Armenian Genocide.

Methodology

Content analysis of official data and documents and public statements of politicians was an important part of the research. Research relies on content analysis of public statements, which “help us learn more about essentially unavailable public figures because it does not require their cooperation.” (Hermann, 2008). With a content analysis official documents, archived articles and interviews is analyzed.

The research is an attempt in-depth study of Armenian history, where detailed explanation covers relations with Turkey, Russia and West. Research in the same way highlights Genocide and ethnic conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Due to the nature of the topic, the case study is the most relevant methodological approach to study this issue. As Yin (Yin, 1994) puts it, “case studies emphasize detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions and their extensive descriptions and analysis of that instance taken as a whole and in its context“. Thus, case study is concerned with close observation of how a particular process is played out in a particular context. Case study is the most relevant approach for us because it helps to understand why Armenia and Russia have strategic cooperation, consequently it reflects which factors had influence which bonds these states together.

Research used also quantitative research methods which reflects Turkish military spending after the dissolution of Soviet Union. In research I have SIPRI’s (global institute of conflict studies, peace and disarmament) data analyses and World Bank data, which reflects Turkish military spending, as a result it depicts incremental numbers of Turkish military.

Chapter 1: Conflict with Turkey and Historical disappointment

Armenians have always been most favored nation under the Ottoman Empire, they were prominent merchants, gunsmiths and artists, the group of people who were trying to enrich state treasury. After fall of Byzantium, Armenian merchants had leading role under Ottoman Empire, the rating port of Smyrna, Armenians were sailing across the Europe, India and China. Merchants had played crucial role of developing Ottoman's trading potential. Armenian apostolic church had its autonomous "*millet*" under Ottoman rulers and was always loyal community for Sultans.

But this situation had radically changed in a short period of the World War I. The events which had drastically undermined Armenians presence in Turkey at the beginning of 20th century and emerge an eternal idea of struggle for salvation. This historical memory gives an echoes of contemporary policy of Armenian people and the genocide has a symbolic importance of Armenian nation inside country and for diaspora as well. As Pierre Nora describes historical memory or "A lieu de mémoire is any significant entity, whether material or non-material in nature, which by dint of human will or the work of time has become a symbolic element of the memorial heritage of any community" (Nora:1996). This explanation highlights idea of Armenian genocide, which reflects an eternal remembrance of that event against innocent civilians. This phenomenon had imprinted in mind of Armenian people and perception of them toward Turks was gradually changed. That moment of bitter experience from history has deepened by war in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1988 and nowadays those moments has an influence of Armenian nation and country's foreign policy and creates idea of struggle for freedom and salvation. As Svante Cornell mentions in the book *Small Nations and Great Powers*: "it is no exaggeration to state that the 'genocide', as it is always referred to in Armenia, is one of the most important factors determining Armenian society today." (Cornell, 2005, p. 21) Yerevan is always trying to highlight that issue, the nation had encapsulated the tragedy and the bitter memory which would never tarnish from their minds. As Pier Norra mentions: "Memory is a perpetually actual phenomenon, a bond tying us to the eternal present."(Nora: 1989) From this explanation we can assume that genocide has intensified and promote creation an image of Turkey as an oppressors of Armenian

people. Despite Ter-petrosyan efforts, who once tried to resolve relations with Turkey, has failed he got strong critics from society and opposition. The critics intensified, when Petrosyan denounced ARF(Armenian Revolutionary Federation) nationalist party and charged them as promoter of genocide during World War I. Stephan Astourian, in his publication, "From Ter-Petrosian to Kocharian: Leadership Change in Armenia" wrote that:"Ter-Petrosyan himself gave a speech in which he blamed the ARF (Armenian Revolutionary Federation or "Dashnaktiutiun") for helping to provoke genocide."(Astourian: 2001). Furthermore Ter-Petrosyan tried to take off genocide form Armenia's foreign policy because he believed that, those steps would promote of resolving relations with Turkey. Petrosyan's "southern policy" (Astourian, 2000) implied rapprochement with Turkey, but the genocide factor which was sensitive for Armenians and "perpetually actual phenomenon" (Norra: 1989), had failed President's plans. Petrosyan believed flexible diplomacy, for him economic prosperity was more important than historical hardship, but people of Armenia and opposition was thinking differently. Ter-Petrosyan had charged several times in treason by opposition and an ordinary citizens, after he intensified anti-genocide allegations. Stephan Astourian described that as follow: "Ter-Petrosian, at that time president of the Supreme Soviet, argued against including a clause about the genocide because doing so would be wrong from both a political and a diplomatic viewpoint." After the allegation, major diaspora parties which were Armenian Communist Party (ACP), Armenian Revolutionary Front (ARF) and Armenian Democratic Liberal Organization was persistently against that decision and rapprochement with Turkey as well. They wanted historic justice for Armenia, which means western territories of Turkey and acknowledgment of genocide, and Ter-petrosyan's policy had caused dissent among the ruling party member. Even the people who were under "perpetually actual phenomenon" (Nora: 1989), was impossible for them to realize positive outcomes of "southern policy" and apparently rapprochement with Turkey was impossible. This impossibility also deepened after Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, when Ankara was avowedly supporting to Azerbaijan.

Armenian genocide occurred in April of 1915, when large number of intellectuals and ordinary Armenians was Arrested by Ottomans and later executed. The outbreak massacre ended up in 1917 it was bloodiest history in South Caucasus. The official number of victims is 1.5

million people, the major theater of massacre was western Anatolia where Armenians was inhabited. As Thomas de Waal in his book *The Caucasus An introduction* putted: "It was Armenian homeland medieval churches and monuments testified to an ancient Armenians presence" (De Waal: 2010:53). If we take a look of before period of Armenian genocide, there was also massacres of them by Ottomans. Armenian rebels who formed self-defense militia known as "fedayi," against Kurdish Hamidian forces who were regularly looting Armenian families inside Turkey, was brutally crushed by Ottomans in 1915 and killed 88 000 Armenians.

After Genocide Armenian people had eventually removed from Turkey. At this moment Turkish political agenda occupied by "Young Turks" who were nationalists and tried to modernize and strengthen the Ottoman Empire, they had deposed Sultan Abdul Hamid and established constitutional parliament, and power had gained by three Pashas – Talat Pasha, Enver Pasha and Jemal Pasha. In March 1914, the Young Turks entered World War I on the side of Germany. Enver Pasha who had Pan-Turkish beliefs immediately started Caucasian campaign, where his army met Russian Imperial forces, Russian was heavily supported by Armenian groups, "and bitter wintry conditions and railway terminus at Sarikamis, south of Kars, in January 1915, suffered one of the worst defeat in military history. Ottomans had loss 75 000 soldiers.

As a result Ottomans, made harsh measures against Armenians, in a reason of imperial security they blamed Armenian in cooperation with Russian Empire who was vigorous enemy of Turkey and undermined Turkish strength in East part of State by the Armenian clandestine operations. And In 1916, Young Turks started anti-Armenian campaign and charged them in treason. In fact "There were Armenian nationalists who acted as guerrillas and cooperated with Russians. They briefly seized the city of Van in the spring of 1915." (KIFNER, n.d.). Young Turks started confiscated of Armenian properties, weapons and money, families were separated. Talat Pasha had ordered to arrest 250 leading Armenians in Constantinople, he also started mass deportations of Armenians from Turkey, the events was ferocious and nightmare for Armenians and after they had escaped from Turkey and become fugitives as a result they are scattered around the world. "The legacy of the First World War massacres have also left a deep imprint on the Armenian psyche" (Cornell, 2005, p. 21). From Ottoman officials "Armenian purges" was committed in a reason of state security, otherwise they would rebel against central authority.

After 1923, when Turkey established as a nation-state, started to abolish and hide any traces and proofs of Armenian genocide. Turkey needed construction of myths and collective memory, which base would have been on Turkish national history without any violent past. This moment from Turkish history described by Uğur Ümit Üngör, *Lost in commemoration: the Armenian genocide in memory and identity*. While silencing certain memories as it did after 1923, “the regime produces other memories and narratives.” (Üngör, 2014), according of author Turkey had always tried deny acknowledgment of genocide. Author underlines that all totalitarian regimes are behaving similarly that way. Regimes are trying to tarnish the violence past which is unpleasant for it. Also, author brings an examples of Nazi Germany and Communist Russia, where authorities under dictators trying to delete ethnic crimes which occurred under them reign. Turkey was blocking every legal books which was written about Armenian genocide. After author brings an example of how Kemalists were justifying all those actions, “they themselves had tried to bury the unpleasant memories that would come to haunt Turkey decades later.” (Üngör, 2014) But everything developed differently, Armenians reinvigorated the feeling and printed in them mind like “perpetually actual phenomenon” (Nora, 1989) and nowadays the memory of persecution, famine and physical obliteration of the nation are the bitter historical moment of this nation and unpleasant moment for Turkey. Revenge for Genocide was started in 1921, when first shot for victims was in Great Britain. After, Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) had prolonged this actions. But why Turkey under Ataturk was trying to “violent past to be muted?” Author brings argument from Machiavellian idea: “that acknowledging the genocide would generate a net power loss.” (Üngör, 2014) In Power loss author means oppositional parties, which would take resistance and charge with an incompetence of current regime. This is one reason why Ataturk persecutes memory of genocide, but there is second reason, image of state in international arena, which would cause degradation in case of acknowledgment. Apparently, Turkey always tried to hide those acts, even contemporary politics of Ankara is based on non-Acknowledgment strategy which constrains his policy in Europe and even in America.

The moment of salvation of Armenia’s bitter experience with Turkey continued in short period of independence after World War I, during 1918-1920. Armenia, had officially declared

independence in 1918, but threats from Turkey and possible confrontation was unavoidable. Despite support of the stability from international community, Turkish foreign policy promised obliteration of Armenia. Under treaty of Sevres Turkish Empire was dissolved and it was new beginning for Armenia. Armenia demands western part of Turkey, where they lived until the genocide and Yerevan continued expansion of its border, they had pointed Nakhichevan and Easter Anatolia. Under treaty of Sevres, Armenia must receive some parts of Turkish territories even the map of state was drawn by Woodrow Wilson, as Thomas d Waal describes :“thanks to lobbying of Woodrow Wilson, and be given vast new state, comprising much of eastern Anatolia, including Trabzon on the Black Sea.” (Waal T. D., 2010, p. 68). The terms of treaty was rejected by Turkish government and Kemal Ataturk who was prime minister of Grand National assembly of Turkey, the war broken up in September 1920. “Kemal launched new offensive in Anatolia, again capturing Kars, and then Alexandropol (Gyumri), and threatening to overrun the whole Armenia” (Waal T. D., 2010, p. 69). The Turkish “Caucasian campaign leaded by Ziya Gokalp, and his motto ‘Turkify, Modernize and Islamize” (Cornell, 2005, p. 276), has failed after the World War I because At the same moment Bolshevik’s 11th Army had crossed Armenian border and captured Yerevan.

“In early October 1920, Armenian Republic addressed the governments of Great Britain, France, Italy and other Allied powers, to force the Turks to stop their offensive,” (Andersen, n.d.). The war ended up in November when Turkish army had crossed Armenian border and occupied Alexandropol (contemporary Gyumri), treaty of Alexandropol was signed immediately. Armenia was exhausted, the resources scattered and military was weakened. The first republic headed by Prime Minister Simon Vratsian faced important political decision. Threats from Turkish nationalist regime was visible and clear, genocide which was occurred several years ago had a huge influence for Armenia at this moment. The choice must be done between bad and worse, in that case Turkey was worse, while Russia was bad. In 1920 Armenian government decided to allow Soviet Army’s entrance in Armenia and transferred power to communists. “Armenian independence was ended up at the price of protection from Turks, and the new Soviet Republic of Armenia was declared” (Waal T. D., 2010, p. 69). As re result treaty of Moscow signed and “finally drew present-day Armenia” (Waal T. D., 2010, p. 69).

1.1 Soviet Union and Historical disappointment

Establishment of communism in Armenia had pushed gradual changes over state. The issue of Nagorno-Karabakh and anti-Turkish sentiments nested in Armenian population as a result, those factors have had several expressions and gathered them around. Nagorno-Karabakh had important under Soviet Union, it was always mobiliser for the nation and bond them against enemy, which in them minds for Turkey for Genocide and Azerbaijanis for Nagorno-Karabakh. If we take a look in the beginning of communism in contrast of Nagorno-Karabakh problem, we will see that it was deliberately created by Joseph Stalin and Vladimir Lenin. Nowadays, the explosion of Nagorno-Karabakh costly affects to Armenia and Azerbaijan, simultaneously anti-Turkish sentiments prevailed when confrontation had started.

As we can see the creator of Nagorno-Karabakh problem was Soviet Union, which then rooted by Armenian intelligentsia and have had several expression by Armenian population. Moscow's strategy which promoted and was waking up Armenia's feelings to regain control on Nagorno-Karabakh called "nativization" or "krenizacia" policy. The "nativization" strategy served to increase Moscow's central powers and decrease powers of autonomous republics. This strategy divides nation and states by strict and artificial boundaries, "strategy was to use national delimitation to create sources of dissent among the Caucasian peoples in particular, whom Stalin saw as the most disloyal in the union" (Cornell, 2005, p. 27). In case of Caucasus under ferocious ruling of Joseph Stalin, idea of national uprising against regime had eliminated. Soviet authority sow dissent among the nations and Kremlin traditional policy of "divide and rule" rushed out. In July 1923 the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region was created within Azerbaijan, with borders that gave it was majority inhabitant Armenian population, approximately number of 94 percent. Svante E. Cornell puts in: "Stalin actually managed to divide both the Armenian and Azeri peoples into non-contiguous territories, creating the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh (an AO) completely encircled by Azerbaijan, and the Azeri enclave of Nakhchivan (an ASSR), cut off from mainland Azerbaijan by Armenia." (Cornell, 2005, p. 28) Therefore, major issue was who could handle this territories, Azerbaijanis communist party or Armenian communists. Svante E. Cornell describes that period as follow: "under Soviet pressure from central authority (Azerbaijan SSR) issued a statement that Karabakh, Zangezur, and Nakhchivan

were all to be transferred to Armenian control,” but the decision changed and control of these territories reached by Azerbaijan. Supposedly USSR authority considered Kemalist Turk’s position, Joseph Stalin and Vladimir Lenin had positive views toward Ankara. Turkey seems to be a possible ally for Bolsheviks, after the Soviet Union established, Russia (USSR) and Turkey signed a Treaty of Brotherhood and Friendship. Under the provisions of this treaty “both Nakhchivan and Karabakh were to be placed under the control of the Azerbaijani SSR.” (Cornell, 2005, p. 60) Consequently, anti-Armenian decision had strengthened its feelings of “perpetually actual phenomenon ” (Nora, 1989), Mustafa Kemal Atatürk continued his discredit policy against Soviet Armenia, “Atatürk was hostile to any territorial arrangements favoring Soviet Armenia, since a strong Armenia could have potential territorial claims on Turkey.” (Cornell, 2005, p. 60). Atatürk had believed that strong Armenia would express its territorial concern as it did after Treaty of Sevres. Thus, if we take a look of this historical period, we can assume that the solution of issue had buried in deep by authority, and future of confrontation had deliberately created under Soviet Union. Even after under communist rule, Armenians had protested government decision and requested to re-transfer Nagorno-Karabakh oblast.

As it seems, for Armenians complex of territorial losses, intensified by Soviet Union and Turkey, which gave big impetus to Armenian people and intellectuals. Territorial losses in western Armenia for Nakhichevan and in Eastern Armenia for Nagorno-Karabakh “have a catalytic effect” (Cornell, 2005, p. 60). The territorial problems for new Soviet Socialist republic of Armenia had been solved under close cooperation of Moscow and Turkey. The historical disappointment of Armenians have started from 1920, when treaty of Kars signed and despite western promises Armenia had lost Eastern territories. The frustration also was continued under Soviet Union when they lost Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh resulted by treaty of Moscow in 1921. In the end of World War I, and formations imperial powers near Armenia’s border, it was unavoidable fact that it was only chess pawn in geopolitical chess-board where Turkey and Soviet Union had levers and controls the rules. The Treaty of Moscow was attempted rapprochement of Moscow and Ankara, under those treaty parties had solved major border disputes which was posed by treaty of Kars and treaty of Sevres. Thereafter, Moscow recognized only Atatürk Government in Turkey and foreign aid was tremendously dispatched “As a result of the treaty, the Soviets supplied the

nationalists with weapons and ammunition, which the Turks used successfully in a war against Greece in 1921–22.” (Britannica, n.d.) There is an interesting statement of Richard Hovhannesian, which is brought by Svante E. Cornell’s book *Small nation and Great Powers*: “Soviet Russia, on the international front, sacrificed the Armenian question to cement the Turkish Alliance.” (Cornell, 2005, p. 62). The powerless Armenian had lost all the lands which were part of Armenia at once, but the goal of irredentism had accumulated under communism. But under censorship of communism, Armenian people had expressed several times, to turn back Nagorno-Karabakh oblast, which reflects strong will and continuation of struggle. There were persistent efforts of Armenian people who were trying of returning Nagorno-Karabakh under Soviet Armenia, but it was suppressed by Joseph Stalin. In 1936, Soviet union disbanded Transcaucasian federation and Armenian sentiments of reunification Karabakh oblast was intensified, Claude Mutafian in his book *The Caucasian Knot: The History & Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabakh* describes persistency of Armenian nation for Nagorno-Karabakh as follow: “In Armenia the weak and timid sentiments of first Party Secretary Khanjian did include the problem of Karabakh,” (Mutafian, 1994, p. 145) after he personally addressed to Stalin, unfortunately that was his last political act toward authority and his initiative was not welcomed by Jugashvili. He was executed in July of 1936, by Lavrenti Beria. After Khanjian, Harutiunian in 1945 did the same he explained to Stalin why Nagorno-Karabakh ought to be united to Armenia, but this proposal was rejected again, but he survived from execution.

After Stalin’s reign, de-Stalinization melted the fears censorship and weakened its constraints, as a result intensified goals of Armenian people of regaining control in Nagorno-Karabakh region. Following that events Karabakh issue and irredentism returned in Armenians perception. The outbreak of discontent in Nagorno-Karabakh marked at 1965, when “2,500 signatures of Armenians from autonomous region and the northern district were sent to Khrushchev” (Mutafian, 1994, p. 145). Khrushchev had idly looked at this, while for that, Azerbaijani assassinated 18 Armenians tremendously on same year. After this petition, in the capital Yerevan some demonstrations took place. Citizens marked 48th anniversary of Genocide, were shouting “Our Lands” in city streets (Mutafian, 1994). During the demonstration people wanted erect the monument of Genocide and message of Nagorno-Karabakh was putting,

according of Mutafian demonstrators motto was “Our Lands,” applied to Armenian regions in Turkey historical parts of Western Armenia and in Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh region. Demonstrators also sang a nationalist songs and was shouting anti-Turkish declarations (Bobelian, 2011). The return of Turkish lands to Armenia was of course impossible but in 1967 authority of USSR had erected genocide monument on hill of Tsiternakaberd in Yerevan. Demonstrations had taken place on other part of world, for example in France, Syria, Egypt, Argentina and USA. At this moment Turkey was not standing idly and in USA Turkish diplomats had denounced demonstrations in USA. For them commemoration of genocide was tragic and failure of Turkish foreign policy.

The next wave of protest was shaken form intellectuals, when “new petition was sent to Moscow addressed to high level party and government bodies” (Mutafian, 1994, p. 146). Between the activists was prominent novelist and head of Karabakh Writers Union from 1949, Bagrat Ulubabyan. Simultaneously, Azerbaijani authority of Nagorno-Karabakh had started intimidation of Armenians to hollow out any idea of reunification with Armenia. Mutafian describes that event as “In 1968 Stepanakert was the scene of confrontations between Armenians and Azerbaijanis” (Mutafian, 1994, p. 146) The situation on Nagorno-Karabakh for Armenians was unchanged, moreover Heydar Aliyev head of Azerbaijan SSR, tried to reintegrate region under Azerbaijan's auspices and mentioned it as an undivided part for Soviet Azerbaijan. Mutafian brings Aliyev's words which had left Armenians tormented at this time “a great stimulus to the renaissance and socialist blossoming of mountainous Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan which is an integral part” (Mutafian, 1994) As it seems, desire of reunification Nagorno-Karabakh under Armenia intensified after destalinization. All demonstrations of peaceful protests was soaked by nationalist sentiments and eternity of Armenian nation. As Thomas De Waal described in his article *The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict:* “the 1960s post-Stalinist ‘thaw’ initiated by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, which created conditions for sanctioned, or ‘orthodox’, forms of nationalism.” (Waal T. D., 2005) Consequently it was difficult to curb and resist expression of national sentiments and dramatic history “were later propagated by writers such as Zia Bunyatov and Zori Balayan” (Waal T. D., 2005).

The impetus of sentiments was also reinvigorated by well-known writers and those books and poetry, where major issue for Armenians were struggle for nationhood and salvation. For example: Khachik Dashtents, Hovhannes Shiraz, Paruyr Sevak, Sero Khanzadyan, Silva Kaputikyan, and etc. “Their books and poetry were widely read, distributed, and discussed”. (Ter-Matevosyan, 2018)

Armenian nation after destalinization had obsessed with national sentiments much more than before and symbolism from national history had been revitalized, when censorship was faded up. The construction of some monuments and historically indispensable museums had big influence on Armenia. After 1959 they had Matenadaran, which is manuscript museum of Armenia. In contrast of destalinization, 1962 massive statue of Stalin had been removed and substituted by statue of “Mother of Armenia,” furthermore prominent warrior and king, Sasuntsi David’s monument erected near railway station in 1965. After two years and torn of demonstrations which I have mentioned above, monument of genocide erected in Tsitsernakaberd. In 1968 Kochinyan head of Armenia’s communist party, “convinced Soviet leaders necessity of celebration 2750th anniversary of Urartian Erebuni—modern-day Yerevan” (Ter-Matevosyan, 2018). The monuments boom in Yerevan had ended up, erection the statue of Vardan Mamikonyan, prominent general and hero of historic battles. Consequently, under the Soviet Union started from Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev and Vladimir Gorbachev was unable to curb those impulses of nationalism and the creation of symbolic form of history by historical monuments had easily promoted creation of anti-Turkish feelings. Furthermore, discontent against Turkey and persistent to reinstate Armenia’s authority in historically western part of Armenia which was lost after Genocide had found eternal place inside population and become “perpetually actual phenomenon” (Nora, 1989). Whereas the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh which was under Azerbaijan, had symbolic ramification inside Armenian perceptions too. The biggest part of non-forgettable of those tribulations contributed by intelligentsia, As Nora mentioned “the relationships between history, memory, and the nation were characterized as more than natural currency: they were shown to involve a reciprocal circularity, a symbiosis at every level—scientific and pedagogical, theoretical and practical” (Nora, 1989, p. 10) follow that idea,

pedagogical memory is development documentary erudition writings in a reason to transfer memory as scholarly to future generation. For Pierre Nora its and national responsibility of transmission those memories. The Armenian intellectuals who were actively agitating and done well documented history where anti-Turkish and irredentism ideas prevailing, transform it as a “perpetually actual phenomenon” or “memory of life”. “Museums, archives, cemeteries, festivals, anniversaries, treaties, depositions, monuments, sanctuaries, fraternal orders these are the boundary stones of another age, illusions of eternity.” (Nora, 1989) Those monuments which had built under communism as a results of demonstrations become necessary materials which serves those memories. Armenian diaspora had played immeasurable role for creation Genocide memory and assimilated “national responsibility” of “pedagogical function” and by the well documented works Genocide become unforgettable and part of Armenian population.

Intensified of national feelings inside population, caused non-forgettable of Nagorno-Karabakh which had blew up in 1988 and involved Azerbaijan and Armenia into full scale war against each other, as well as Turkey and Russian federation was trying to handle the conflict for sake of them interests. The historical experience which was full of punishment and the struggle for salvation reinvigorated national feelings in Armenia and linked them to future where shadows of Ottomans was promising destruction. All expressions, demonstrations and discontent of Armenian people was soaked by nationalism and had spiritual connection to past which become eternal. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and uncontrolled clashes, an expression of nationalism finally caused protracted conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. The likelihood of conflict intensified when Sumgait pogroms occurred and Azerbaijanis deemed like Ottoman Turks, Svante E. Cornell describes this moment as follow: “To the Armenians, Sumgait was like a reminder of the massacres of the First World War and equated the Azeri with the Ottoman armies.”(Cornell: 70:2005). The struggle for Nagorno-Karabakh and Genocide issue, both are perpetually actual phenomenon” (Nora: 1989) for Armenia and major driven force for future foreign politics. Which creates illusion of eternal struggle for salvation against Turks (Azerbaijan as well). These factors have an indispensable influence for diaspora and population, for them it is divine and spiritual past with a bitter elements which always bonds them together against enemy.

Chapter 2: Dissolution of the Soviet Union and War in Nagorno-Karabakh

Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh have had breaking point for Armenian People. The genocide experience and Nagorno-Karabakh become cornerstone for statehood and nationality which encapsulated in Armenian history. This chapter underlines outbreak conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh and what influences did it have on Armenia. We will see that conflict gradually changed region's geopolitical scenario and promoted Russian Federation to reinvigorate its positions in that region. Major part will cover Turkey as historical rival for Armenia and Ankara's role on belligerents.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict had started in 1988, but precursor of confrontations was Zori Balayan book which was about Azerbaijan and Turkey, where author described them as a threats for Armenian People. Svante E. Cornell describes the beginning of this as follow: "In 1984, the well-known Armenian writer Zori Balayan published a book which was widely perceived in Azerbaijan as including defamatory language with respect to Turks in general and Azerbaijani Turks in particular." (Cornell, 2005, p. 64). If we take a clear look of Balayan's work "Balayan calls the Turks and by extension the Azerbaijanis the "enemy" of both Russia and Armenia." (Waal T. D., 2003, p. 143). Despite of censorship which could not affects at all, this book was published and easily survived politburo's constraints and simultaneously in Baku protests had took place. In 1987, intellectuals from Yerevan, had rapidly signed a petition and demanded from Moscow to transfer Nagorno-Karabakh oblast to Armenian Socialist republic. The Nagorno-Karabakh has long rooted discontent, among Azerbaijan and Armenian nations. Thomas de Waal even went further and described Nagorno-Karabakh position during reign of Stalinism. In his book "Black Garden," he underlines the demands of transferring oblast under Yerevan's authority which according to him had started before the 1987. He underlines: "An underground movement for unification with Armenia had existed inside Karabakh for decades. Whenever there was a political thaw or major political shift in the USSR—in 1945, 1965, and 1977, for example—Armenians sent letters and petitions to Moscow, asking for Nagorno-Karabakh to be made part of Soviet Armenia." (Waal T. D., Black Garden , 2003, p. 16). And here, Armenian came back again for "Black Garden" and "With the advent of glasnost and perestroika under Gorbachev, they begin to mobilize

again.” (Waal T. D., Black Garden , 2003, p. 16). Mark Saroyan mentioned Armenian persistence for Nagorno-Karabakh as a historical right to rejoin it on Armenia: “decades-old aspirations for union with Armenia.” (Saroyan, 1997, p. 175) Gorbachev and Politburo was unable to detent the situation, state apparatus collapsed and decayed of leading ideology and could not halt a national uprising. It was unpredictable for Azerbaijanis, as de Waal puts in his publication: “to them that Nagorno-Karabakh was part of their republic was a self-evident fact, reinforced by everyday news as well as by scholarly literature that stressed the territory’s Azerbaijani heritage.” (Waal T. D., 2005). Gorbachev's plan to resolve situation was follow: “neither local Karabakh Armenian nor republican Azerbaijani security forces could be relied on to keep order and had a motorized battalion of 160 Soviet Interior Ministry troops dispatched from the neighboring republic of Georgia to Karabakh.” (Waal T. D., 2003, p. 12) The situation in Karabakh worsen, refugees flow from Armenia and Azerbaijan precipitate inter-state war, which become harsh and detrimental for both sides. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, in 1991, civil clashes between former soviet republics, transformed inter-state confrontation. The situation become harsh and uncontrolled when both sides inherited Soviet weaponry which had recklessly used against each other, “At the same time the transfer of Soviet weaponry to each side increased the destructive capacity of both combatants” (Waal T. D., 2005)

At the beginning of Karabakh conflict, Moscow was supporter of Azerbaijan. Baku was ruled by pro-Russian government headed by Ayaz Mutalibov. To detent the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and stop Armenian paramilitary forces, Russia and Azerbaijan had conducted joint operation, code name “operation ring” (Օղակ գործողություն). The aftermath of this operation was territorial losses for Armenia, and Azerbaijan advanced. “Operation Ring, as it was called, forced more than 20,000 Armenian villagers to become displaced people, and many others were brutalized and killed.” (Astourian, 2000). Mutalibov had persuaded Russian authority to conduct that operation, at this time Armenia was developing mostly Anti-Soviet and anti-Russian state. Armenian ruling party Armenia’s pan-National Movement members, more of them was anti-Russian, and according Astourian that operation was “a clear message of warning from Moscow”

(Astourian, 2000). And such operation had furthered Armenia from Soviet Union. The operation had punishment nature of Armenia and serves Moscow's "divide and rule" strategy.

At that time Azerbaijan experienced political crisis. Mark Saroyan, Armenian professor of Islamic and Soviet studies coined the term "Karabakh Syndrome" (Saroyan, 1997). He believed that, term was for Azerbaijan politics, and in a contrast of Karabakh conflict, this term could explain the general situation in Azerbaijan. The Popular unrest in Baku and downfall of pro-Russian ruler, Moscow had radically changed political vectors toward Baku and provide support to Armenia. After Mutalibov Azerbaijan popular front (APF) came into power and president of Azerbaijan become Abulfaz Elchibey. He had nationalistic and pro-Turkist policy. Azerbaijan in 1992, has rejected to become member of Russian led security organization, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), while Armenia Become member of it in 1992. After Abulfaz Elchibey, president of Azerbaijan become Heydar Aliyev, old soviet policymaker, and in 1993 he started restoration of failed relation with Russia and become member of CIS in 1994. By Commonwealth of independent State (CIS) and Collective security treaty Organization (CSTO).

In Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrosyan elected as a president of the republic at 1991. Before presidency he was member of the Karabakh Movement, organization which was persistently trying to reunite Nagorno-Karabakh under Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. But after Armenian National Movement came to power, for president Ter-Petrosyan, Karabakh problem become minor issue. Thomas de Waal described that moment as follow: "the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia was the "catalyst" of the 1988 movement but not necessarily its central goal" (Waal T. D., 2003) As it seems, Ter-Petrosyan used sensitive issue for further uprising against Soviet system. Petrosyan had also anti-Russian sentiments as well, Stephan Astourian wrote about that:"Ter-Petrosian argued that these events had destroyed the "illusion" that the USSR ensured the security of the Armenians" (Astourian, 2000, p. 19) according author, Petrosyan mean pogroms against Armenian population in Baku, where Russia under Gorbachev did nothing, only sparked ethnic clashes and promoted instability of Armenia.

Chronologically at first year of Ter-Petrosyan presidency, characterized as anti-Russian. He's party intellectuals supporting idea of independent, "the leaders of new Armenian state

should take a different approach than adopted by previous Armenian leaders” (Astourian, 2000, p. 19), he considers historical disappointment of Armenian nation when they lost their lands in Anatolia. Levon Ter-Petrosyan tried to resolve relations with Turkey but his foreign policy had failed. The Armenian genocide and Nagorno-Karabakh which is a touchy issue for the population, treated as a minor problem by APNM ideologists. The efforts of the ruling party were to decrease genocide hysteria and Karabakh problem for Armenia in a reasonable approach to Turkey. As Stephan Astourian mentions: “The ideologists of the APNM argued that, for the sake of independence and state building, the Armenian genocide should be left off Armenia’s political agenda.” (Astourian, 2000, p. 19). Furthermore, when Armenia’s Supreme Soviet had declared independence of Armenia, Ter-Petrosyan was against to include a clause of genocide in the constitution, he thought that it would be an immature act for Armenia’s diplomacy. As it seemed, Ter-Petrosyan and his government in 1990-1992 started “Southern (Turkish) orientation” (Astourian, 2000, p. 23) of foreign policy and the genocide issue was one of the major problems which were hindering the resolution of that policy. Well-known Armenian politician Gerard Libaridian who was serving as an adviser of the presidential office, was against Ter-Petrosyan’s ideas about genocide, but was a supporter of “Southern Orientation.” For Libaridian “Armenians could expect at best a symbolic recognition of the Armenian genocide from Turkey” (Astourian, 2000, p. 24), he believed that after the recognition, normalization of relations with Turks it would be beneficial for Armenia and Turkey as well.

The Armenian political elites headed by Ter-Petrosyan, had realized that rapprochement with Ankara, brought economic benefits to Armenia, “the huge reserves of oil and gas lying in the depths of the Caspian Sea and the economic benefits they could have for the Caucasian states” (Astourian, 2000, p. 24) where Armenia would become a transit state and have some economic dividends from it. Petrosyan’s strategy of southern orientation put under criticism from opposition and even from his party members. After that, the president himself blamed “The ARF (Armenian Revolutionary Federation) for helping provoke the genocide” (Astourian, 2000, p. 26)

Ter-Petrosyan’s political system was weak, the government was unable to curb criminal and economic problems, inflation was at a high level and shortages of public goods were unresolved for the regime. The major problem was war in Nagorno-Karabakh, where anti-Russian sentiments had

caused territorial losses for Armenia. Petrosyan plan of conflict resolution was opposed by majority, "Ter-Petrosyan always referred to the surrounding territories of the Karabakh as being "occupied" and was ready to return them to Azerbaijan." (Aydinyan..., 2015) That idea was put under critics from opposition and APNM's members too. For example Vazgen Manukyan, who was Petrosyan's comrade and prominent member of Karabakh Movement. Because of Nagorno-Karabakh "they quarreled and violently disputed the results of the 1996 presidential elections, but in the pre independence period, they made a strong tandem" (Waal T. D., Black Garden , 2003, p. 56) As Thomas De Waal described, for Vazgen Manukyan genocide issue and Nagorno-Karabakh was impulses to "waking Armenians from their Soviet-era slumber." Ter-Petrosyan's idea of genocide and conflict resolution had caused bitter critics from Diaspora. Member of diaspora had key connections with Armenian policymakers and opposition, as a result president received several critics from diaspora as well.

For Turkey, it was equivocal perception that Armenian would resolve relations with Ankara, either Ter-petrosyan was unable to persuade his people and party members that rapprochement with Turkey, would be beneficial for Armenia. War for Nagorno-Karabakh and territorial losses to Azerbaijan, anger Turkey and took aggressive stances toward Armenia. Diaspora parties such as Armenian Communist Party and Armenian Revolutionary federation were against Petrosyan's pro-Turkish orientation. Astourian described that moment as follow: "pan-Turkism was the bogeyman that the Armenian Communist Party and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation were using to maintain Armenia's dependence on the Soviet Union" (Astourian, 2000, p. 27). For them, Russia and Soviet Union was savior and which brought Armenia in 20th century.

The failure of "Southern Orientation" was outcome of Armenian perceptions. There were vague issues which hindered rapprochement with Ankara. Turkey as strategic partner for Azerbaijan had opposite views of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. Subsequent issue was genocide, Ter-Petrosyan believed that Turkey would forget genocide but he made a mistake, for Turkey it remains impossible to escape genocide, because large number diaspora persistently fight acknowledgment of genocide in Europe and in America. Another issue as Astourian described was: "pan-Turkic feelings, when Armenia's ruling party's ideologists alluded that "pan-

Turkism” for Ankara “was not” important and would not hinder a policy that the APNM viewed as highly rational.” (Astourian, 2000, p. 27) Ter-Petrosyan had wrong understanding of political processes, because after the dissolution of Soviet Union, Ankara had elaborate active foreign policy. The ruling party of Armenia and political elites of Pan-Armenian National Movement (PANM) party had nationalist ideas while any expression of pro-Turkish and anti-Armenian policy would be against them views. As Ter-Petrosyan did, for many Armenians he threatened to Armenian historical and nationalist goal “Hai Dat” or “Armenian cause” which means unification of all Armenian around world for common nationalist aims. The PANM party generation was part of nationalist demonstrators which took place in 1965-67, and major reason failure of Southern orientation was also nationalism and feelings of “perpetually actual” (Nora, 1989) phenomenon, genocide. Moreover, Armenian population frightened by Turkish president Turgut Ozal, who alluded genocide: “Armenia has not learned its lesson from the experience in Anatolia and the punishment inflicted.” (Astourian, 2000, p. 31)

In Nagorno-Karabakh full scale war had started in 1992, and Armenian had captured Shusha and Lachin corridor. Lachin had strategic importance for Armenia, it was major logistic corridor for Armenian troops in Nagorno-Karabakh. For Azerbaijan losing of Lachine was shock, which was reinvigorated after Khojaly events when Armenian troops had forced population to flee and killed large number of Azerbaijanis. There are debates around Khojaly massacre, pro-Armenian sources argued about operation, that it was only military operation with non-exaggeration, but death tolls after the operation depicts bitter truth. As Svante E. Cornell described that Khojaly massacre committed for to force Azeri population never come back, “Khojaly massacre was to create precisely this type of fear” (Cornell, Small Nations and Great, 2005, p. 83), in down below 2.1 - subchapter describes Turkish active foreign policy and its impact over Armenia, Turkish factor become major driven force to brought Yerevan under Russia.

2.1 Turkish Active Foreign Policy and Armenia

Following to research hypothesis, *Turkish aggressive foreign policy after the dissolution of USSR, which threatened to Armenia and promised incursion, had influenced foreign policy of*

Yerevan and choose pro-Russian vector and deepened strategic cooperation with Moscow, that expectation derived from Turkish active “foreign policy.” Some Armenian researchers, describes Turkish foreign policy as a Pan-Turkism, for example Stephan Astourian in his research which is about Ter-Petrosyan presidency, described Turkish active foreign policy as pan-Turkism: “the term “pan-Turkism” referred to Ankara’s foreign policy which at that time hoped to draw on kinship ties among Turkic peoples to increase Turkey’s influence in Central Asia and Azerbaijan.” From his research author underlined Pan-Turkism as major issue which hindered Ter-Petrosyan “southern orientation.” But from my perspectives, Pan-Turkism is exaggerated claims from Stephan Astourian and Armenian researchers. We can say that Turkish foreign policy at this moment (90’s), was characterized as sedentary, which had shaken after dissolution of the USSR. By pursuing Active foreign policy, Turkey had frightened Armenia and after caused the Russian-Armenian rapprochement and Moscow become as a “big brother” for Yerevan. For Ankara, unambiguous support was indispensable toward Baku, otherwise its image in Muslim world would distorted. As Svante E. Cornell described: ‘the failure to demonstrate unambiguous support for Azerbaijan could undermine Turkey’s prestige in Azerbaijan and Central Asia’ (Cornell, 2011, p. 369). The proponent of that idea was also Turkish opposition and public, the idea of invasion in Armenia also intensified by Turkish Media. They were depicting Azerbaijani’s hardship during war and territorial losses. As a result anti-Armenian sentiments kindled in Turkey and Armenian population were frightened and risks of Turkish invasion and Pan-Turkism regularly propagated by Armenian diaspora and pro-diaspora journals.


Geopolitical changes which started after dissolution of communist bloc, strengthens Turkish positions. Ankara had formulated new foreign policy which used to be an active and non-hesitant as Makovsky mentioned: “Turkish President Turgut Ozal declared at a 1991 post-Gulf War press conference that Turkey “should leave its former passive and hesitant policies and engage in an active foreign policy,” (Makovsky, 1999). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and crumble of major superpower, Turkish-Western military alliance remained but Turkey had encapsulated its regional, geopolitical strategies. There was unpleasant moments inside Turkish political life, some groups of nationalists emerged who wanted taking of anti-western policy. Nasuh Uslu in his book *Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-cold War Period* described

uprising of national sentiments: religious groups claimed that “west never wanted Turkey’s increasing its power” for that reasons “Turkey should integrate with the Muslim world rather than the western bloc which always seemed unreliable” (Uslu, 2004, p. 120) The nationalist demands was close to Pan-Turkism that Turkey should take leading role among the Muslim states. The nationalist parties who were supporters of alienating from west, had successfully won local elections and formed coalitions. For example Turkish Islamist Party, the Welfare (Refah) Party. The idea of, Turkey should distance from the west, intensified when EU rejected Turkish membership, which had domino effect over nationalists and “increase likelihood of Turkish islamisation” (Uslu, 2004, p. 122). But we should consider Western bloc interests, European Union, NATO and United State, had regional power as ally and islamisation and alienation of Turkey did not fit on them strategic concerns. From that perspectives Uslu underlined :”Turkish military sought new roles for Turkey in Middle East, the Persian Gulf and the surrounding regions in the context of European and American strategic interests” (Uslu, 2004, p. 122) Fortunately, Turkish-Israeli relations have contributed positive atmosphere with relations to west. And consequently Ankara remained major ally of it. As a result Turkish regional importance and power had increased, it also “underscored by its strategic relations with Israel and growing security ties with Jordan” (Makovsky, 1999). Turkey needed good relations with neighbors as well, especially with Russia. The Russian had potentially vast market for Turkish firms “good relations with Moscow for political but also economic reasons, gives Turkey’s huge private business relations with Russia” (Cornell, 2005, p. 287). Improvement of regional politics, had gave economic and political success to Ankara, Turkey increased its influence over post-soviet especially in South Caucasus and central Asia.

Consequently from 90’s Turkey has implemented assertive foreign policy, which meets with western allies interests. Foreign policy prone to promoting stability and security of the region. “By carrying out military operations, Ankara proved” (Uslu, 2004, p. 124) that in case of national interest, he would take aggressive and active foreign policy, those military operations were held in Middle East against PKK groups. Therefore, Ankara needed strong military and sophisticated weaponry to intimidate opponents’ therefore strong military helped Turkey to promote stability in the region and idea of regional power had intensified. After dissolution of

Soviet Union, Turkey's military spending had significantly increased. As Alan Makovsky puts in: "Between 1985 and 1995, Turkey's defense expenditures more than doubled, in constant (1995) dollars, from \$3.1 billion to \$6.6 billion" (Makovsky, 1999, p. 2) Comparing with United states and other NATO members who had decreased military spending, only in Turkey and Greece case depicts that "expenditures increased from \$3.1 (the same total as Turkey's in 1985) to \$5.1 billion" (Makovsky, 1999).

Turkish Military Spending in 1985-1996.



Source: *The World Bank* (World Bank, n.d.)

Turkey intends to continue this trend and the parliament draft new defense budget and "allocates \$3.4 billion (in current dollars) to equipment procurement," (Makovsky, 1999). Consequently Turkey had improved conventional forces, which can easily conduct different types of operations. Dissolution of the USSR had gave Turkey opportunities to establish relations with Turkish speaking nations, such as Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Ankara had started investments in these countries and "ultimately be linked by pipeline to energy resources in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan" (Makovsky, 1999). Following its military activities, Turkish soldiers started to participate in peacekeeping operations, with an exceptional examples

like Korea and Cyprus, Turkish troops had never served outside Turkey in such kind of operations. (Makovsky, 1999).

Consequently, Turkish foreign policy was always acceptable for West but there was some critics in contrast of military operations, which caused dissent approach from its allies. But on the other hand it is difficult to mention radical changes between Turkey and the West. If we consider last events when Turkey had political scandals to west and rapprochement with Russia, Ankara might care about only fifth generation F-35 jets. The congress still discuss idea to transfer it or not to Turkey. (Copp, 2018) Taking into account, historical experience of Turkey, induced it to improve national military production which nowadays meets international standards. "The Turkish defense industry had developed greatly as a result of activities of Turkish authorities" (Uslu, 2004, p. 126).

Officially, Turkish-Azerbaijani military cooperation marked on 1992, when Ankara and Baku signed an agreement which provides military education for Azeri soldiers. (ÖZTARSU, 2011) Azerbaijani army was exhausted during Karabakh war, Soviet arms which transferred under Tashkent Treaty to Baku, was almost malfunctioned. There was not any significant support which brings some weapons and hardware to Baku, but only political and diplomatic condolences from official Ankara. The superiority of Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh was in fact outcome of Russian military support to official Yerevan, as a result Armenia had significantly conquered Azerbaijani territories.

After territorial losses in Nagorno-Karabakh and a significant victories of Armenian soldiers, Turkey had taken aggressive politics toward Yerevan. Following to Ter-Petrosyan's failure in pro-Turkish or as it coined by Astourian "Southern orientation", Ankara had started intimidating policy toward Armenia. Simultaneously Russian federation had expressed its support, which served only Kremlin imperial ambitions, for example "Russian defense minister Pavel Grachev warned Ankara in rather undiplomatic terms to stay out of Azerbaijan." (Cornell, 2011, p. 370), when Turkish side had charged Moscow transferring of military equipment to Armenia. Apparently, Moscow was seeking strategies to grab upon future ally in South Caucasus, it only needed proper moment and after little while that moment had come.

At the beginning of conflict and dissolution of the USSR, Ankara was trying to have mediator role between Armenia and Azerbaijan. "Ankara tried to present itself as a mediator between the parties." Following to events, Turkey had used his connections in western society, to highlight sensitivity of conflict for western governments. But following events reflected that it seemed unlikely, of Ankara would have been mediator between Cristian Armenia and Muslim Azerbaijan, if we take a look above mentioned "active foreign policy" (Makovsky, 1999) and Ankara's possible image as leader between Muslim nations "The Turkish attempt at mediation was not destined to last long." (Cornell, 2011, p. 368). After the Khojaly massacre in 1992, for Turkish citizens, Armenia portrayed by Turkish newspapers and TV channels as an oppressor of Azerbaijani brothers and some demonstrations had took place in Ankara's streets. Where "tens of thousands of people demonstrating in favor of a military intervention on Azerbaijan's behalf." (Cornell, 2011, p. 368). Also Azerbaijan favored by Turkish leaders, Ankara had sympathies and key figures in political elites expressed support toward Azerbaijan. For example Turgut Ozal and Suleiman Demirel, their foreign policy and dependence over Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, had gradually changed Armenia's future and as hypothesis underlines: *Turkish aggressive foreign policy after dissolution of USSR, which threatened to Armenia and promised incursion, had influenced foreign policy of Yerevan and choose pro-Russian orientation and deepened strategic cooperation with Moscow.* Ozal toward Armenia, had radically changed and become aggressive after the Khojaly events. At the beginning of 1992, Armenian side had started battle for Khojaly, "The Armenian assault began on the night of 25–26 February, (Waal T. D., 2003, p. 170). Khojaly events reflects Armenian revenge over Azerbaijan, where Armenian actions was brutal. After Khojaly, Abulfaz Elchibey and Azerbaijani's Popular Front entered under virulent critics and he resigned. In Khojaly, Russia provided important support to Armenia, which is described below. As a result Khojaly battle, conquering of Lachin corridor and liberation of Shusha, become final straw for Turkey and started anti-Armenian and aggressive foreign policy, which promised invasion in Armenia.

Anti-Armenian foreign policy by Ankara had started after Armenia's victories in conflict. As a result Armenians with Russian troops had captured strategically important territories from

Azerbaijan. Turkish president Ozal stated: “on the matter of Karabakh, it is necessary to scare the Armenians a little bit” (Astourian, 2000). The aggressive rhetoric was appeared in Armenian press immediately and had greatly frightened Armenian population, fears and anti-Turkish sentiments intensified when Turkish president alluded Armenian genocide, Stephan Astourian puts it as follow: “Armenia has not learned its lesson from the experience in Anatolia and the punishment inflicted” (Astourian, 2000). Consequently such acts pushed Armenian to think more persistently to “invite” Russia as a security guarantor of its motherland. The western press also highlighted Turkish stances over Armenian and where some critics had echoed for Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan, in content was prevailing aggressive rhetoric and intimidates Armenia. For example British newspaper The Independence wrote: “Powerful voices in Turkey are calling openly for military intervention to help Azerbaijan in its losing battle against Armenia.” (POPE, 1993) From Ozal’s allegations it turns out that “The Turkish government could not disregard these public demands” (Cornell, 2011, p. 368). Consequently, after Armenia's victories in Nagorno-Karabakh which caused hysteria in Azerbaijan, Ozal was proponent of an idea, frightening Armenia, “a little” (Cornell, 2011, p. 368). Philip Robins, in his book Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War, mentioned Turgut Ozal’ reported sentiments about Armenia, which promise intimidation of Armenian nation for Nagorno-Karabakh but author did not mention openly that Turkey would send the troops in Yerevan or Nagorno-Karabakh to help Azerbaijan which occurred vice versa. Likewise allegation from Ozal when he was United States, in Houston for medical treatment and in his interview with journalists, Los Angeles Times wrote: “We’ll send troops to Nakhichevan, without hesitation.” (GOLDBERG, 1993). “His (Ozal) widely reported sentiments, that Turkey should scare the Armenians “served only one reason to abandon fight in Khojaly and stop supplying of its troops by Lachine Corridor (Robins, 2003, p. 168). At the same time, consequences and perceptions of his allegations was promising obliteration to Armenia, to follow our research hypothesis *aggressive foreign policy* from Ankara which threatened to Armenia had catalyst effect over Yerevan, it easily caught aggressive messages and changed Pro-Turkish perceptions radically. From Ozal’s perspective, Armenia’s self-conceit aspirations must be curbed for sake of Azerbaijan, at this moment Baku needed military support, but Ankara provided only diplomatic and political assistance to its Turkish brothers. Turkish threats was clear and enough

which affected to Armenian citizens and diaspora, and had shaken Armenia's political agenda. Turgut Ozal have sent thousands of soldiers near Armenia's borders and dispatched several numbers of Turkish officers to Baku for Military advising, Ozal "dispatched several dozen of officers to advise and train the Azerbaijani Army and he deployed about 50 000 military reinforcement along the Armenian border" (Touraj Atabaki, 2005, p. 89)

The next politician who irritated by Armenia's victories was Suleyman Demirel, After Ozal's death, he become president of Turkey and was against Armenia's actions in Nagorno-Karabakh. But Demirel did not want entangling Turkey in that conflict. He believed this war "that could turn the fighting into a religious war between Christians and Muslims" and would have desperate outcome for Region (COWELL, 1992) Demirel has always mention that the political solutions of conflict was better for region, Demirel mentioned "We want a political solution." (COWELL, 1992) This meant that he was against invasion in Armenia but, he had never excluded incursion in Armenia, "the all options remained on the table" (Robins, 2003, p. 169). But Demirel as an experienced politician had known already, an importance of Armenian Diaspora, which had scattered almost every corner of Earth. Maybe he thought that in case of incursion in Armenia on one hand that would bring victory to Azerbaijan, but after, Armenian diaspora would constrain Turkey "Prime Minister Demirel stated in early 1993 that a Turkish intervention on Azerbaijan's side would only result in the whole world getting behind Armenia" (Cornell, 2011, p. 371). But Armenian newspapers had speared plots about possibly Turkish invasion from Nakhchivan region. One of the major plot was possible Turkish-Russian cover agreement about Armenia. This information had widely speared around Yerevan during 1992 and 1994. According to plot in 1993, when Soviet Union dissolved, Russian Parliament speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov and Turkish Prime minister Tansu Ciller had a secret agreement. If attempted coup against Yetlsin which was headed by Khasbulatov would win, "Khasbulatov would order Russian troops to withdraw from Armenia, where they helped guard the latter's border with Turkey" (Boyajian, 2014). After Turkey would easily invade in Armenian territory.

The public stunned when several confrontations happened in Turkish-Armenian border. Armenian Diaspora journal, Foreign Policy Journal's allegation in 1993 September the Turkish side

had opened fire to Armenian border patrol, “the Russian border defense forces in Armenia, declared that his staff was concerned about the presence of additional sub-divisions of the Turkish army,” (ANI Armenian Research Center , 2015) After that, diaspora journal had highlighted possible dialogue between Suleiman Demirel and US President Bush, where US president mentioned invasion in Armenia and suggested Demirel to forget that idea from Bush’s words, he had known constraints which was coming from Turkish public and mentioned” I strongly urge you to exercise restraint and avoid military intervention. The situation is extremely complicated” (Avetisyan, 2018) . According of Svante Cornell, Demirel was “under severe pressure to take more decisive action, and did not rule out a Turkish military intervention” at all (Cornell, 2011, p. 369)

Simultaneously with a public and policymakers, oppositional parties had started manipulation by Nagorno-Karabakh. However, oppositional leader had criticized official Ankara, and charged inactivity while it Azerbaijani brothers were killing by Armenians. The leader of the Nationalist Labor Party (MHP), Alparslan Tirkkes argued that:” ‘Turkey cannot stand idly by while Azerbaijan’s territory is being occupied.” (Cornell, 2011, p. 284). The idea to send Turkish troops in Armenian border alluded by Mesut Yilmaz too, who was former foreign minister and his party Motherland Party (ANAP) had anti-Armenian sentiments as well (Robins, 2003). Yilmaz’s allegations had big influence over public, his party was biggest opposition in Turkey. Yilmaz argued: that” troops to be deployed along the Armenian border and reminded the public that Turkey retains a guarantor status over Nagorno-Karabakh” (Cornell, 2011, p. 284). The aggressive allegations also came from Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, she warned Armenia that official Ankara “would not sit with its arms crossed”, if Yerevan continued confrontation against Azerbaijan. (SCHMEMANN, 1993). And she avowedly accused Armenia as supporters of Kurds. The Canadian journal in its 1993 publication had alluded Ciller’s speech that she” would call on parliament to declare war on Armenia if its troops moved against the Azerbaijani enclave of Nakhichevan, a sliver of land bounded by Armenia to the north and east, and Turkey and Iran to the south. (BOSTON GLOBE, 1993)

Aggressive politics had desperately affects Armenia economically, when Demirel pushed full blockade of state. “Demirel’s government announced that it would inspect airplanes headed

for Armenia that would be passing over Turkish airspace” (Cornell, 2011, p. 369), then Turkey halted humanitarian aid which came from European Union “refusing to allow aid or trade destined for that country to transit Turkish territory” (Cornell, 2011, p. 369). As Astourian puts in:” Ankara forced Armenian civil flights to land in Turkey and delayed for months the delivery of humanitarian relief.” (Astourian, 2000)The common image of Turkey against Armenia was aggressive, thus Azerbaijan was calling for invasion in Armenia with Turkish brothers. Abulfaz Elchibay’s nationalistic and pro-Turkish policy had intensified feelings for Armenian people that Armenians are fighting both Turks from Azerbaijan and Turks form Turkey, when Anti-Armenian allegations was speared in the Turkish political elite, simultaneously intensified idea of salvation around Armenia and Armenian diaspora. The perception of Armenian people had influenced and soaked trough this approach and as a result, *Turkish aggressive foreign policy after the dissolution of USSR, which threatened to Armenia and promised incursion, had influenced foreign policy of Yerevan and choose pro-Russian vector and deepened strategic partnership with Moscow* in a reason to avoid bitter historical memory which directly evoked from Ankara’s allegations.

Apparently, Turkish physical inactivity in Nagorno-Karabakh was “profound restraint exercised by Turkish leaders,” caused by Russian positions, which become major ally for Armenia after 1992. Despite of covert support from Turkey by military personnel to Azerbaijan which consisted only several officers, was not enough, but had sufficiently affected on Armenia, and stick Yerevan on Russian orbit. Confrontation and close border with Turkey, where military pieces was dispatched in close to Armenia “made Armenia’s pursuit of closer relations with Russia almost inevitable” (Robins, 2003, p. 168). The author of the book: *The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications* Michael P. Croissant writes: “As a Great power and a fellow Christian country, the Armenian looked to Russia as a “big brother” to protect form hostile Turks and Azeris.” (Croissant, 1998, p. 109)

To follow the hypothesis, *Turkish aggressive foreign policy which threatened to Armenia and promised invasion in country, had influenced on foreign policy of Yerevan and switched pro-Russian foreign policy*, Turkish active foreign policy which is strongly denouncing Armenia’s

victories in Nagorno-Karabakh and strong critics from policymakers, who several times mentioned involvement in conflict to support Azerbaijan had snatched up by Yerevan as biggest threats and precipitated Russian entrance into the Caucasian political chess board. Ironically, Armenia's rapprochement to Russian federation had started from 1991, when Armenia signed Alma-Ata Declaration and joined Commonwealth of Independent States. As a result Russia's attitude towards Yerevan changed because of Moscow personal and tacit interest revealed. As I mentioned above, Russia was Baku's supporter at first, because pro-Russian government had ensured Russia influence over Azerbaijan, but after the pro-Russian government substituted by anti-Russian, Pro-Turkish and nationalists, Kremlin had changed its vectors, simultaneously it was Armenian goals to find shelter under Russia's auspices. To follow those events chronologically, Armenia had signed Tashkent Collective security treaty on 1992 of May, therefore it joined defense alliance which was led by Russian Federation. Author Philip Robins describes Russian-Armenian relations as follow:" This dependent relationship was strengthened by outbreak of conflict with Azerbaijan" (Robins, 2003, p. 168). Turgut Ozal's campaign against Armenian which was served to "scare the Armenian little bit" and in contrast fights in Nagorno-Karabakh, had caused in one hand intimidations of Armenia, but in other hand alienation from Ankara and stick around to Russia. After joining the Russian led organizations, Moscow deemed Armenia as her major servant in South Caucasus, in contrast of Georgia and Azerbaijan, supporting to Armenia was best opportunity for Russia's imperial policy, which consequently enables to Russia "maintain leverages in its near abroad policy" (Robins, 2003, p. 170).

Simultaneously, after Ozal had started intimidation of Armenia, Moscow did not stand idly. The military commander in chief of Commonwealth of Independent States sad that Turkish possible incursion in Armenia would cause Third World War. As Los Angeles Times column section describes: Moscow had tacitly turned to Armenia and Marshal Shaposhnikov sad about: "we shall be on the brink of a new world war." (GOLDBERG, 1993). Shaposhnikov's message had anti-Turkish elements, where he suggesting to deter any military support to Azerbaijan. After Russian "come back" they had blatantly meddled on Nagorno-Karabakh war in Armenian side. Shortly before the Ozal death, he underlined that Russian military planes had regularly been transferred equipment to Armenian military. Press conference which held with Ebulfeyz Elcibey in Ankara,

Ozal said: "Russian transport planes increased their flights to Yerevan substantially before and after the Armenian aggression on Kelbajar", where his doubts was based on Turkish Intelligence (MIT- Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı) findings. (TheNew Yourk Times, 1993) Russian military involvement had proofed by several diplomats in Turkey as well, "The Russian language material was standard combat talk about things like coordinates for artillery fire along mountain roads and directives to supply trucks coming from Armenia," (The New Yourk Times, 1993). Svante E. Cornell mentioned former Soviet Army's, 366th artillery regiment participation which were helping to Armenian side in Karabakh, when they advanced in Azerbaijan villages Malybeili, Karadagly and Agdaban. Consequently, by the Russian help Armenia captured strategically important Agdam-Stepanakert road and airport, "artillery fire Armenian forces on 27 February, according to many impartial observers supported by the 366th CIS (formerly Soviet) motor rifle regiment" (Cornell, 2005, p. 81), although Russian troops assisted by ground operation in Svante E. Cornell in his second book Azerbaijan Since Independence, described that operation : "The combined forces of ethnic Armenians and the Russian infantry regiment attacked the town from three sides," (Cornell, 2011, p. 62).

After 1992 and supposedly Russian participation in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Yerevan and Moscow had tightened strategic cooperation. At the same year Russia and Armenia had signed a treaty "on the status of the Russian border guards in Armenia" (Bennett, 2002) . The help of border protection from Russia was important for Armenia, "Russians to recruit Armenians to the Russian border troop units stationed in Armenia" (Bennett, 2002). The Russian Federal Border Service (FBS) had four detachments "in Gyumrinsk, Oktemberyansk, Artashat and Megry" (Bennett, 2002). They were looking for 345 km border with Turkey. In 1995, partners had signed agreement and: "formalized the presence of Russian forces in the republic, with their basing facilities in Gyumri and Yerevan" (Robins, 2003, p. 169). The cooperation intensified when in 1997, sides agreed comprehensive security treaty "which included the provision of mutual assistance clause in case of external attack" (Robins, 2003, p. 169).

The ceasefire document between Armenian and Azerbaijan signed in 1994 May, but there are some severe moments for Baku. It was likely that Armenians and Azerbaijanis was not going to stop the confrontation. The Russia, who was always an official mediator between parties, in

May started detente of situation and Armenian side signed the Bishkek Protocol, which was refused by Heydar Aliyev's representative, Eldar Namazov. Aliyev was not in Bishkek, he was in Brussel and coming a strong pressure from Moscow over Azerbaijan was only reason why agreement delayed until Heydar Aliyev's return. Namazov was confused, he met in Bishkek, Russian parliament official representative Kazimirov, while his views was anti-Azerbaijan and pro-Armenian contours was likely. Namazov had mentioned that Armenians was planned assault of Azerbaijan regions, if Baku would not sign a document Ganje, Terter, Barda would lost. In the book "Black Garden" De Waal describes the ambivalence of Azerbaijanis as follow: "Kazimirov delivered a warning from the Russians that if the Azerbaijanis did not cooperate, they risked losing more territory." (Waal T. D., 2003, p. 238). After several days, Aliyev returned in Baku, and Kazimirov flew simultaneously and bring the Bishkek Document and president had finally signed it and the 12 May of 1994, and cease-fire reflected a number realities. Belligerents were exhausted, especially Azerbaijan which had loss large number of its territories, officially Baku lost 14 percent of territories, and Azerbaijan also rejected peacekeeper forces in conflict zone. For Armenian peacekeepers was not important they had already achieved goal and returned territories which was "perpetually actual phenomenon" (Nora, 1989). Although, Yerevan with a tireless work by future president of Armenia, Serj Sargisyan had successfully create defensive tranches. "The battles were over, but the fundamental issues of the conflict were still unresolved." (Waal T. D., 2003, p. 240)

In General, those allegations from Ozal and Demirel, had big influence on Armenian policymakers, citizens and especially on diaspora. Thus, Ankara's allegations to frightened Armenians little bit, "pursue a policy of discrediting Turkey as planning a 'new' genocide on Armenians." (Cornell, 2005, p. 284)

Armenian people who have already been stigmatized by genocide memory and territorial losses, tragic experience which become to follow of Pierre Nora's words, as a life, for Armenian population and transformed it "perpetually actual phenomenon" (Nora, 1989), aggressive allegations from state which "gifted" those tragedy and memory, has promised again future obliteration. To follow research hypothesis, which highlights idea of Turkish threats of intervention in Armenia which was confirmed by Turkish policymakers and Turkish public in

general, gave impulse to Armenia and chose Pro-Russian foreign policy. As a result Armenia become pro-Russian state and entangled Moscow's imperial ambitions. Russian foreign policy, which promised regain an influence over former Soviet republic, Yerevan had important part on that strategy. Turkish threats was clear and military maneuvers near Armenian border depicted truth of sudden invasion in Armenia, although intimidation policy and radical allegations was visible from Turkish policymakers, opposition and public.

After ceasefire agreement, in 1994, Armenia emerged as a victorious, but that victory had its price. Internationally unrecognized territory and economic hardship brought Armenian fully suspended on Russia and its political ambitions. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was major driven force which brings Armenian into Russian arms, visible threats from neighbors and political pressures, had strongly affected to Armenia. Moscow provided significant military and political support to Armenia, as a result Turkish active foreign policy over Caucasian region was weak and failed to achieve its goal, as Gerard Libaridian described in his book *Modern Armenia, People Nation State: Turkey* "Were not to replace Russian domination, with a new "big brother" (Libaridian, 2007, p. 295)

Chapter 3: Russian-Armenian Strategic Cooperation, how does it works for Armenia

After dissolution of Soviet Union, Russian federation become major regional player in South Caucasus. Moscow always tried to ensure its influence over former Soviet states and hinders them rapprochements to West. The major goals of Russia, was to reiterate communist influence over post-Soviet space and thus the exception was not South Caucasus, where three republics had swallowed by an economic and political crisis. The ethnic conflicts had outraged Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Nagorno-Karabakh, and Georgians in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Consequently, Russian was not idly and provoked situation and ensured its influences over them. Russia's elaborated strategy serves to reinvigorate her influences in South Caucasus and it called "near abroad" or "ближнее зарубежье" policy. Russian "near abroad" served only Moscow's interests, which promised reassurance his power in the former servants. The "near abroad" implies that "Russia has special interests in other ex-Soviet republics based on historical background of these states, their proximity, and the presence in them of a multimillion Russian diaspora" (Mandelbaum, 1998). As a result, necessity of Russian interests intensified after Moscow had lost an influence over Azerbaijan and large number of Russian military personnel transferred in Armenia.

Yerevan has special relations with Russia, Armenia is landlocked by two neighbors, Turkey and Azerbaijan. For Russia "Armenia is a country where Russian troops can be stationed without a problem" (Kasim, 2003). As a result Russian troops are stationed in Gyumri in 1995 which is "Last Bastion" for Russian federation in the south Caucasus. To follow research hypothesis: *Turkish aggressive foreign policy after dissolution of USSR, which threatened to Armenia and promised incursion, had influenced foreign policy of Yerevan and choose pro-Russian vector and deepened military and strategic cooperation with Moscow.* In contrast of Russian ambitions, opening military base in Armenia served Yerevan's interests to deter Turkey from Turkish invasion. After attempted coup d'état in Moscow, which failed Russian foreign policy had soaked by the Eurasionists views which promised come back in post-soviet states and consequence of them approach was abovementioned "near abroad" policy. However Armenia was one of the

major part of that strategy. From Russian perspectives Armenia had central role in that strategy and as a result of geopolitical necessity, cooperation between them started after outbreak of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. There were some of allegations about Russian 366th regiments participation on conflict in Armenia's behalf, which proofed. Chronologically Russian support started in short period of time, unlike Georgia and Azerbaijan, in 1991 December, first Armenia signed document and joined Commonwealth of Independent States. The basic function of this organization was to provide security assistance to Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Consequently, at first Year of confrontations, Armenia had dexterously used all diplomatic assets from this organization, and those assets had come from Russia. For example in 1992, when battle for Shusha had started, Armenia complained that if Azerbaijan prolong confrontation against Yerevan, Armenia "would quit the alliance unless they come to its defense under a recently signed mutual security pact." (PARKS, 1992). In fact, that allegations served only Armenian and Russian excuses, as a result Moscow had secretly sent its troops in Nagorno-Karabakh on Armenia's side. The creation of Commonwealth of Independent States organization served and serves only Russian interests.

As it was discussed above, Russian Eurasionist approach in foreign policy provides controlling of newly emerged republics and necessity of military base on South Caucasus under legal frames was very important for Moscow. Opening of military bases in Armenia was best achievement for Russia, at the same time, "Armenian administration is that Russian military presence provides security for Armenia." (Kasim, 2003) In 1992, Armenia signed also Tashkent Collective Security treaty and joined alliance of that organization. After little while, Armenian captured strategic town Susha. From 1992 Russia had started supplying of Armenian military with fuel and arms at first Russian was helping to Azerbaijan side, but after Elchibey regimes had started anti-Russian policy and called to dispatch all Russian units from Azerbaijan, Moscow had started supporting Armenian side, "how this support for the Armenians was translated on to the battlefield" (Waal T. D., 2003, p. 200) was major concern for Azerbaijan and Turkey as well, as Thomas De Waal described, as a result Azerbaijan gradually lost its advantages in Nagorno-Karabakh. Russian was fighting on Azerbaijani side as well after 1992, but not Regular army. Generally they were mercenaries' and served as tank drivers and instructor officers. As De Waal

underlines, they were members of 7th special regiment battalion, and after Elchibey started anti-Russian policy Russia had “began to pull out of Azerbaijan and close down its bases” (Waal T. D., 2003, p. 202) and the remnants soldiers of 7th battalion, Azerbaijani side offered service and training of soldiers. Russian soldiers who were dispatched from Azerbaijan entrenched in Armenia, on Gyumri military base. Russian support was disclosed when Armenian captured Khojali and strategically important Lachine corridor and started supplying its troops in Nagorno-Karabakh. Moscow had secretly supplying Armenian forces which caused Turkish critics. Supplying of Armenian troops by Russians, Turgut Ozal mentioned “Russian transport planes increased their flights to Yerevan substantially before and after the Armenian aggression on Kelbajal” (The New York Times, 1993). Russian high ranking officers progressively support to Armenian military, but that assistance was not enough and served only to perceive power balance against Azerbaijan. Thomas de Waal brings Ter-Petrosyan’s narratives about Russian support:” According to Ter-Petrosian, because Azerbaijan had inherited far more Soviet weaponry than Armenia had, Yeltsin wanted to preserve a military balance in the Karabakh conflict” (Waal T. D., 2003, p. 199)

The sympathies from Russian political elites was intensified when Armenia openly joined on Pro-Russian Orientation. For example *Colonel-General Fyodor Reut*, was ex-commander of 7th military regiment who was in Tbilisi, “he helped landlocked Armenia get supplies to and from the Black Sea ports in Georgia” (Waal T. D., 2003, p. 203). According to De Waal the next person who provided military assistance to Armenia was another former commander of 7th regiment battalion. The most important support was provided by defense minister of Russia Pavel Grachev he “began to adopt a more pro-Armenian line.” (Waal T. D., 2003, p. 203). The Russian trace in Nagorno-Karabakh was vital, and Armenian achieved significant victories “some of the Soviet-era T-72 tanks used by the Nagorno-Karabakh separatists, have been improved with modern upgrades” (Synovitz, 2016)

In terms of personal sympathies and “near abroad” policy, Russian federation had illegally transferred large number of equipment to Armenian side in 1993-96. As it seems Russia had persistently established his cells in South Caucasus and starting to accomplish goals of “near abroad” strategy. From this interaction and secret cooperation with Russia, Armenia had some

dividends, Yerevan had received significant equipment from Moscow, which had a big concern for Azerbaijanis and Turkish security. As Svante E. Cornell describes, that fact revealed by chairman of Russian parliament General Lev Rokhlin “The pro-government Paper *Sovietskaya Rossiya* in April 1997 published a tentative list of the equipment transferred to Armenia” (Cornell, *Small Nations and Great*, 2005, p. 354). According of Thomas De Waal, official information from Russian Arms shipment highlighted in 1997, “in a report made to the Russian parliament, the State Duma, by the Russian general Lev Rokhlin” (Waal T. D., 2003, p. 199) Rokhlin also alluded that large number of heavy equipment had been sent only in 1995-96, when battle ended up in Nagorno-Karabakh. Follow to Rokhlin’s “confession”, heavy weapons included “eighty-four T-72 tanks and fifty BMP-2 armored personnel carriers” (Waal T. D., 2003, p. 199) The T-72 tanks, which at this time had one of the most sophisticated performance, could radically changed battlefield scenarios for sake of Armenia. Chronologically Armenia’s supplying by Russia started in 1992, “there had been mass deliveries of ammunition from warehouses in the Russian military base at Mozdok to Armenia” (Waal T. D., 2003, p. 200) In a contrast Rokhlin allegations, next official who confirmed transferring of equipment to Armenian side, was former defense minister of Russia Igor Rodionov, his account shows that large number of arms were transferred to Yerevan after 1992, total amount of purchasing consisted around 720 million USA dollar. As Michael Mandelbaum puts in: “Their account shows that from August 1992 to late 1996, \$720 million of Russian arms, including T-72 tanks, BMP infantry fighting vehicles and multiply rocket launchers were provided to Armenia” (Mandelbaum, *New Yourk*, p. 132) As it seems, when agreement achieved Armenia took a credits from Russia and thus the weapons was transferred without payments. The General view of Russian help to Armenia which is confirmed by Thomas De Waal, Svante E. Cornell and As Michael Mandelbaum, was significant for Yerevan, which have positive and negative impact as well.

The establishment of strategic partnership which had started after the 1992 when Armenia signed 1992 Tashkent Collective Security Treaty (CSTO). Thereafter Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance and the Declaration on the Collaboration formed (in 1997) which was acting under Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), as National Security Strategy depicts that “presence (Russian) in Caucasus is an important factor for Armenia’s

security and for the preservation of the political and military balance in the region.” The Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrosyan eulogized agreement “he hailed a treaty as qualitatively new stage in relations with Russia and the basis for strategic partnership stronger than that created by Russian-Belarus treaty of union” (Mandelbaum, 1998, p. 130) In 1995, between Armenian and Russian governments signed treaty which mentions Russian military presence legally in the country. According to agreement Russian Army Command Unit 127, deployed in Gyumri with a 5 000 personnel, “under the order of the Group of Russian Troops in Transcaucasia of the Russian Federation’s North Caucasian command and is equipped with anti-aircraft missiles, C-300 airplanes and MiG-29 fighter jets.” (Ghazinyan, 2010)

Armenia and Russia, themselves are worried about Turkish military buildup, consequently “The close relationship between the two was cemented by the conclusion of a treaty in early 1997 on Russian military bases in Armenia” (Cornell, Small Nations and Great, 2005, p. 354). In 1997 Russia and Armenia signed a treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and cooperation, under the frames of agreement, sides would provide assistance in human rights, security and ensuring military cooperation. The agreement formed after Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan had long talks. “It would mark the first time in the post-Soviet era that Russia is committing itself by treaty to defend an ally militarily if attacked by a foreign country.” (Tamrazian, 1997). Under the treaty Russian and Armenian had deepened military cooperation and in case of foreign attack Russia took obligations and will protect country. “In case of attack by a foreign country on Russia or Armenia, military facilities and equipment of each country will be jointly used by both sides” (Tamrazian, 1997). Russian and Armenia are continuing to ensure stability of south Caucasus region and consider each other in foreign policy, at the same time both sides are helping in military and economic fields. The policymakers in Russia and even in Armenia was mentioning was staunch and durable. As Ygor Stroyev the Russian Duma member “told reporters yesterday he believes there is already a Russia-Armenia union” (Tamrazian, 1997). Russian intention to maintain its influence in the post-Soviet space had successfully progressed. Under the agreement, Russia staying in Armenia during 25 years and “Russian troops may enter Armenia by mutual consent to deal with a ‘threat to the security of either side” (Cornell, Small Nations and Great, 2005, p. 354) Armenia’s dependent on Russian is evident also in economic

sphere. In 2001 Armenia and Russia had signed an agreement and key Armenian enterprises transferred under Russian control, the action was to pay back state debt which I have mentioned above and transferred strategically important facilities, power and research plants to Russia:

- Yerevan Automated Control Systems Scientific Research Institute.
- Yerevan Scientific Research Institute of Mathematical Machines. Institute of Material Science.
- “Mars” Factory (electronics and robotics plant)
- Hrazdan Thermo Power Plant.

After Levon Ter-Petrosyan, president become Robert Khocharian, he had never questioned Russian role for Armenia’s security and statehood. In contrast of Armenia’s integration in western organization it never hindered of strategic cooperation to Russia. The “Russia first” strategy in Armenia was major approach for his foreign policy, as Aram Tarzyan, brings Khocarian’s words in his publication “Russia is our pivotal partner which does not preclude us from establishing new relationships with the European Union, the United States of America and Iran” (Terzyan, <http://ysu.am>). As a result Armenia-Russian Relation has continued and in 2007, Armenian side in his National security strategy notes that Russia as major foreign ally, trade and economic partner while reiterating Russian role as mediator in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The major part had strategic partnership, where Moscow remains supplier for Armenian Military, which contributes security to Armenia. According to Armenia’s National security strategy document “the Russian Federation, thereby easing Armenia’s energy dependence” (ETH Zurich, 2007). Document also mentions Russia as strategic partner for Armenia:” bilateral relations with Russia, with defense and technical military cooperation, through strategic partnership between the two states” (ETH Zurich, 2007). Russia remains external security guarantor for Armenia, “Russia’s role for the security of Armenia, the traditional friendly links between the two nations” (ETH Zurich, 2007) which provides economic and trade relations between Moscow and Yerevan, and as a result goods turn over in 2008 increased by 9.5 comparing to previous years and “the volume of private transfers from Russia to Armenia reached \$1 billion per year” (Ghazinyan, 2010) . At the end of an

official document Armenia express hopes that this cooperation would deepen in the future which give more prosperity and stability to the Caucasian region. Yerevan envisaged “great importance to its cooperation with Russia in the areas of defense, military-technical relations, energy, transportation, regional stability and security” (ETH Zurich, 2007).

It is important to stress that, Armenia is only CIS member who maintains its military base since Soviet times. For Yerevan as it underlines, Gyumri base and Russian presence is serving only Armenia’s security and Russia’s imperial ambitions, and cooperation with Moscow on that fields counterbalancing “Azerbaijani and Turkish potential threats” (Geukjian, 2016, p. 242) At first year of Independence, Russia had helped Armenia to deter Turkish aggression and settle conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, but that cooperation has a price which reflects Yerevan and its people nowadays. A closer relationship with Russia had cut off Yerevan from international projects, therefore Armenia’s foreign policy become with strong consideration of Russian position. Armenia’s economic blockade by Turkey and Azerbaijan continued after de-escalation of Nagorno-Karabakh war, as a result Armenian national income fell 12 percent. The blockade coincided severe energy shortages and unemployment was running above 50 percent. The war in Nagorno-Karabakh and as a result economic blockade exhausted Armenian economy as Stephen M. Saideman, R. William Ayres describes “Thus, irredentism seems to have taken a serious economic toll” (Stephen M. Saideman, 2015, p. 92)

As an entrance of Russia, Caucasian politics, Turkey had strategic and security concerns. Rooted to historical rivalry between Imperial Russia and an Ottoman empires, “this perception continued to shape Turkey’s outlook on Russian policies in the Caspian Region.” (Robert Ebel, 2000, p. 237) Increased Russian involvement in Caucasian region had limited Turkish regional aspirations and constrained Ankara expanding further role to shaping more effective foreign policy which oriented on South Caucasus. Ankara’s inability was result of Moscow’s action against Azerbaijan’s president Abulfaz Elchibey, who overthrown by Russian backed rebellion in 1992. Growing of military cooperation between Yerevan and Moscow during 90’s, as a result transferring high tech weaponry in Gyumri base such as S-300 missiles and Mig-29 fighter jets to Armenia, had heightened Turkish security concern in the region. “Growing Russian military presence close to Turkish borders could lead to the expansion of Turkey’s military ties with

Azerbaijan” (Robert Ebel, 2000) Follow that argument military and security cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey had increased significantly, they signed several agreements which protects sovereignty of Azerbaijan and Turkey from incursion. Turkish military firms had provide assistance to Azerbaijani’s military companies, consequently Baku had improved its military industries. In a contrast to Armenia and Georgia, currently Azerbaijan has high-tech weapons and military facilities.

3.1 Prosperous Neighbor but Historical Enemy

When we are talking Armenia and Turkey we should consider ongoing diplomatic relations between them, and how that relations had constrained under historical memory or as in Armenian case we have used, how perpetually actual phenomenon or genocide affects evolution of Turkish Armenian Relations. As a result of Nagorno-Karabakh and rapprochement with Russia, Yerevan become landlocked between two neighbors Azerbaijan and Turkey and excluded from energetic projects which gave significant income to Georgia. During Nagorno-Karabakh war Turkey had locked the border with Armenia:” One of the unpleasant diplomatic byproducts of Yerevan’s dispute with Baku over Nagorno-Karabakh was Turkey’s decision in 1993 to close its 204-mile-long border with Armenia in a show of solidarity with Azerbaijan” (Daly, 2008). When Rober Khocharian become president of Armenia, he took also radical steps against Turkey, he denounced Turkish actions during Karabakh war and blamed Ankara in sparking of conflict. Turkey as major bridge between Armenia and European Union and after Khocharian’s critical allegations, hindered to Yerevan’s rapprochement with European Union. As 2007’s National Security Strategy of Armenia, normalization relations with Turkey “would help to create a more conducive environment for the final settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” (ETH Zurich, 2007) even official document had expressed restoration of diplomatic relations an absence of any preconditions toward Turkey. (Terzyan, Yerevan State University, 2015). But an idea of absence of precondition was only words in paper in real life Turkey had always aggressive approach toward Armenia and Azerbaijan, while Armenia is always fight for acknowledgment of genocide. As Aram Terzyan brings idea that under Khocharyan Armenia was always “important neighbor and historical foe, characterized by non-European policy and belligerent rhetoric.” (Terzyan, Yerevan

State University, 2015) For Khocharian, Turkey remained major impediment of sustainable development and obstacle to Armenia's European integration.

However when AKP(Turkish-*Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi in English Justice and Development Party*) came to power in 2002, intended to open new chepter Turkish-Armenian relations, "rapproachment with Turkey was pro-democracy agenda" (Elanchenny, 2012). Early steps of rapproachment was took by Abdullah Gul, who was Foreign minsiter of Turkey, he had several times met his Armenian counterpart Vartan Oskanian, at internation conferences in 2003 and 2004. After him on April, 2005, Erdogan sent to Robert Khocharyan and official letter, where he talking about creation ogroups whit an historians and other experts form Armenia and Turkey to investigate Genocide, but Kocharyan rejected Erdogan's proposal. After several efforts which was mediated by United States between Ankara and Yerevan had no result. But ice melted after 2008, Ankara and Yerevan had opened doors and started several efforts of rapprochement, Armenian president Serj Sargisian had invited Turkish president Abdullah Gül to visit Yerevan and to attend football matches between Armenian national team against Turkey, "What has come to be known as football (soccer) diplomacy began with an invitation to Turkish President Gül from his Armenian counterpart, Serzh Sarkisian " (Akyurt, 2011). The importance of developed nature of Turkish-Armenian relation first of all for Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, where Ankara will become mediator between parties and second reason is increasing of Turkish regional role in Caucasus. (Akyurt, 2011). As a result Foreign ministers from Ankara and Armenian had signed protocols in Switzerland 2009, with a presence of several diplomats' from EU and United States:" among them United States secretary of state Hillary Clinton, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner, European Union foreign-policy chief Javier Solana - reflects the geopolitical importance of the deal." (CHETERIAN, 2009). When protocols signed and disclosed to public both Ankara and Yerevan confirmed state borders which was given due to this moment, also condemned terrorism and expressed goals for cooperation in security, sides also agreed to conduct mutual meetings of ministers and conduct mutual consultations. Protocols also envisaged to starting of measures to restore trade relations and promote tourism business among them.

However, outcome of this relations was unpleasant for diaspora, which had started bitter critics of Serj Sargysyan. “Diaspora organizations opposed the rapprochement and Sargysyan was roundly criticized in a number of public meetings” (Waal T. d., 2013). An important thing about documents was the genocide, which angered diaspora. Consequently, there was specific and vague commitment from Armenian side “sub-commission of historical dimension to implement dialogue” (Waal T. d., 2013). That approach tacitly revised idea of genocide, and at the same time for diaspora the creation of sub-commission was an expression lack of reference to genocide which promised impossibility of rapprochement. Turkish activities angered Azerbaijan too, In Baku they had removed Turkish flag form World War I memorial, which means that Azerbaijanis was furious about Ankara’s rapprochement with Armenia. The failure of “football diplomacy” was close, skepticism firstly expressed by Prime Minister Erdogan, who received 11 parliamentarians from Baku, after he travelled in Azerbaijan and reiterate Turkish historical support in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict at behalf to Azerbaijan.

The difficulty of rapprochement lied in heart of both sides, Ankara was trying to neglect Kars Treaty, which promotes Turkish goal to deflect and delay of recognition of Armenia genocide. Turkish position and protocols “by creating a process that deters foreign powers from intervening and putting pressure on Turkey, and by granting Turkey the formal possibility of questioning the genocide. (CHETERIAN, 2009) The next issue which hindered rapprochement was Turkish position in Nagorno-Karabakh, where Erdogan emphasized that Armenia should withdraw from conflict regions its troops. Foreign minister Davitoglu also reinterpreted Erdogan’s idea and added:” not only in Karabakh but also the seven Azerbaijani districts adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh that are under occupation.” (GMT, 2009) For Armenia, Serj Sargisian’s diplomacy toward Anakara become sensitive for his citizens and also large diaspora nationalist party “Dasnaktsutiun”. This party has strong economic and political links to Armenian diaspora who always has an anti-Turkish approach, critics are coming from diaspora and ordinary citizens, ratification of protocols promised schism between Armenian diaspora and government, the diaspora who were descendant of scattered population after genocide were persistently opposing non-precondition of Armenian genocide in diplomatic talks, the diaspora who had played great role creation of “perpetually actual phenomenon” and created aspiration of “pedagogical function” (Nora, 1989)

was impossible delay bitterness of genocide and what them making furious is Turkish non-acknowledgment policy of genocide. Thus, Armenia and Turkey had entered in negotiations without consideration of outcome form it, Turkey neglected Azerbaijani side simultaneously Armenian neglected Diaspora community, which are persistently fights for recognition of Genocide, which is contradictory for Ankara's diplomacy.

Theoretical explanation

In order to explain hypothesis: *Turkish aggressive foreign policy after the dissolution of USSR, which threatened to Armenia and promised incursion, had influenced foreign policy of Yerevan and choose pro-Russian vector and deepened military cooperation with Moscow*, I will use theory of Neo-Realism. To be more precise and explain Russian-Armenian strategic and military cooperation, therefore to explain behavior of Armenia, Stephen M. Walt's idea of The Origins of Alliances will be used. He explains alliance formation in a different scenarios which factors has an influence of such behavior, hence we should pay attention to Armenia's behavior and compare it two approach of alliance, which are: Balancing or Bandwagoning.

- Balancing Behavior - according this approach states join other states in alliance to protect themselves from aggressor states or alliances, "whose superior resources could pose a threat" (Walt, 1990)
- Bandwagoning Behavior - the essence of that approach is that states attracted by strength, the more power means more alliances/bandwagoners. Author identify two major reason of batwagoning: First is form of appeasement when weaker states are trying to avoid any confrontation with strong entity. Second is: "state may align with the dominant side in wartime in order to share the spoils of victory" (Walt, 1990, p. 21)

In regard of Armenia, Balancing behavior explains, hence it help us to underline Russian-Armenian strategic cooperation in frames of balance vis-a-vis Turkey.

The major driving force which formulated alliance are threats, author underlines: "the force that bring states together and drive them apart will affect the security of individual states by determining both how large a threat face and how much help they can expect" (Walt, 1990). Moreover factors which are inducing alliance formations are shaping international system as well. Author also paying attention to the outcome of alliance formation decision, which he coined as a "grand strategy", however we should follow on that approach to underline Armenia's behavior and clarify how the "grand strategy" of Armenia provides security (or not) to it. Our focus will also be on foreign aid of Armenia, as we know large number of foreign capital are coming from Russia,

Moscow is major arms supplier for Armenia and theory of alliance formation reviews that moment as well. As author underlines “one central issue is how states respond to threats” (Walt, 1990, p. 3) and by that approach to evaluate Russian-Armenian relations in contrast of foreign aid is also proper way of explanation. Next issue which help to explain Armenia’s behavior is an alliance preference, the essence of this idea is cultural and ideological affinity toward preferred one. Those issues have significant effect on alliance formation.

In regard to balancing behavior, after the dissolution of Soviet Union and aggressive foreign policy of Turkey toward Armenia, pledged Armenia’s policymakers and formed alliance with Russia. According of author “states join to balance for two reasons: the first reason is they placed their survival at risk if they fail to curb a potential hegemon before it becomes too strong” (Walt, 1990, p. 18) Therefore, after Soviet Russia crumbled and Turkish active steps toward foreign policy become sensitive, it reflects risks for Armenia. Henceforth “To ally with dominant power means placing one’s trust in its continued benevolence” (Walt, 1990, p. 18). The strategic partnership between Armenia and Russia reflects alliance of weaker side with strong. The second reason of balancing is better for strong side, as author mentioned “joining the weaker side increases the new member’s influence within the alliance” (Walt, 1990, p. 19) .We can assume that Armenia has greater need for assistance and Russia as strong ally, had easily influenced to it.

In the origins of alliances to take in depth look, we must see that precursor of alliance formation are threats consequently alliance must resist and deter it. Author underlined level of threats that states may pose: “aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power and aggressive intentions” (Walt, 1990, p. 22)

In aggregate power author conceptualize “population, industrial and military capabilities and technological prowess “which pose threats for states. In Armenia’s case military power of Turkey which significantly improved and increased after dissolution of the USSR, was serious concern of security for Yerevan.

Next threat which provoke states to create alliance, is offensive power. Walt explains it as follow: “offensive power is ability to threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of another state at an acceptable cost.” (Walt, 1990, p. 24) But simultaneously we must pay attention to

territorial proximity of states, if states are closely or neighbors, possibility of confrontation will increase. Geographic proximity of Turkey and Azerbaijan, with combination to offensive power, had influence Armenia's decision to balance it by Russia.

Author after those factors underlined aggressive intentions. When states strategy based on expression of aggressive foreign policy and actions against other entities. Aggressive intention is major factor for states, it establish perceptions between each other. If state is believed as an aggressor, "balancing with others may be the only way to avoid" (Walt, 1990, p. 26) become a victim. As in 1992, aggressive intentions of Turkey was major driven force for Armenia and joined Russian led Collective security Treaty Organization, and joined defence alliance to Russia. "The more aggressive or expansionist a state appears to be, the more likely it is to trigger an opposing coalition" (Walt, 1990, p. 26)

When Alliance formed, it brings strategic cooperation. In that case, we should pay attention foreign aid which is coming from, ally/allies and sometimes accomplished monopoly of Supply of an Important Asset. Stephen M.Walt wrote: "The more aid, the tighter the resulting alliance" (Walt, 1990, p. 41) that approach helps to explain economic and military assistance programs between allies. In regard to Armenia, which is receiving lot of capital and assistance from Russian federation, linked to Moscow's spheres of influence in military, economy and energetic fields. However we can say, that migrant workers of Armenia who are working in Russia are "economic assistance" from Moscow. Aram Terzyan in his publication: "Armenia's foreign policy between European identity and Eurasian Integration," wrote as follow: "evidence suggests that permanent flows of Armenian migrant workers to Russia in recent years have catalyzed substantial increase in cash transfers from there making up around 9.1 % of Armenia's GDP". (Terzyan, Yerevan State University, 2015) Monopolizing of important assets increases hegemony of supplier. The Logic here is simple: "when aid is especially valuable and when alternatives are nonexistent, recipients will be more willing to follow donor's preferences in order to obtain assistance" (Walt, 1990, p. 43). Armenia after dissolution of the USSR, has become most insular state in world, the natural resources was impossible to transfer from Azerbaijan and economic cooperation with Turkey halted. "Energy security concerns and namely Armenia's heavy

dependence on Russian energy supply, which was skilfully used by Russia” (Terzyan, Yerevan State University, 2015), has placed Russia in superior places.

After the significant victories of Armenia in 1992 over Azerbaijan in Khojaly, Turkish invasion was significant, to balance Turkish and Azerbaijani threats Armenia had formed alliance with Russian Federation. Moscow at this moment pursued “near abroad” policy, consequently Armenia’s allegiance handled by it. From 1992 Armenia and Russia become allies, Russian side had provides lot of assistance on military economic and energetic fields. Armenia is major purchaser of Russian arms in south Caucasus. Russia is major trade partner and “also maintains lead in the realm of foreign investments in Armenia” (Terzyan, Yerevan State University, 2015)

Taken together all factors which precise Russian-Armenian strategic partnership, we can assume Armenia as a weak state balanced Turkish threats. When Turkish incursion was obvious (1992) and war in Nagorno-Karabakh against Azerbaijan, Russia from Armenia’s point of view deemed as a “great power capable of rapid and effective action” (Walt, 1990, p. 30)

The next theoretical explanation of “Turkish aggressive foreign policy and threats to Armenia, had influenced Armenia’s foreign policy and chose pro-Russian foreign policy” hypothesis is theory of constructivism.

The core element of constructivism is “irreducibly intersubjective dimension of human action” (KAUPPI, 2012, p. 278) which helps humanity to understand a reality. Norms, identities, rules, that affects our reality that conception are infused in social structure, are major for international relations and international politics. The constructivism views the world as a project always under construction “ (KAUPPI, 2012, p. 279) The constructivism understanding of international relations theory consider security dilemma between states but it is infused by intersubjective understandings and “states are prone to make worst-case assumptions about one another’s intentions” (KAUPPI, 2012, p. 284). In security dilemma states are under self-help, and seek allies or coalitions.

The one of the major issue for constructivism understanding is identity “special understandings and expectations about one’s self” (KAUPPI, 2012, p. 287) it is produced by with an interaction of others. Identities are based on human consciousness and are mutually

constituted “thus (identities) constitutes the other” (KAUPPI, 2012, p. 287). If we consider Turkish-Armenian relations during World War I from constructivist understanding international relations, which is infused by intersubjective understandings and “social relationship” Armenian people had identified themselves as anti-Turkish. Those perceptions based on norms and rules above historical memory, as Pierre Nora’s history is always:” the reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer” (Nora, 1989). From that perspective, Armenian identity was influenced, consequently constructivism underlines: ‘influences on identities can stem from any number of sources” (KAUPPI, 2012, p. 288), it might be influenced by gender, religion, race or ideologies. Genocide, which had precise Armenian identity had become “Memory” (Nora, 1989), “perpetually actual phenomenon, a bond tying” of Armenian nation “to the eternal present” (Nora, 1989).

However, genocide constructed Armenian identity and Turks become foes. After outbreak war in Nagorno-Karabakh Turkey had appeared as enemy and sometimes Turkish and Azerbaijani has mentioned by same notion as Turks. “Therefore, is not limited to perceptions of another actor being friend or foe” (KAUPPI, 2012, p. 289). From that view, Armenian perception was stigmatized by Genocide memory and political agenda of policymaker and even ordinary people had soaked by “perpetually actual phenomenon” (Nora, 1989) and expectations from Ankara was promising future obliteration to Armenia and Turkey with its policymakers started form Turgur Ozal and Suleiman Demirel become foes for statehood and Armenian “Hai Dat”.

Summary

The strategic cooperation between Armenia and Russia started after the dissolution of Soviet Union, relations between two states are staunch and Armenia is entangled in Russian auspices. Yerevan is part of Russian geopolitics, and strong cooperation in security, economic and political level turns Yerevan on Russia orbit. As a result Moscow's imperial ambitions for Armenia hindered from rapprochement with west and excluded Armenia from strategic energetic projects which involved its neighbors. To be more precise research question was formed as follow: "**Which factors defined strategic partnership between Armenia and Russia?**" From research we can see that rapprochement of Armenia and Russia started after 1992, when Armenia had achieved significant victories in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and after when ceasefire agreement reached between Baku and Yerevan. At this moment Moscow become mediator between conflict and at the same time protector of Armenia's statehood from external treats and in 1995 re-opened military base in Gyumri.

The thesis examines origins of Turkish "active foreign" policy as a major factor for Armenia and its security. Turkish active "foreign policy" after dissolution of USSR characterized as an incremental behavior and promised important challenge for the region, and especially for Armenia. Yerevan, at this time fought against Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh and Turkey was ardent political and diplomatic supporter of Azerbaijan. According research hypothesis "active foreign policy of Ankara" is an independent variables and Armenia's behavior which brings it pro-Russian orientation as a dependent variables.

While operationalization variables, thesis reviews Turkish-Armenian historical relations at the beginning of 20th century and after the dissolution of the USSR. In contrast of historical relations, historical memory had a big influence over Armenia. As Pierre Nora described a memory "installs remembrance within the sacred" which after becomes "perpetually actual phenomenon" (Nora, 1989). As a result, genocide which inherited from Turkey become sacred phenomenon for Armenians and historical tribulations which eternally dinted in Armenian nation has an influence over future. The memory of bitterness from Turkey has implemented eternal idea of salvation. Moreover historical memory's relation with Armenian nation as a natural

currency (Nora, 1989) and diaspora's efforts which had burdened "pedagogical authority to transmit values" (Nora, 1989) of genocide had a big influence over Armenian's perceptions. Diaspora has diligently intensified efforts of acknowledgment of Armenia's genocide, which directly affects also Armenia's foreign policy, because diaspora has huge influence inside Armenia and its political agenda.

Consequently, after attempted rapprochement by Levon Ter-Petrosyan with Turkey, which caused political disagreement into Armenia, had failed because perceptions of historical tribulations of Armenian nation prevailed. Simultaneously in regard of Armenia's activities in Nagorno-Karabakh, which promised again Turkish invasion and involvement into Nagorno-Karabakh had shaken Armenian population, Diaspora and policymakers. To follow research which is closely examines Turkish treats for Armenia and historical rivalry and again that trends emerged after dissolution of the Soviet Union. Turkish threats of invasion in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh in behalf of Azerbaijan had influenced Yerevan. As a result research hypothesis is formulated: *"Turkish aggressive foreign policy after the dissolution of USSR, which threatened to Armenia and promised incursion, had influenced foreign policy of Yerevan and choose pro-Russian vector and deepened strategic cooperation with Moscow."* The next issue which developed during research is a result of that cooperation and its outcome for Armenia or **how this cooperation reduce security threats from Turkey?** As we can clarify from research Russian base had significantly ensured safety for Armenia and produce security concerns for Turkey and Azerbaijan. As a result Turkish threats decreased, and after Baku and Ankara had deepened military cooperation in contrast of Armenia and Russia. Armenia's pro-Russian orientation and joining of Russian led security organizations, ensured for Yerevan to retain Nagorno-Karabakh but also occupied extra territories of Azerbaijan. But those victories has it price, Russia as military and diplomatic supporter of Armenia had achieved total influence on Armenia and handled indispensable assets of Armenia's economy. Russia as a "big brother" fully involved in economy, Moscow is major arms supplier for Armenia, which increased dependence on Russia. Russian partnership which provides also foreign aid, gives special levers over Armenia, in contrast of our theory of alliance chooses which underlines: "economic or military assistance creates effective allies" (Walt, 1990) according author it evokes "sense of gratitude." The

provision of assistance “gives suppliers significant leverage over recipient” (Walt, 1990). Russian influence had proved in Armenia’s National Security Concept where Moscow depicted as an external power which ensured Armenia’s energetic crisis and its security, Moscow’s existence have never been question in Yerevan’s political agenda. As a result of under frames of historical memory, “football diplomacy” and any attempts of rapprochement with Turkey failed. Armenian cannot yielding its approach for “perpetually actual phenomenon” (Nora, 1989) which is uncompromised in relations with Ankara.

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